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Re´sume´
L
e de´veloppement durable stimule´ par une croissance auto-entretenue et qui, de par
sa nature, garantirait le recul de la pauvrete´ de fac¸on substantielle, est un the`me
qui a rec¸u beaucoup d’attention dans des cercles de re´flexion, autant dans les milieux
acade´miques que politiques, et occupe une place importante sur la liste des priorite´s
d’actions-cibles dans l’orientation des politiques e´conomiques pense´es par les pays de´velop-
pe´s. L’aide est conside´re´e comme un outil qui permet de promouvoir le de´veloppement
durable et de lutter contre la pauvrete´ et les ine´galite´s ; c’est ainsi un important instrument
de la politique de de´veloppement imple´mente´e par les e´conomies de´veloppe´es vis-a`-vis des
e´conomies en de´veloppement.
La conviction commune que l’aide, en tant que source additionnelle de financement
pour les pays pauvres (pays re´cipiendaires qui manquent de ressources domestiques et dont
l’acce`s aux marche´s internationaux de capitaux est limite´ et couˆteux) permet a` ces pays
d’obtenir un niveau suffisamment e´leve´ de fonds d’investissements qui, a` leur tour, stimu-
lent la croissance, a domine´ le discours international sur le de´veloppement. Les supporteurs
de l’aide (Sachs, Stiglitz, Stern) mettent en avant les succe`s de l’aide dans les cas des pays
comme Botswana, Indone´sie, Core´e, Tanzanie ou Mozambique (Radelet, 2006). Lorsque
l’aide fait partie d’une strate´gie cohe´rente de de´veloppement impliquant une coope´ration
e´troite entre les pays de´veloppe´s et les pays en de´veloppement, et lorsqu’elle est de´ploye´e de
manie`re efficace, elle est porteuse d’effets durables sur le de´veloppement. Cette strate´gie
exige la mise en place par les pays de´veloppe´s d’un mix de politiques relatives a` l’aide, au
commerce, a` l’investissement et a` la migration, en accord avec les objectives de de´veloppe-
ment. Elle exige en meˆme temps que les pays en de´veloppement multiplient leurs efforts
pour ame´liorer la qualite´ de leurs politiques et institutions, dont notamment la qualite´ de
la gouvernance.
Il s’ave`re ne´anmoins que l’expe´rience ne´gative des pays pauvres qui n’ont re´alise´s que
des maigres progre`s en de´pit des montants important d’aide rec¸us (e.g. le Tchad, la
Re´publique De´mocratique de Congo, la Somalie, et de nombreux pays d’Asie de Sud) a
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remis en question le bien-fonde´ de l’aide (Radelet, 2006). Les critiques de l’aide (Friedman,
Bauer, Easterly, Ditchter) soutiennent que l’aide a e´te´ souvent contre-productive car elle a
contribue´ a` enrichir les e´lites au pouvoir, peu soucieuses de la redistribution des montants
rec¸us. D’autres voix expliquent les e´checs de l’aide par le fait que les donneurs privile´gient
leurs inte´reˆts strate´giques, politiques et commerciaux, plutoˆt que les besoins des pays
receveurs.
Pour comprendre comment l’aide est devenue un outil important de la politique de
de´veloppement, le chapitre pre´liminaire de cette the`se pre´sente une synthe`se des questions
lie´es a` l’histoire de l’aide depuis sa formalisation en tant que concept dans la litte´rature.
Le chapitre propose un historique de l’aide publique au de´veloppement et esquisse la dy-
namique e´volution de son roˆle, de ses objectifs et des implications de politique e´conomique,
au cours du demi-sie`cle dernier. La deuxie`me partie du chapitre est consacre´e aux questions
me´thodologiques (de´finitions et mesures de l’aide) et aussi aux faits stylise´s sur l’e´volution
en termes de flux ainsi que sa re´partition ge´ographique, avec un accent mis sur les pays
de l’Europe de l’Est.
Les objectifs de l’aide ont e´volue´ au fil du temps sous l’effet conjoint de changements
d’orientation e´conomique et de la transformation des enjeux ge´opolitiques. Les analyses
de l’historique de l’e´volution de l’aide (Riddell, 1987; Krueger, Michalopoulos et Ruttan,
1989; Schulpen et Hoebink, 1998; Thorbecke 2000) permettent d’identifier plusieurs phases
durant lesquelles l’aide internationale a soutenu des objectifs diffe´rents.
Ainsi, l’origine de l’aide internationale remonte a` la pe´riode coloniale, pe´riode pendant
laquelle elle re´pondait principalement a` la logique d’inte´reˆts particuliers (e´conomiques et
politiques) des “Me´tropoles”. Dans sa forme moderne, le concept d’aide tire ses origines
du Plan Marshall mis en oeuvre apre`s la seconde guerre mondiale. Le contexte e´tait
tel que les pays de´truits par la guerre avaient besoin de reconstruire leurs e´conomies,
et l’aide internationale e´tait conside´re´e comme un instrument financier permettant de
de´gager des flux ne´cessaires au de´veloppement e´conomique des pays re´cipiendaires. Les
motivations des donneurs e´taient fondamentalement d’ordre moral, et dans une moindre
mesure politiques ou` e´conomiques. Ne´anmoins, la priorite´ n’e´tait toujours pas donne´e au
pays en de´veloppement, mais aux pays occidentaux. Le Plan Marshall a e´te´ un succe`s
et a conforte´ la conviction que l’aide pourrait contribuer a` la transformation rapide des
e´conomies be´ne´ficiaires.
Les strate´gies de de´veloppement des anne´es cinquante et soixante se sont ainsi tourne´es
vers les pays en de´veloppement et ont e´te´ alors centre´es sur la croissance e´conomique
conside´re´e comme le re´sultat de la modernisation par l’investissement et l’accumulation du
capital et de l’e´pargne. Le roˆle de l’aide dans ce contexte e´tait d’alimenter l’investissement
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et de combler ainsi l’e´cart entre une e´pargne domestique insuffisante et l’e´pargne ne´cessaire
a` la croissance1. Dans les anne´es soixante, les priorite´s de l’activite´ e´conomique telles que
l’industrialisation par la planification e´conomique, la nationalisation et la substitution aux
importations2 apparaissent progressivement insuffisantes au de´veloppement e´conomique.
Les anne´es soixante-dix ont e´te´ caracte´rise´es par l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des objectifs de l’aide
au de´veloppement. S’ajoutant au tout premier objectif, celui de la croissance e´conomique
des pays en de´veloppement, la re´duction de la pauvrete´ par la lutte contre les ine´galite´s
et la satisfaction des besoins de base devient une priorite´ des strate´gies de de´veloppement
et entraˆıne une nouvelle perception du roˆle de l’aide internationale. Cependant, plusieurs
approches ont oriente´ les strate´gies d’aide au de´veloppement: (i) une approche reliant la
croissance et la redistribution des revenus (Chenery et al., 1974) et s’appuyant sur la mise
en place d’un syste`me de transferts vers les plus pauvres; (ii) l’approche dite des “besoins
fondamentaux”3 avec l’ide´e d’une ne´cessite´ de redistribuer, dans une certaine mesure, les
dotations initiales et de mettre en place des changements structurels (Thorbecke 2000);
(iii) une approche fonde´e sur une redistribution des terres favorisant ainsi l’adoption d’un
mode`le collectiviste. A cette pe´riode, le financement des projets dans le de´veloppement ru-
ral, l’agriculture, l’e´ducation et la sante´ devenait une priorite´ pour les donneurs bilate´raux
et multilate´raux.
L’e´mergence des crises de la dette et les de´ficits des balances de paiements survenus au
de´but des anne´es quatre-vingt dans les e´conomies de´veloppe´es ont eu pour conse´quences
des re´percussions importantes sur les politiques e´conomiques des pays en de´veloppement.
La mise en oeuvre des re´formes de stabilisation macroe´conomique et d’ajustement struc-
turel devenait l’objectif principal des politiques e´conomiques visant a` atteindre l’e´quilibre
macroe´conomique. Dans ce contexte, le roˆle de l’aide d’une part, e´tait de soutenir la
dette publique, et d’autre part, de contribuer a` la mise en place des politiques macroe´-
conomiques et d’ajustement structurel approprie´es. L’objectif de l’aide internationale
changeait donc fondamentalement dans les anne´es quatre-vingt. C’est dans ce cadre que
le concept de conditionnalite´ apparut en imposant aux pays be´ne´ficiaires des conditions
pour d’allocation de l’aide. Ge´ne´ralement, cette conditionnalite´ e´tait associe´e a` l’aide
multilate´rale provenant des organisations internationales, telles que le Fond Mone´taire
International (FMI), la Banque Mondiale ou les banques de de´veloppement - la Banque
1Rostow (1956), dans sa the´orie des “e´tapes de la croissance e´conomique” identifie plusieurs e´tapes du
de´veloppement e´conomique: les socie´te´s traditionnelles, les socie´te´s ayant atteint les pre´-conditions au
de´collage, le de´collage, la phase de maturite´, et la socie´te´ de consommation.
2Il s’agit pour les pays dont l’e´conomie est de´pendante des importations (des produits manufacture´s)
de les sustituer a` une production nationale en mettant en place de barrie`res tarifaires ou non tarifaires.
3Les besoins qualifie´s de fondamentaux sont: (i) un minimum de consommation vitale (alimentaire,
habillement); (ii) des services sociaux propose´s a` la communaute´ dans son ensemble, tels que l’acce`s a`
l’eau potable, aux soins me´dicales et a` l’e´ducation.
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interame´ricaine de de´veloppement (BID), la Banque africaine de de´veloppement (BAfD),
etc. Ne´anmoins, tout donneur bilate´ral e´tait libre d’imposer, dans une certaine mesure,
ses propres conditions a` l’allocation de l’aide.
De plus, la conjoncture de´favorable a` l’aide internationale qui s’e´tait installe´e suite
aux crises e´conomiques et aux contraintes budge´taires auxquelles e´taient confronte´s la
plupart des donneurs, a conduit, au de´but des anne´es quatre-vingt-dix, a` une re´duction
assez importante des flux d’aides vers les pays en de´veloppement. Notamment, c’est sur
le fond de cette diminution des montants d’aide fournis que le de´bat sur l’efficacite´ de
l’aide internationale a e´te´ relance´ par la Banque Mondiale dans le rapport “Assessing
Aid” (1998). Fonde´ sur les travaux de Brurnside et Dollar (2000), la Banque Mondiale
s’est montre´e ouverte a` l’ide´e selon laquelle l’efficacite´ de l’aide du point de vue de la
croissance e´conomique de´pendait de la qualite´ des politiques e´conomiques mene´es dans les
pays receveurs. Par conse´quent, si l’aide au de´veloppement se re´ve´lait plus efficace dans
les e´conomies ayant mis en place de bonnes politiques e´conomiques, alors ces pays devaient
eˆtre re´compense´s par des montants plus e´leve´s d’aide. L’efficacite´ de l’aide est devenue
ainsi une priorite´ pour les bailleurs de fonds. Le concept de conditionnalite´ de l’aide a
e´te´ embrasse´ par la communaute´ internationale, donnant ainsi naissance au concept de
se´lectivite´ qui consiste a` cibler l’aider vers les pays susceptibles a` l’utiliser de manie`re plus
efficace.
Ne´anmoins, cette approche n’a pas e´te´ exempte de critiques. En premier lieu il con-
vient de rappeler les critiques portant sur la restriction du champ des facteurs de´ter-
minant l’efficacite´ de l’aide a` seulement trois, a` savoir l’inflation, la balance budge´taire
et l’ouverture commerciale (Lensink et White 2000). D’autres facteurs, tels que la vul-
ne´rabilite´ des pays be´ne´ficiaires aux chocs externes, les conflits et les situations de post-
conflit (Chauvet et Guillaumont 2001) devraient occuper aussi une place importante dans
une analyse en terme d’efficacite´ de l’aide sur la croissance. Il est important de signaler
e´galement les critiques lie´es aux impre´cisions me´thodologiques. Ainsi, la spe´cification
e´conome´trique a e´te´ conside´re´e inapproprie´e et les re´sultats manquer de robustes (Hanse
et Tarp, 2000, 2001). La validite´ des re´sultats a apparu sensible a` l’inclusion ou l’omission
des observations (Roodman, 2003; Easterly et al., 2003; Jensen et Paldam, 2003).
Le milieu des anne´es quatre-vingt-dix a apporte´ du nouveau dans le de´bat sur l’impact
de l’aide sur la croissance e´conomique avec la prise en compte de la qualite´ institutionnelle
des re´cipiendaires dans l’analyse de l’efficacite´ de l’aide (Durbarry, Gemmell et Greenaway
1998 ; Hansen et Tarp 2000, 2001). Puisque la mauvaise qualite´ des institutions et un cadre
re´glementaire inade´quat sont des facteurs qui peuvent nuire a` la croissance et a` la bonne
gestion du de´veloppement, ils sont e´galement susceptibles d’affecter l’usage des ressources
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financie`res rec¸ues. La question de la “bonne gouvernance” devient ainsi une pre´occupation
des bailleurs de fonds.
Cependant, si les questions d’aide au de´veloppement n’ont pendant longtemps concerne´
que les pays en de´veloppement, la chute du mur de Berlin s’est traduit par une re´orien-
tation des flux d’aide vers de nouveaux be´ne´ficiaires, tels que les pays d’Europe Centrale
et Orientale (PECO) et la Communaute´ d’Etats Inde´pendants (CEI). Le succe`s du Plan
Marshall dans la restructuration des e´conomies de´truites par la seconde guerre mondiale
a amene´ la communaute´ internationale a` l’ide´e qu’un Plan Marshall pour les e´conomies
en transition pouvait eˆtre l’instrument ne´cessaire pour mener a` bien leur transformation
en e´conomies de marche´. La mise en oeuvre de cette transformation a e´te´ recommande´e
par les organisations e´conomiques internationales implique´es dans les recommandations
de politiques e´conomiques, i.e. la Banque Mondiale et le FMI. Ces institutions ont abouti
au Consensus de Washington4 qui s’appuyait sur des re´formes de stabilisation macroe´-
conomique, libe´ralisation et privatisation. Si un consensus existait quant a` la ne´cessite´
des re´formes, il y avait ne´anmoins un de´bat sur la manie`re de les mettre en place. Deux
points de vue ont alors e´merge´s: la the´rapie de choc et le gradualisme. La the´rapie de choc
consistait a` entreprendre toutes les re´formes a` un rythme acce´le´re´ et de fac¸on simultane´e.
En revanche, le gradualisme recommandait une mise en place des re´formes non toutes
simultane´ment comme le proˆnait la the´rapie de choc, mais par e´tapes, afin de prendre en
compte l’he´ritage du passe´ et ne pas conduire a` l’effondrement de l’e´conomie plutoˆt qu’a`
sa restructuration (Andreff, 2007). Dans la pratique, les programmes mis en place e´taient
souvent un me´lange de ces deux types de strate´gies. Plus tard l’orientation des politiques
e´conomiques a e´te´ porte´e vers la dimension institutionnelle et les changements structurels
(le consensus post-Washington).
Dans ce contexte de transformation, l’he´ritage du communisme ne permettait pas de
de´gager les flux financiers pour mener les changements ne´cessaires afin de baˆtir la struc-
ture de l’e´conomie de marche´. En plus des flux d’investissement directs e´trangers (IDE)
ou d’autres flux financiers prive´s dont ces e´conomies ont pu be´ne´ficier, l’aide repre´sentait
une source importante de financement. L’aide rec¸ue e´tait donc principalement destine´e a`
soutenir la mise en place de reformes voue´es a` libe´raliser, privatiser et stabiliser, ainsi qu’a`
la cre´ation de nouvelles institutions et re´glementations. De plus, les de´se´quilibres survenus
tout au long du processus de transformation, tel que le de´clin de la production et la hausse
de l’inflation, la de´pre´ciation des monnaies domestiques, des de´ficits budge´taires impor-
4Les mesures du Consensus de Washington e´taient les suivantes: (1) discipline budge´taire; (2) re´ori-
entation des de´penses publiques vers les activite´s a` haut rendement et vers une meilleure re´partition
des revenus; (3) re´forme fiscale; (4) libe´ralisation des taux d’inte´reˆt; (5) taux de change compe´titif; (6)
libe´ralisation du commerce; (7) libe´ralisation des investissements e´trangers entrants; (8) privatisation; (9)
de´re´regulation; (10) protection des droits de proprie´te´.
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tants et la de´te´rioration des conditions sociales, ne´cessitaient e´galement des programmes
de stabilisation et d’ajustement structurel. Plusieurs acteurs se sont ainsi implique´s dans
la transformation, l’assistance fournie a` ces pays e´tant caracte´rise´e par une grande di-
versite´ de bailleurs bilate´raux et multilate´raux. L’aide bilate´rale e´manait principalement
des donneurs membres du Comite´ d’Aide au De´veloppement (CAD) de l’Organisation de
Coope´ration et le De´veloppement Economiques (OCDE), alors que l’aide multilate´rale
provenait de l’Union Europe´enne (UE), et des organisations internationales telles que la
Banque Mondiale, le FMI, la Banque Europe´enne d’Investissement (BEI) ou encore la
Banque Europe´enne pour la Reconstruction et le De´veloppement (BERD), cette dernie`re
ayant e´te´ spe´cialement cre´e´e en 1991 pour soutenir la transition.
Il convient de signaler que l’aide a e´te´ assez ine´galement re´partie. Les PECO ont pu
be´ne´ficier, dans le contexte de l’e´largissement de l’UE, de flux plus importants par rapport
a` la CEI, notamment en matie`re d’aide multilate´rale. En effet le processus de re´unification
par l’inte´gration des PECO dans l’UE ne´cessitait une solidarite´ de la part des membres
de l’UE qui s’est refle´te´e dans l’assistance fournie. Cette aide e´tait perc¸ue comme un me´-
canisme efficace permettant d’acque´rir les capacite´s ne´cessaires pour satisfaire les crite`res
e´conomiques et politiques qui de´coulent du statut de membre de l’UE en devenir. L’aide a`
la pre´adhe´sion a e´te´ fournie par le biais de plusieurs instruments. Le tout premier instru-
ment e´tait le programme PHARE d’assistance aux reformes et a` la transition en Pologne
et Hongrie. Si a` l’origine il concernait uniquement ces deux pays, il a e´te´ e´tendu plus
tard a` l’ensemble des PECO pour y soutenir la restructuration e´conomique et les pre´parer
pour l’adhe´sion a` l’UE. Par la suite, a` partir des anne´es 2000, le programme PHARE a e´te´
comple´te´ par d’autres programmes: ISPA - l’instrument structurel de pre´adhe´sion relatif
a` l’environnement et aux transports et SAPARD - l’instrument agricole de pre´adhe´sion
pour le de´veloppement rural et la reprise de l’acquis communautaire dans l’agriculture5.
Pour la CEI, l’aide de l’UE a e´te´ de´livre´e dans le programme TACIS, visant a` favoriser la
transition vers l’e´conomie de marche´ et renforcer la de´mocratie et l’E´tat de droit.
La perspective d’inte´gration dans l’UE et du soutien pre´vu a` cette fin ont eu beau-
coup d’effet sur la transformation institutionnelle des PECO. La ne´cessite´ pour les PECO
d’harmoniser leurs institutions avec celles des membres de l’UE, i.e. l’adoption de l’acquis
communautaire a soutenu encore plus l’orientation de leurs politiques e´conomiques dans sa
dimension institutionnelle. C’est cette pre´paration qui a e´te´ de´terminante dans la trans-
formation institutionnelle des PECO, alors que, dans le processus de transformation de
la CEI ce facteur institutionnel constituait un e´le´ment manquant. Cela explique dans
5Pour la pe´riode 2007-2013 ces trois instruments ont e´te´ remplace´ par l’IAP (instrument d’aide de
pre´adhe´sion) dont be´ne´ficient les pays candidats des Balkans occidentaux et la Turquie. Cette aide est
fournie sur la base des progre`s re´alise´s par les pays be´ne´ficiaires et de leurs besoins
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une certaine mesure le retard accumule´ par ces pays dans leur chemin vers l’e´conomie de
marche´.
En revenant a` la perspective historique de l’aide, il convient de noter qu’a` partir de
milieu des anne´es 1990, l’objectif de lutte contre la pauvrete´ et les ine´galite´s devenait a` nou-
veau l’un des objectifs-cle´ du processus d’allocation de l’aide publique au de´veloppement.
L’adoption en 2000 par les Nations Unis des Objectifs du Mille´naire pour le de´veloppement
est venue soutenir davantage le but ultime de l’aide, a` savoir la re´duction de la pauvrete´
dans les pays en de´veloppement. Le tout premier objectif du Mille´naire est notamment
la re´duction a` moitie´ de la population en dessous du seuil de pauvrete´6, a` l’horizon de
l’an 2015. Les autres objectifs concernent l’e´tablissement d’un niveau d’e´ducation pri-
maire universel dans tous les pays, ou` encore, la re´duction du taux de mortalite´ infantile
et maternelle, ainsi qu’une meilleure accessibilite´ aux soins me´dicaux. Bien que l’aide
se soit tourne´e vers la pauvrete´ dans sa multidimensionalite´, la conditionnalite´ continu-
ait a` dominer le de´bat sur sor efficacite´. Des mode`les d’allocation optimale de l’aide qui
confe`re une place centrale a` l’objectif de re´duction de la pauvrete´ et qui prennent e´gale-
ment en compte la qualite´ des politiques et institutions ont e´te´ propose´s dans des travaux
empiriques (Collier et Dollar, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2002).
La pre´sentation de l’aide dans sa perspective historique a mis en e´vidence la manie`re
dont les objectifs de l’aide (croissance, stabilisation e´conomique, lutte contre la pauvrete´,
etc.) se sont successivement modifie´s a` travers le temps. Elle nous a permis e´galement
d’identifier l’importance de la question de conditionnalite´ dans le de´bat actuel lie´ a` la
proble´matique de l’aide. Ainsi, nous arrivons a` en de´gager le champ d’analyse principal
explore´ a` travers cette the`se, a` savoir les effets et les de´terminants de l’allocation de l’aide.
Nous nous interrogeons sur, d’une part, l’efficacite´ de l’aide qui s’est souvent vue freine´e
a` la fois, par le de´tournement de ses objectifs suite a` une mauvaise gestion dans les pays
be´ne´ficiaires et par le manque de consensus politique de la part de donneurs, et, sur,
d’autre part, les objectifs de l’aide internationale qui n’ont pas toujours e´te´ homoge`nes.
Le but de cette the`se est d’analyser l’aide internationale dans le cadre de la reconstruc-
tion des PECO et de la CEI. Ce sujet complexe est analyse´ sous trois angles diffe´rents,
chacun correspondant a` un chapitre. Les principales questions de recherche souleve´es a`
travers cette the`se sont les suivantes:
• La qualite´ des politiques e´conomiques, l’avancement des re´formes et les conditions
initiales sont-ils des facteurs conditionnant l’efficacite´ de l’aide en termes de crois-
sance ?
6La pauvrete´, telle qu’elle est comprise dans les Objectifs du Mille´naire pour le de´veloppement, se re´fe`re
a` la pauvrete´ mone´taire. Ainsi, est conside´re´ pauvre, toute personne qui doit vivre avec moins d’un dollar
par jour.
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• L’allocation de l’aide re´pond-t-elle aux inte´reˆts des donneurs ou aux besoins et per-
formances des re´cipiendaires ? La gouvernance occupe-t-elle une place importante
dans les de´cisions d’allocation d’aide?
• Y-a-t-il une cohe´rence des politiques au service du de´veloppement en matie`re d’aide
et migration ? L’aide et la migration sont-elles des substituts ou des comple´ments ?
Aide, Politiques et Institutions
La premie`re analyse s’inscrit dans l’e´tude des facteurs de´terminants de la relation aide-
croissance e´conomique. L’impact de l’aide sur la croissance des e´conomies be´ne´ficiaires
repre´sente l’un des the`mes majeurs et fortement de´battus dans la litte´rature autant the´o-
rique qu’empirique sur les questions de de´veloppement. Notons que trois grands courants
de pense´e se de´gagent des e´tudes empiriques: (i) l’aide n’a aucun impact sur la croissance
et peut meˆme la freiner (Mosley et al. 1987, 1992; Boone, 1995); (ii) l’aide a ge´ne´ralement
un impact positif sur la croissance, mais avec des rendements de´croissants (Durbarry et
al. 1998; Dalgaard et Hansen, 2000; Hansen et Tarp, 2000, 2001; Lensink et White, 2001;
Dalgaard et al. 2004); (iii) la relation entre l’aide et la croissance est conditionnelle ;
parmi les facteurs susceptibles d’influencer l’effet de l’aide sur la croissance, la qualite´
de politiques macroe´conomiques est le plus souvent retenue (Hadjimichael et al., 1995;
Durbarry et al., 1998; Hansen et Tarp, 1999; Burnside et Dolla, 2000). Selon le concept de
conditionnalite´, l’aide peut atteindre son objectif seulement si les e´conomies re´cipiendaires
ont mis en place des bonnes politiques e´conomiques. Ce concept proˆne donc une allocation
de l’aide en faveur des pays avec des politiques saines. Mais la conditionnalite´ ne concerne
pas uniquement les politiques e´conomiques; d’autres facteurs ont e´te´ identifie´s, tels que
la vulne´rabilite´ aux chocs externes, les conflits, l’instabilite´ socio-politique (Chauvet et
Guillaumont 1999, 2001) et les situations de post-conflit (Collier et Hoeﬄer, 2002).
Bien que l’analyse porte sur des pays de´pourvus d’histoire longue en tant que re´cipi-
endaires d’aide, les donne´es disponibles sont suffisantes pour e´tudier la question. L’expe´-
rience de ces pays permet d’e´largir l’horizon de la connaissance sur les questions lie´es a`
l’efficacite´ de l’aide.
Le contexte historique nous place dans une situation ou` le retournement de l’Ouest
europe´en vers l’Est a change´ dans une mesure significative les flux d’aide internationale.
Nous avons donc assiste´, dans la premie`re moitie´ des anne´es 1990, a` une re´orientation
des flux d’aide vers les PECO et des ex-re´publiques Sovie´tiques. Notre premier chapitre a
justement pour vocation d’identifier la contribution de l’aide aux efforts de restructuration
et de´veloppement de ces pays. Bien que notre analyse se concentre sur tous les pays de
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l’ancien bloc communiste, nous perdons pas de vue, que cette re´gion est caracte´rise´e par
une forte he´te´roge´neite´, notamment entre les PECO et les ex-re´publiques Sovie´tiques.
En de´pit du fait que l’objectif principal d’allocation de l’aide ait e´te´ le meˆme (besoins
de restructuration des e´conomies planifie´es en vue d’une convergence vers le niveau de
de´veloppement des e´conomies occidentales), il n’en e´te´ pas de meˆme avec les motivations
des bailleurs de fonds. Ainsi, les pays pour lesquels l’inte´gration dans l’UE avait e´te´
envisage´e, ont be´ne´ficie´ de montants d’aide plus e´leve´s et d’une assistance technique plus
importante, ce qui leur a permis un avancement plus rapide.
Le point de de´part de notre analyse est repre´sente´ par le de´bat autour de la question de
conditionnalite´ lance´e par Burnside et Dollar (2000) qui proˆnait une allocation d’aide qui
prendrait en compte la qualite´ de politiques e´conomiques (i.e. inflation, balance budge´taire
et ouverture commerciale) mene´es dans les pays be´ne´ficiaires d’aide. Dans le meˆme esprit,
nous estimons l’impact de l’aide sur le taux de croissance tout en prenant en compte la
qualite´ des politiques macroe´conomiques, et l’avancement des re´formes structurelles et
institutionnelles. Une question collate´rale surgit: les conditions initiales (au de´but de la
transition) ont-elles favorise´ l’impact de l’aide en termes de croissance? De plus, est-ce
que l’impact des conditions intiales sur la croissance est stable dans le temps, ou bien il
diminue avec le temps?
Afin de trouver une validation empirique de nos hypothe`ses, nous proce´dons a` l’estima-
tion d’une e´quation de croissance (voir e´quation 2.8 p. 48, Chapitre 1). Lorsqu’il s’agit
d’une analyse en donne´es de panel dynamique, plusieurs proble`mes e´conome´triques ne´ces-
sitent d’eˆtre re´solus afin de ne pas obtenir des re´sultats biaise´s. Parmi eux, nous devons
d’emble´e traiter le proble`me d’endoge´ne´ite´ des de´terminants de la croissance (il peut y
avoir une causalite´ inverse entre la variable d’aide et la croissance e´conomique, ou bien en-
tre les variables de politique e´conomique et des institutions et la croissance). De plus, nous
devons faire attention a` la pre´sence des facteurs non-observe´s spe´cifiques aux pays, fac-
teurs qui se trouvent incorpore´s dans le terme d’erreurs (e.g. la possible corre´lation entre
le terme d’erreurs et les variables d’aide, de politique e´conomique et d’institutions). Pour
prendre en compte ces deux aspects, la me´thode d’estimation la plus approprie´e, confirme´e
aussi par la litte´rature, est la Me´thode des Moments Ge´ne´ralise´s. Cette technique utilise
des instruments internes qui sont de´finis a` partir des valeurs retarde´es des variables explica-
tives endoge`nes. Cette me´thode permet aussi de prendre en compte l’he´te´rosce´dasticite´
ou` l’autocorre´lation des re´sidus.
Les donne´es utilise´es proviennent d’une base de donne´es, construite a` partir de don-
ne´es macroe´conomiques harmonise´es, telles que la base de donne´es du Commite´ d’Aide
au De´veloppement (OCDE) pour les flux d’aide; la base de donne´es de la BERD pour
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les indicateurs de re´formes, Transition Indicators ; et la base de donne´es de la Banque
Mondiale, World Development Indicators, pour les autres variables. L’e´chantillon qui fait
l’objet de l’analyse est forme´ de 25 pays en transition7. La pe´riode d’analyse est comprise
entre 1990 et 2004. En 2005 la liste des pays be´ne´ficiaires, “Part II” (pays en transition) a
e´te´ abolie, puisqu’elle incluait des pays qui sont devenus membres de l’UE au 1er Janvier
2005. Les donne´es sur les flux d’aide de CAD (OCDE) ne sont plus recueillies pour ces
pays a` partir de 2005.
Les re´sultats de notre analyse se placent dans le contexte du de´bat concernant les
effets de l’aide sur la croissance e´conomique, de´bat fonde´ sur le concept de conditionnalite´
identifie´s dans les travaux de Burnside et Dollar (2000). En plus de la conditionnalite´ des
politiques e´conomiques, sont pris en compte d’autres facteurs, tels que l’avancement des
re´formes structurelles et institutionnelles, ainsi que les conditions initiales au de´but de la
transition.
Notre e´tude s’articule au tour de trois hypothe`ses : (1) l’aide a un impact positif sur
la croissance et cet impact positif est conditionne´ par la pre´sence des politiques macroe´-
conomique efficaces, mais e´galement par la qualite´ des re´formes structurelles et des insti-
tutions ; (2) les conditions initiales affectent le de´veloppement e´conomique de pays et la
manie`re dont l’aide soutient la croissance e´conomique ; (3) l’aide a un impact positif sur
la croissance, mais avec des rendements marginaux de´croissants (l’impact positif de l’aide
en termes de croissance devient plus faible a` partir d’un certain seuil). Afin de tester
ces hypothe`ses nous construisons plusieurs indicateurs. Policy - l’indicateur construit a`
partir de la me´thode de Burnside et Dollar (2000), et de´fini comme la somme des trois
indicateurs macroe´conomiques, a` savoir le taux d’inflation, le balance budge´taire (en %
du PIB) et l’ouverture commerciale (taux d’ouverture commerciale ajuste´)8 ponde´re´s par
leur impact sur la croissance (les coefficients de ponde´ration sont obtenus a` partir d’une
e´quation de croissance, voir le Tableau 2.7 page 69). Deux autres indicateurs, Structural
Policy Reforms et Institutional Reforms sont construits a` partir de Transition Indicators9
de la BERD, avec la me´thode d’Analyse en Composante Principale. Ces deux indicateurs
mesurent l’avancement des re´formes vers une e´conomie de marche´ et donne ainsi une ide´e
de la qualite´ des institutions.
7Les pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale: Albanie, Bulgarie, Croatie, Re´publique Tche`que, Estonie,
Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Mace´doine, Pologne, Roumanie, Slovaquie, Slove´nie et les ex-Re´publiques
Sovie´tique: Arme´nie, Azerba¨ıdjan, Bie´lorussie, Ge´orgie, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldavie, Ouzbe´kistan,
Russie, Tadjikistan, Turkme´nistan, Ukraine.
8 La politique d’ouverture est de´finie comme la part de l’ouverture observe´e qui n’est pas explique´e par
des facteurs structurels. Il s’agit donc de taux d’ouverture observe´ purge´ de tous les facteurs inde´pendants
de la politique, en re´gressant le taux d’ouverture commerciale observe´ sur plusieurs facteurs structurels.
Plus de de´tails sont fournit dans l’Annexe du Chapitre 2.
9Voir l’encadre´ dans l’Annexe du Chapitre 2, page 77.
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Par la suite, afin de mesurer l’impact de l’aide sur la croissance conditionne´ par la
qualite´ des politiques macroe´conomiques et des institutions, des termes interactifs sont
construits : l’aide croise´e avec les politiques (Aid ∗ Policy), avec le re´formes structurelles
(Aid ∗ SPR) et avec les institutions (Aid ∗ IR). Enfin, pour controˆler l’influence des
conditions initiales sur l’impact de l’aide en termes de croissance, l’aide est croise´e avec
l’indicateur de conditions initiales de Falcetti et al. (2005)10. Finalement, l’indicateur
de conditions initiales est croise´ avec une variable temps mesure´e par le nombre d’anne´es
depuis le de´but de la transition (14 ans pour les PECO et 12 ans pour les CEI11) pour
ve´rifier si l’impact des conditions initiales diminue dans le temps, avec l’avancement de la
transition; et si c’est le cas, nous ve´rifions e´galement si celle-la` affecte l’e´fficacite´ de l’aide
en matie`re de croissnace.
Ainsi nos re´sultats montrent l’impact de l’aide sur la croissance dans les pays en tran-
sition n’est pas influence´ par la qualite´ des politiques macroe´conomiques ou par la qualite´
des re´formes structurelles et institutionnelles mises en place. Nous re´sultats s’inscrivent
ainsi dans la litte´rature qui ne confirme pas la conditionnalite´ de l’aide (Hansen and Tarp,
2000; Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004). Bien qu’ayant des effets positifs sur
la croissance, la qualite´ des politiques macroe´conomiques et des re´formes, en revanche, ne
semblent pas avoir renforce´ l’efficacite´ de l’aide. L’analyse de l’impact de l’aide en fonction
de diffe´rences entre les pays be´ne´ficiaires, mesure´s par les conditions initiales au de´but du
processus de transformation, met en e´vidence une corre´lation ne´gative entre l’aide et les
conditions initiales. Rappelons qu’une valeur e´leve´e (positive) de l’indicateur de conditions
initiales (IC) traduit des mauvaises conditions intiales. Cela nous ame`ne a` en conclure
que l’efficacite´ de l’aide a e´te´ plus forte dans les e´conomies avec des conditions initiales
mauvaises. Ne´anmoins, lorsque nous controˆlons pour l’intensite´ de l’impact des conditions
initiales, il ressort qu’elle diminue dans le temps. Plus nous nous e´loignons du de´but de la
transition, moins les conditions initiales affectent la croissance, et e´galement l’impact de
l’aide en termes de croissance.
Les de´terminants de l’allocation de l’aide
L’anlyse propose´e dans le troisie`me chapitre de la the`se s’inscrit dans l’e´tude des
crite`res d’allocation de l’aide. Plus pre´cise´ment, nous analysons si les inte´reˆts particuliers
de pays donneurs conditionnent la destination de l’aide pre´valant sur les besoins et les
10Cet indicateur de conditions initiales est e´galement construit avec la me´thode d’Analyse en Com-
posante Principale.
11En effet nous supposons que la transition a commence´ dans les anne´es 1990 pour les PECO et 1992
pour les CEI.
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performances de pays be´ne´ficiaires. En outre, une place importante est accorde´e dans
notre analyse a` la qualite´ de la gouvernance des e´conomies en transition qui tout au long
du processus de transition ont e´te´ confronte´es a` la corruption, a` des cadres juridiques
inade´quates, a` des climats d’affaires instables.
Motive´e par le de´bat sur l’efficacite´ de l’aide sur la croissance lance´ par Burnside and
Dollar (2000), la question de la “bonne gouvernance” est devenue une pre´occupation pour
les bailleurs de fonds. Parce que la bonne gouvernance permet la cre´ation d’un climat
stable et propice a` l’activite´ e´conomique et a` la mise en place de politiques e´conomiques
efficaces destine´es a` soutenir le de´veloppement e´conomique, elle est conside´re´ comme un
signal de la bonne gestion de l’aide. Par contre, les de´faillances de la gouvernance, dont
la corruption, sont perc¸ues comme pouvant nuire a` l’efficacite´ de l’aide sur la croissance.
La premie`re partie du chapitre propose une revue de la litte´rature empirique qui
tente d’analyser les de´terminants de l’allocation de l’aide. Si le de´bat autour des crite`res
d’allocation de l’aide portait initialement uniquement sur la question d’identifier si l’alloca-
tion de l’aide re´pondait plutoˆt aux besoins des be´ne´ficiaires ou aux inte´reˆts spe´cifiques des
donneurs (commerciaux, strate´gies, politiques), plus tard, les performances e´conomiques
des re´cipiendaires ont e´te´ introduites dans le de´bat. A pre´sent, un large consensus ex-
iste sur les motifs justifiant l’allocation de l’aide: (i) les inte´reˆts spe´cifiques des donneurs
(Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Gounder, 1994, 1999); (ii) les be-
soins des be´ne´ficiaires et (iii) les performances des be´ne´ficiaires (Trumbull et Wall, 1994;
Apodaca et Stohl, 1999; Svensson, 1999; Alesina et Dollar, 2000; Alesina et Weder, 2002;
Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Neumayer 2003). Cependant, les e´tudes empiriques identifient
de diffe´rences en ce qui concerne les motivations et les crite`res d’allocation de diffe´rents
donneurs. Par exemple, les pays Nordiques ou les Etats Unis accordent plus d’importance,
dans leurs de´cisions d’allocation d’aide, aux besoins et aux performances des pays receveurs
(e.g. la pauvrete´, l’ouverture) que la France ou le Japon (Alesina et Dollar, 2000; Alesina
et Weder, 2002; Berthle´my et Tichit, 2004).
L’objet de cette analyse reste le meˆme que dans le Chapitre 2, les 25 pays en transition
qui ont fait l’objet de l’analyse de l’efficacite´ de l’aide; par contre l’horizon temporel
change; la pe´riode d’analyse est 1996-2004, contrainte par la disponibilite´ des indicateurs
de gouvernance (Kaufmann et al., 2005). La variable de´pendante dans cette analyse est le
montant d’aide alloue´ par habitant. L’aide est mesure´e comme les engagements12, et les
donne´es proviennent de la base de donne´es du Comite´ d’Aide au De´veloppement (CAD-
OCDE). Pour l’allocation bilate´rale les donneurs retenus sont les 22 membres du CAD-
12Nous suivons le consensus dans la litte´rature qui pre´fe`re les engagements aux versements d’aide dans
une analyse sur les crite`res d’allocation de l’aide; les engagements refle`tent mieux la de´cision d’allocation
des donneurs.
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OCDE, tandis que pour l’analyse multilate´rale sont conside´re´s les flux d’aide en provenance
de la Commission Europe´enne et de la BERD (les deux bailleurs multilate´raux les plus
importants pour la re´gion).
Afin de trouver une re´ponse empirique a` la question pre´ce´demment pose´e, a` savoir la
place qu’occupent les inte´reˆts des donneurs (commerciaux, politiques, strate´giques), les
besoins et me´rites (en particulier la gouvernance) des be´ne´ficiaires, quant a` l’attribution
de l’aide nous utilisons le mode`le de´terministe d’allocation de l’aide introduit par Dudley
and Montmarquette (1976) et e´tendu plu tard par Trumbull and Wall (1994). Il s’agit
d’un mode`le base´ sur un mode`le microe´conomique de maximisation de l’utilite´ qui explique
l’allocation bilate´rale de l’aide dans une approche en deux e´tapes: (1) la phase de se´lection
des be´ne´ficiaires qui correspond a` la de´cision des donneurs d’allouer ou pas l’aide et (2) la
phase d’allocation de l’aide qui correspond a` une de´cision concernant le montant d’aide a`
allouer aux be´ne´ficiaires choisis dans la phase de se´lection.
Une premie`re extension que nous faisions a` ce mode`le consiste a` ajouter des variables
qui mesurent la qualite´ de la gouvernance (les indicateurs de Kaufmann et al. (2005),
Banque Mondiale). Une deuxie`me extension est l’introduction, des effets spe´cifiques don-
neurs, en plus des effets spe´cifiques receveurs. En effet, une hypothe`se importante dans
le mode`le de Trumbull and Wall (1994) est que les donneurs accordent, dans leurs de´ci-
sions d’allocation d’aide, la meˆme importance a` chaque pays be´ne´ficiaire de l’aide. Nous
conside´rons cette hypothe`se trop stricte, puisque l’importance des be´ne´ficiaires aux yeux
de bailleurs de fonds peut eˆtre de´termine´e par les liens historiques, culturels, politiques,
strate´giques ou ge´ographiques. Il est vrai que cet aspect peut eˆtre controˆle´ dans une cer-
taine mesure par l’introduction des variables muettes pour la langue commune, les liens
coloniaux, etc. Mais de tels facteurs sont absents dans notre e´chantillon, puisqu’il s’agit
de pays qui n’ont pas vraiment de tels liens. Ne´anmoins il existe certainement d’autres
facteurs (ge´ographiques, politiques) qui doivent eˆtre controˆle´s et qui ne sont pas pris en
compte par les variables explicatives. Pour ces raisons, nous conside´rons qu’il est approprie´
d’estimer notre mode`le en panel avec des effets fixes donneurs, receveurs et temporels.
Mais, la nature censure´e de notre variable explique´e, les flux d’aide bilate´raux (dans
le mode`le d’allocation bilate´rale), ne´cessite une estimation par une me´thode qui permet
de controˆler pour le biais de se´lection (Neumayer, 2003; Berthe´lemy et Tichit, 2004;
Berthe´lemy, 2006). La me´thode de Heckman nous parait approprie´e. Le seul proble`me
est que cette me´thode ne permet pas d’introduire des effets fixes dans l’e´quation de se´lec-
tion qui est estime´e par un Probit (celle-ci induirait le “incidental parameters problem”13.
Suivant Berthe´lemy (2006) nous ignorons dans un premier temps le biais potentiel de se´lec-
13Voir (Greene, 2004)
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tion provenant du fait que les crite`res de se´lection pourraient eˆtre diffe´rents des crite`res
d’allocation de l’aide.
Notre analyse va se focaliser donc seulement sur l’e´tape d’allocation de l’aide. Ainsi,
la premie`re e´tape de notre analyse consiste a` estimer une e´quation d’allocation de l’aide
bilate´rale (Voir l’e´quation 3.5 page 93) a` la fois avec la me´thode des effets fixes en panel,
mais aussi avec la me´thode de Heckman, puisque dans notre e´chantillon le coefficient
de corre´lation entre les terms d’erreurs des deux e´quations est de 0.35. La deuxie`me
e´tape consiste a` prendre en compte la nature dynamique de l’allocation de l’aide. Nous
faisons ainsi l’hypothe`se que l’allocation pre´sente de l’aide de´pend de l’allocation passe´e
(la variable explique´e retarde´e se retrouve parmi les variables explicatives). La me´thode
d’estimation retenue comme la plus approprie´e pour ce type d’analyse est la Me´thode de
Moments Ge´ne´ralise´s. La dernie`re e´tape de l’analyse bilate´rale se focalise sur les de´ter-
minants de l’allocation de l’aide de principaux bailleurs: les Etats Unis, l’Allemagne, le
Japon, la France et le Royaume Uni. Pour cette analyse, la variable de´pendente n’est pas
censure´e (ces bailleurs de fonds allouent l’aide a` tous les receveurs dans notre e´chantillon)
en conse´quence nous appliquons la me´thode des effets fixes en panel, avec des effets fixes
spe´cifiques receveurs et des effets temporelles.
La deuxie`me partie de l’analyse empirique concerne l’allocation de l’aide multilate´rale.
Pour cette analyse nous conside´rons uniquement les flux agre´ge´s puisque, comme nous le
montrons dans le section 3.3.1, la Commission Europe´enne et la BERD, les deux bailleurs
de fond multilate´raux les plus importants pour les pays de la re´gion, fournissent ensemble
en moyenne environ 80-90% de l’aide multilate´rale totale; une analyse de´sagre´ge´e n’a alors
pas vraiment d’inte´reˆt. La me´thode d’estimation est toujours la me´thode des effets fixes
en panel, avec des effets fixes receveurs et temporels (la variable de´pendante n’est pas
censure´e, le proble`me de la se´lection des pays be´ne´ficiaires ne se pose pas ici).
Nos re´sultats sugge`rent qu’a` la fois les besoins des be´ne´ficiaires et les inte´reˆts de don-
neurs guident l’allocation bilate´rale de l’aide. Il semble que le niveau de de´veloppement
(mesure´ par le PIB par habitant) de´termine l’allocation de l’aide. Les besoins sociaux
(mesure´s ici par le taux de scolarisation dans le secondaire) n’apparaissent pas a` influencer
l’allocation de l’aide. Mais ce re´sultat devrait eˆtre conside´re´ avec pre´caution puisqu’il peut
eˆtre une conse´quence de la qualite´ faible de donne´es (a` cause de donne´es manquantes).
Quant a` la qualite´ de la gouvernance (mesure´e ici les indicateurs de Kaufmann et al.,
2005) elle semble aussi influencer l’allocation bilate´rale de l’aide14. Il ressort ainsi que les
bailleurs de fonds re´compensent la qualite´ de la gouvernance, perc¸ue comme une mesure
14Des re´sultats similaires sont obtenus dans l’analyse conjointe de la relation aide-migration qui fait
l’objet du Chapitre 4.
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de la bonne gestion de l’aide. L’analyse bilate´rale nous a permis aussi de tester la relation
de substitution/comple´mentarite´ entre l’allocation d’un donneur en particulier et celle des
autres donneurs bilate´raux/multilate´raux. En accord avec les re´sultats de Berthe´lemy
(2006), il semble qu’un donneur fournit moins d’aide a` un certain be´ne´ficiaire si celui-ci
rec¸oit de l’aide de la part des autres donneurs (il y a donc une relation de substitution
entre les donneurs bilate´raux). Ne´anmoins, une relation de comple´mentarite´ apparait
entre l’allocation bilate´rale et multilate´rale: un donneur alloue plus d’aide a` un certain
re´cipiendaire si celui-ci rec¸oit de l’aide de la part des bailleurs multilate´raux.
L’analyse de l’allocation multilate´rale re´ve`le peu de diffe´rences entre les mode`les d’alloca-
tion bilate´rale et multilate´rale; la qualite´ de la gouvernance apparait e´galement comme
crite`re important d’allocation de l’aide pour les donneurs multilate´raux. Bien que par sa
nature, l’aide multilate´rale soit oriente´e plus vers les pays receveurs (guide´e par les be-
soins), une question collate´rale pourrait eˆtre de se demander si l’aide de la part de l’UE
(Commission Europe´enne) dont les PECO ont be´ne´ficie´ (plus que les CEI), ne re´pondrait
pas e´galement aux inte´reˆts des donneurs, e´tant donne´e que l’objectif ultime de cette aide
e´tait l’inte´gration des be´ne´ficiaires dans l’UE. En absence de cette inte´gration les PECO
serait-ils privile´gie´s?
Aide et Migration: substituts ou comple´ments?
La proble´matique de l’aide internationale autour de deux axes importantes - l’efficacite´
et l’allocation de l’aide, nous a amene´ a` comprendre que, bien que l’aide soit un outil im-
portant de la politique de de´veloppement, elle ne peut pas a` elle seule faire des miracles.
D’autres mesures prises par les gouvernements des pays de´veloppe´es vis-a`-vis des pays en
de´veloppement peuvent avoir un impact sur la croissance et le de´veloppement, et peuvent
renforcer l’impact de l’aide. Nous e´tudions donc dans le dernier chapitre de cette the`se
la proble´matique de la cohe´rence des politiques au service du de´veloppement. Le de´bat
autour de la cohe´rence des politiques au service du de´veloppement imple´mente´es vis-a`-vis
des pays en de´veloppement a e´merge´ re´cemment dans les pays de l’OCDE. La proble´ma-
tique de la cohe´rence est en effet apparue suite a` l’amplification des interde´pendances15
entre les e´conomies, conse´quence de la globalisation.
La nature de la relation entre migration, investissement, commerce et aide constitue
une pre´occupation pour les e´conomistes, notamment en raison de son importance pour
15Rappelons a` titre d’exemple que les pays de´veloppe´s de l’OCDE de´pendent des pays en de´veloppement
pour leurs exportations et leur consommation de pe´trole ; en meˆme temps, les pays en de´veloppement sont
lie´s aux pays de´veloppe´s pour leurs e´changes, et particulie`rement pour leurs importations de produits de
base.
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la conception des politiques e´conomiques. Le de´bat autour de cette relation inte´resse
notamment les de´cideurs de politiques e´conomiques puisqu’il vise une imple´mentation de
fac¸on coordonne´e des politiques de de´veloppement en matie`re d’aide, de migration, de
commerce et d’investissement. Par ailleurs, la cohe´rence des politiques s’inscrit dans une
relation de re´ciprocite´. Les pays de´veloppe´s doivent veiller a` ce que leurs politiques n’aient
pas d’effets pre´judiciables sur les pays pauvres. Et les pays en de´veloppement sont tenus a`
ame´liorer leur capacite´ de tirer avantage des politiques e´conomiques des pays de´veloppe´s
qui leur sont favorables. En mettant en place de manie`re coordonne´e ces politiques de
fac¸on a` ce que les objectifs poursuivis et les instruments utilise´s pour leur imple´mentation
soient compatibles, l’efficacite´ de ces politiques augmente et de meilleurs retombe´es sont
obtenues pour les pays en de´veloppement16.
Pour analyser la manie`re dont les interactions entre les politiques se constituent,
selon l’effet des politiques relativement a` un objectif donne´, la question de substitu-
tion/comple´mentarite´ des politiques a e´te´ ainsi souleve´e. A titre d’exemple, prenons le
cas d’une politique migratoire et d’une politique d’aide, conside´re´es comple´mentaires. Une
politique migratoire permissive vis-a`-vis des pays en de´veloppement qui a un effet stimulant
sur les entre´es de transferts de fonds de ces pays en de´veloppement peut eˆtre accompagne´e
d’une politique d’aide qui vise a` augmenter et en meˆme temps a` cibler les flux d’aide dans
les pays d’origine des migrants. Ces deux politiques sont conside´re´es comple´mentaires,
car l’aide facilite une re´partition plus e´quitable des be´ne´fices de la migration, augmentant
ainsi l’effet positif de´gage´ graˆce a` la politique migratoire (Dayton-Johnson et Xenogiani,
2006). Il est donc important d’identifier la nature de la relation entre les politiques afin de
mieux analyser leurs synergies et arbitrages, et mieux atteindre l’objectif commun, celui
de promouvoir la croissance dans les pays en de´veloppement.
Plusieurs aspects du de´bat concernant la cohe´rence des politiques au service du de´velo-
ppement ont e´te´ pre´ce´demment explore´s dans la litte´rature. La substitution/comple´menta-
rite´ entre le commerce et les mouvements des facteurs (travail, capital ou d’autres facteurs
de production) repre´sente un the`me re´current dans la litte´rature e´conomique internationale
depuis l’oeuvre fondatrice de Mundell (1957). Se basant sur le mode`le de Heckscher-
Ohlin, Mundell montre qu’il y a substitution entre les mouvements de travailleurs et le
commerce; plus pre´cise´ment il trouve que (i) une augmentation des barrie`res commerciales
provoque une baisse des e´changes commerciaux et une augmentation des migrations et (ii)
une augmentation des barrie`res migratoires de´termine la re´duction des flux migratoires et
l’augmentation des flux commerciaux. Cependant, ce the`me a e´te´ souvent revisite´17 avec
16Pour plus de de´tails concernant les interactions entre les quatre politiques au service du de´veloppement
le lecteur peut se rapporter au tableau 4.1 page 125).
17Voir Schiff (2006) pour une synthe`se de de´veloppements re´cents dans cette litte´rature.
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de nouveaux re´sultats, proposant d’e´ventuelles comple´mentarite´s entre les flux de travail
et de commerce en particulier (Markusen, 1993).
L’analyse propose´e a` travers ce dernier chapitre s’inscrit dans le de´bat sur la cohe´rence
des politiques au service du de´veloppement, mais elle s’articule autour d’un aspect moins
explore´, a` savoir la relation de substitution/comple´mentarite´ entre l’aide et la migration.
Le choix d’analyser conjointement la migration et l’aide repose sur plusieurs e´le´ments.
Premie`rement, apre`s avoir explore´ les questions lie´es a` l’efficacite´ et l’allocation de l’aide il
nous a paru inte´ressant d’identifier dans quelle mesure les objectifs de la politique d’aide
interagissent avec ceux d’autres politiques. Pourquoi a-t-on choisi la migration ? Parce
que la migration est devenu un des aspects importants du processus de globalisation avec
de multiples implications a` la fois pour les pays d’origine des migrants et pour les pays
d’accueil (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). En effet, la
libe´ralisation des mouvements de travailleurs a` travers le processus de globalisation, bien
que be´ne´fique dans une certaine mesure, a aussi eu des conse´quences ne´gatives, telle que
l’immigration non-de´sire´e, suscitant ainsi des oppositions dans les pays de´veloppe´s. Des
barrie`res a` l’entre´e ont e´te´ cre´e´es afin d’empeˆcher le flux de migrants non souhaite´s. Cepen-
dant, malgre´ des politiques de migration assez restrictives instaure´es par les pays de´velop-
pe´es la part des immigrants dans la population totale des pays de´veloppe´s a augmente´
avec le temps (elle a double´ pendant la pe´riode 1970-2000).
Les politiques migratoires visant a` stopper l’immigration pre´sentent en effet deux points
faibles. Dans un premier temps, elles stimulent l’immigration ille´gale qui dans des nom-
breux pays est couˆteuse, difficile a` pre´venir et peut parfois meˆme de´terminer des tensions
sociales et politiques. Dans un second temps, il peut y avoir une contradiction entre les
instruments de politiques migratoires et ceux des autres politiques avec des conse´quences
ne´gatives pour les pays be´ne´ficiaires. Pour illustrer la ne´cessite´ de concevoir des politiques
optimales, en l’occurrence d’aide et de migration, dont les effets devraient eˆtre positifs
pour les pays be´ne´ficiaires, prenons l’exemple des pays d”Europe Centrale et Orientale
qui tout au long de processus de transition vers l’e´conomie de marche´ ont connu de nom-
breuses restructurations. La destruction d’emploi a e´te´ le principal proble`me auquel ont
e´te´ confronte´es les populations de ces pays. L’explosion du choˆmage dans ces pays a e´te´
un des facteurs de l’e´migration vers les pays occidentaux, plus proches ge´ographiquement.
Il aurait e´te´ incohe´rent d’assister les pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale dans leur
de´veloppement afin des leurs permettre d’inte´grer progressivement l’Union Europe´enne,
et en meˆme temps d’empeˆcher l’immigration des travailleurs en provenance de ces meˆmes
pays par la mise en place de politiques se´ve`res d’immigration.
L’inte´reˆt que nous portons a` l’e´tude de la relation aide-migration se justifie aussi par le
souhait de contribuer a` la litte´rature empirique sur la cohe´rence des politiques au service
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du de´veloppement en analysant un aspect des moins explore´s. A notre connaissance,
peu d’e´tudes empiriques ont souleve´ cette question. Une contribution importante a` cette
litte´rature est faite par Faini and Venturini (1993) qui, dans une e´tude sur la Gre`ce, le
Portugal, l’Espagne et la Turquie, montrent que la croissance ne re´duit pas forcement
l’incitation a` migrer (sous l’hypothe`se que l’aide est favorable a` la croissance). Ce re´sultat
contre-intuitif est explique´ par l’approche dite de “hump-shaped”18 qui sugge`re que, pour
des niveaux tre`s bas du revenu par teˆte (dans les pays se trouvant dans la phase de de´but
du de´veloppement), la croissance se traduit par davantage de migration puisqu’elle relaˆche
la contrainte financie`re de migrants et alle`ge les couˆts de migration. Lorsque le revenu
de´passe un certain seuil, la migration est susceptible de diminuer. Les migrants potentiels
sont ainsi moins incite´s a` partir car ils trouvent plus d’opportunite´s de travail dans leur
pays d’origine.
La question pertinente que nous soulevons a` travers ce chapitre est de clarifier dans
quelle mesure l’attribution de l’aide aux pays en de´veloppement et en transition a un
impact sur les flux migratoires. En suivant la litte´rature pre´ce´dente, nous conside´rons
l’impact de l’aide totale sur la migration, mais paralle`lement, nous e´tudions aussi l’impact
de l’aide bilate´rale.
Dans un premier temps nous analysons l’incidence de l’aide totale, en tant que com-
posante de la de´pense nationale brute, sur la migration. Puisqu’il n y a pas de consensus
concernant l’impact de l’aide sur la croissance dans les pays en de´veloppement19 dans
cette analyse nous faisons l’hypothe`se que l’aide influence la migration non a` travers la
croissance, mais a` travers la de´pense nationale brute. Nous supposons donc que l’aide
contribue au financement de cette de´pense ce qui induit une augmentation des salaires
dans l’e´conomie re´cipiendaire. Un niveau plus e´leve´ des salaires intensifie par la suite la
migration. Nous conside´rons cette relation entre l’aide totale et la migration comme un
effet “push”.
Dans un deuxie`me temps, nous testons un effet positif de l’aide bilate´rale sur la migra-
tion. Nous conside´rons cet effet comme un effet“d’attraction”. Il illustre l’ide´e que plus un
pays rec¸oit de l’aide bilate´rale plus la population de ce pays est attire´e a` migrer vers le pays
donneur. Les contacts bilate´raux qui s’e´tablissent entre les pays donneur et be´ne´ficiaire
de l’aide intensifient l’information disponible et re´duisent les couˆts de transactions relatifs
a` la migration. Il peut s’agir des liens/contacts qui se cre´ent entre les autorite´s nationales
et les experts des pays donneurs lors de visites visant la mise en place de politiques d’aide.
18Voir aussi Hatton et Williamson (1998) et Vogler et Rotte (2000).
19Voir Doucouliagos et Paldam (2008) pour une synthe`se re´cente de la litte´rature sur l’aide et la crois-
sance.
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Cet effet d’attraction peut eˆtre aussi associe´ au financement de bourses pour les e´tudiants
e´trangers ou encore a` l’aide pour les re´fugie´es politiques20.
Dans notre analyse, en plus de l’impact potentiel de l’aide sur la migration, nous
prenons en compte l’impact potentiel de la migration sur l’aide. Nous suivons ainsi Lahiri
et Raimondos-Møller (2000) qui trouvent que les activite´s de lobby mene´es par les mi-
grants peuvent avoir une incidence sur la re´partition ge´ographique de l’aide a` travers un
me´canisme de re´seaux.
Parce que nous analysons en meˆme temps l’impact de l’aide sur la migration et l’impact
de la migration sur l’aide nous sommes confronte´s a` un proble`me de simultane´ite´. Afin de
le prendre en compte, nous proposons un mode`le a` deux e´quations simultane´es qui explique
a` la fois la migration et l’aide. Les deux e´quations sont conjointement estime´es (Voir les
e´quations 4.2 et 4.3, page 148-147), les parame`tres de chaque e´quation e´tant estime´s en
prenant en compte l’information fournie par l’autre e´quation du syste`me. Les e´quations
contiennent e´galement des variables exoge`nes qui permettent d’identifier correctement les
deux e´quations. Nous conside´rons aussi la possibilite´ qu’il y a des variables non-observe´s
susceptibles de co-de´terminer l’aide et la migration, ce qui en termes e´conome´triques se
traduit par une corre´lation entre les termes d’erreur de deux e´quations.
L’estimation de ces deux e´quations soule`ve un proble`me e´conome´trique, a` savoir la
nature censure´e des variables explique´es ; elles peuvent eˆtre soit positives soit nulles, mais
jamais ne´gatives. Estimer les deux e´quations avec toutes les observations pourrait conduire
a` des biais d’estimation. La litte´rature sur l’allocation de l’aide propose une solution pour
corriger ce proble`me qui est d’estimer les e´quations uniquement en prenant en compte
les observations positives. Cela permet aussi la spe´cification des e´quations sous forme
logarithmique, ce qui facilite l’interpre´tation des parame`tres qui sont des e´lasticite´s. Un
deuxie`me biais peut apparaˆıtre; il s’agit de biais de se´lection qui provient du fait que la
se´lection d’un pays comme be´ne´ficiaire d’aide (ou destination des migrants) peut de´pendre
d’autres facteurs que ceux qui de´terminent le montant d’aide alloue´ (ou le nombre de
migrants). La solution usuelle lorsqu’il n’existe pas une variable de se´lection qui pourrait
expliquer la se´lection du be´ne´ficiaire, mais pas le montant d’aide alloue´, est de conside´rer
que ce biais est secondaire. Nous suivons ainsi Berthe´lemy (2005) qui dans une e´tude
sur l’allocation de l’aide sur un e´chantillon beaucoup plus large, trouve une corre´lation
faible entre la se´lection des be´ne´ficiaires et l’allocation de l’aide, et sugge`re que le biais de
se´lection peut eˆtre ignore´. La me´thode d’estimation que nous utilisons, qui nous permet
a` la fois de corriger le biais de simultane´ite´ et de prendre en compte la corre´lation des
re´sidus est la me´thode de triples moindres carre´s.
20En France par exemple, ces deux composantes repre´sentent 25% du total de l’aide publique au
de´veloppement de´bourse´e au cours de dernie`res anne´es.
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Les donne´es utilise´es dans cette e´tude proviennent d’une base de donne´es de la Banque
Mondiale re´cemment mise a` jour par le Centre de Recherche sur la Migration, la Glob-
alisation et la Pauvrete´. Il s’agit d’une base de donne´es des stocks de migrants par pays
d’origine et destination21. Bien que la base contienne des observations pour 226 pays
(une matrice 226×226), nous utilisons les observations concernant uniquement 187 pays
en de´veloppement et en transition (be´ne´ficiaires d’aide et origines des migrants) et 22 pays
donneurs d’aide, membres du Comite´ d’Aide au De´veloppement (OCDE) (et pays d’accueil
des migrants). Un avantage de cette base de donne´es est que les stocks de migrants sont
renseigne´s par niveau d’e´ducation, ce qui nous permet de distinguer dans notre analyse les
migrations qualifie´es et non qualifie´es et de comparer leurs de´terminants. Il y a ne´anmoins
deux principales contraintes: la base n’offre qu’une seule observation dans le temps, pour
l’anne´e 2000, et elle fournit des donne´es de stocks et non de flux. Puisque nous sommes
inte´resse´s par l’impact des flux d’aide sur la migration, l’ide´al serait d’utiliser aussi des flux
de migrants et non des stocks. Afin de corriger la disparite´ provenant du fait que l’aide est
mesure´e en flux et la migration en stock, nous utilisons des flux d’aide agre´ge´s sur deux
pe´riodes diffe´rentes, cinq et dix ans (les re´sultats des estimations e´tant assez similaires).
Les donne´es d’aide proviennent de la base du Comite´ d’Aide au De´veloppement (OCDE)
et sont mesure´s comme des engagements d’aide.
Nous proposons une analyse en deux e´tapes. Dans un premier temps il s’agit de mener
une analyse agre´ge´e sur les flux totaux de migration“Sud-Nord” et d’aide “Nord-Sud”. Par
la suite, nous poursuivrons notre analyse au niveau de´sagre´ge´ en distinguant les migrants
qualifie´s et non-qualifie´s.
L’analyse agre´ge´e fait ressortir que l’aide et la migration sont des substituts pour un
niveau du PIB par habitant supe´rieur a` environ US$7348 (en PPA prix constants 2000).
Pour les pays qui disposent d’un niveau du PIB supe´rieur a` ce seuil, augmenter l’aide
re´duirait la pression migratoire. Lorsqu’elle est imple´mente´e dans des pays pauvres, avec
un niveau de PIB inferieur a` ce seuil, la combinaison d’une politique ge´ne´reuse d’aide et
d’une politique de migration restrictive n’est pas cohe´rente.
En prenant en compte la double causalite´ de la relation aide-migration nous identifions
plusieurs e´le´ments. L’analyse confirme l’hypothe`se d’un impact important de la migration
sur l’allocation d’aide, sugge´re´ par le mode`le de Lahiri et Raimondos-Møller (2000). En
ce qui concerne la causalite´ inverse, celle de l’impact de l’aide sur la migration, deux
composantes sont identifie´s: (i) la causalite´ de l’aide bilate´rale vers la migration qui refle`te
l’effet “d’attraction” lie´ a` la re´duction des couˆts de transaction; (ii) la causalite´ de l’aide
totale vers la migration qui est lie´e a` l’alle´gement de la contrainte budge´taire.
21Voir Parsons et al. (2007) pour une description de´taille´e de la base de donne´es.
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Lorsque nous faisons la distinction entre les migrants selon le niveau d’e´ducation il en
re´sulte que: (i) les politiques de migration re´centes favorisent la migration qualifie´e; (ii)
les migrants non-qualifie´s sont plus attire´s vers les pays qui offrent des aide sociales impor-
tantes, alors que les migrants qualifie´s migrent vers les pays qui offrent plus d’opportunite´s
et des salaires plus e´leve´s; (iii) la comple´mentarite´ entre le commerce et la migration est
plus forte pour les migrants qualifie´s, ce qui explique la compe´titivite´ des pays riches
qui produisent et exportent des biens ne´cessitant une importante main d’oeuvre qualifie´e;
ce re´sultat est en ligne avec le mode`le de Markusen (1983) qui repose sur la supe´riorite´
technologique des pays riches.
***
Apre`s avoir pre´sente´ les principaux re´sultats de notre analyse empirique, nous souhaitons
jetter les bases de quelques re´flexions sur des futurs de´fis sur la proble`matique de l’aide.
Malgre´ les controverses sur la capacite´ de l’aide a` stimuler la croissance, nous pensons
que l’aide est un instrument utile de la politique de de´veloppement. L’expe´rience des
e´conomies en transition qui ont re´ussi leur transformation a de´montre´ que l’aide est un outil
adapte´ pour re´pondre aux enjeux du de´veloppement. L’assistance financie`re et technique
fournie par les organisations internationales (la Banque Mondiale, le FMI, la Commission
Europe´enne, la BERD) a joue´ un roˆle important dans la restructuration, et par la suite,
dans le de´veloppement e´conomique de ces pays.
Nous pensons que les limites de l’aide ne doivent pas force´ment eˆtre cherche´es dans
les strate´gies d’allocation des bailleurs de fonds ou encore dans l’insuffisance des volumes
d’aide, mais plutoˆt dans les caracte´ristiques structurelles des pays et/ou dans leur capacite´
a` ge´rer l’aide rec¸ue en l’utilisant de manie`re efficace. Il s’ave`re donc que la redistribution
efficace de l’aide conjugue´e a` la volonte´ de mener cette action soient les clefs du succe`s.
En effet tre`s souvent la gestion efficace de l’aide se heurte a` la corruption, tre`s pre´sente
dans le processus de transition. Des pays de la CEI, comme l’Ouzbe´kistan, le Turk-
me´nistan, le Kirghizstan, l’Azerba¨ıdjan, le Tadjikistan occupent des places en teˆte de liste
des pays les plus corrompus au monde (selon Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency
International, 2008). De plus, la mauvaise gouvernance constitue un autre e´le´ment qui
influence le bon fonctionnement des programmes d’aide et qui peut de´tourner l’aide de
ses objectifs premiers. Les bailleurs de fonds doivent se pre´occuper de la manie`re dont
l’aide est utilise´e: ils ne peuvent apporter leur assistance que s’ils sont convaincus que
l’utilisation qui en est faite ainsi que sa gestion sont adapte´es. Une solution envisageable
serait donc de de´bourser l’aide par l’interme´diaire des organisations non-gouvernamentales
(ONG), dans la mesure ou` les ONG sont efficaces, contournant ainsi les gouvernements.
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Re´former les e´conomies et atteindre une croissance rapide et auto-entretenue sont des
e´tapes difficiles de la transition, dont les re´sultats ont varie´ selon les pays. Accompagne´s
dans la plupart des cas de de´se´quilibres, les conse´quences positives des re´formes n’ont
toujours pas e´te´ ressenties. De plus, elles ont engendre´ des couˆts sociaux meˆme dans les
pays qui e´taient parvenus a` atteindre un niveau stable de croissance et de bien-eˆtre (e.g.
Hongrie, Pologne, Re´publique tche`que). Les ine´galite´s excessives, les diffe´rences entre les
re´gions, la pauvrete´ et l’exclusion sociale sont des proble`mes qui doivent toujours eˆtre
repense´s. A notre avis, beaucoup reste a` faire pour re´soudre ces questions sociales. Dans
des secteurs tels que la sante´ et l’e´ducation (en particulier dans las re´gions rurales) il y a
toujours un besoin accrue d’aide. Nous soulignons l’importance de renforcer l’allocation
de l’aide au niveau sectoriel, en mettant davantage de ressources vers ces secteurs a` la
disposition des pouvoirs publics (lorsqu’il y ait la conviction d’une utilisation efficace de
l’aide) ou comme pre´ce´demment souligne´, a` la disposition des ONG.
Au-dela` de secteurs conside´re´s, comme la sante´ et l’e´ducation, plus de soutien devrait
eˆtre apporte´ a` l’activite´ d’investissement des entreprises. Il est envisageable que le manque
a` gagner de l’Etat duˆ a` la re´duction d’impoˆts sur les socie´te´s pourrait eˆtre, a` juste titre,
comble´ par l’aide; cette politique de gestion de l’aide pourrait rendre l’investissement prive´
plus attractif. Surtout dans le contexte de la crise actuelle, soutenir l’investissement et tout
particulie`rement des PME, repre´senterait une piste d’ame´nagement de l’aide permettant
ainsi de soutenir la croissance a` long terme et l’emploi (les pays de la re´gion sont confronte´s
avec des taux de choˆmage inquie´tants) et stimuler le de´veloppement e´conomique.
Il convient de rappeller que la re´gion est caracte´rise´e par une forte he´te´roge´ne´ite´, avec
de diffe´rences importantes entres les pays en termes de revenu par teˆte. Cette he´te´roge´ne´ite´
se traduit en effet par des priorite´s diffe´rentes selon les pays be´ne´ficiaires d’aide. Il est
donc important de cibler les politiques d’aide en fonctions des besoins de chacun.
Enfin, nous souhaitons renforcer l’ide´e que l’aide n’est pas le seul et unique instrument
approprie´ a` atteindre les objectifs de de´veloppement en termes de croissance et de re´duction
de la pauvrete´. D’autres politiques, telles que les politiques migratoires ou commerciales
sont au moins aussi efficaces, sinon plus. Les re´sultats d’analyse conjointe de l’aide et
de la migration nous permettent de souligner l’importance de la cohe´rence des politiques
des donneurs au service du de´veloppement. En ve´rifiant empiriquement que l’aide et la
migration sont des substituts uniquement dans des e´conomies dont le niveau du revenu
par habitant de´passe un certain seuil (7300 dollars, en PPA prix constants 2000), nous
confirmons la ne´cessite´ de s’interroger sur les effets potentiellement contradictoires de ces
politiques.
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General Overview
A
chieving development and making poverty history are themes which have received
a lot of attention in the academic literature and in policy circles in the Western
world. Since development cannot be achieved without self-sustained growth, a particular
interest has been devoted in the economic analysis to growth and its determinants. Trade,
investment, and increasing returns to knowledge are commonly identified as growth drivers.
In addition to these factors, foreign aid, has been seen as an important instrument of the
development policies implemented by Western nations vis-a`-vis poor nations, specifically
as a tool for promoting economic growth and fighting against poverty and inequalities.
However, the earlier focus of development assistance (in the 1950s), was not the de-
veloping world, but the reconstruction of Western economies destroyed by the World War
II. This has changed over time, as the rhetoric of aid has increasingly shifted towards
the challenges of development. Reducing poverty through combating inequalities and the
satisfaction of basic needs became a development objective by the 1970s. In recent years,
the emerging consensus that economic development should be synonymous with improve-
ments in living standards of population, was reflected in the shift of the development goals
towards a multidimensional concept of poverty (monetary poverty, poor health, illiter-
acy, social exclusion). This was given concrete expression in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2000 by the United Nations at Millennium Summit22.
The common belief that aid, as a source of additional finance for recipient countries
(that lack domestic savings and have limited or no access to international private capital
markets), helps to fill financing gaps, increases the investment which in turn enhances eco-
nomic growth, largely dominated the international development discourse. Aid advocates
22The MDGs are drawn from the actions and targets contained in the Millennium Declaration that was
adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of state and governments during the United Nations
Millennium Summit in September 2000. These goals to be achieved by 2015, underscore (1) eradication
of extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achievement of universal primary education; (3) promotion of gender
inequality and empowerment of women; (4) reduction of child mortality; (5) improvement of maternal
health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability;
and (8) development of global partnership.
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(Sachs, Stiglitz, Stern) pointed out to success stories, where aid has contributed to poverty
reduction and improved growth in countries like Botswana, Indonesia, Korea, Tanzania
and Mozambique (Radelet, 2006). Success stories support the point of view that, whenever
aid is part of a coherent development strategy, which implies a close cooperation between
developed and developing countries, and whenever it is deployed in an effective way, aid
does make a lasting difference to development. This coherent strategy requires that be-
sides aid policy, developed countries set up development policies with regard to trade,
investment, and migration, that are consistent with development goals, and that ensure
transfers of resources from the developed to the developing world, instead of the other
way around. At the same time, it requires developing countries to multiply their efforts to
improve governance quality, and provide a more stable and secure business environment.
But, experience has shown that foreign aid did not make miracles. Countries in Africa
(e.g. Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo23, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Somalia)
and in South Asia are often given as examples of aid ineffectiveness (Radelet, 2006). Critics
(Friedman, Bauer, Easterly, Ditchter) argued that aid has been counterproductive and has
sometimes even harmed recipient economies by enlarging government bureaucracies, and
by perpetuating bad governments and enriching elites. Moreover, it has been argued
that if aid has not always reached its objectives, it might be because it has not always
been targeted at the poor, and has instead been oriented towards donors’ self-interests;
ranging from political support of friendly developing nations (especially those considered
geographically strategic) to support for trade partners or ex-colonies.
One argument which is often brought up in favor of aid failures is the insufficient aid
resources, in terms of volume, deployed by donors. A solution identified to overcome aid
failures is the scaling up of aid. Recently, in the context of MDGs, donors have committed
to scale up aid by providing around 0.7 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to
developing countries, and about 0.15 to 0.20 percent to the least developed countries, so
as to meet the target level fixed for official development assistance (ODA)24. Although not
all donors have yet reached the fixed targets, some of them have significantly increased
their commitments for development assistance. Furthermore, at the Gleneagles G8 and
UN Millennium summits in 2005, donors renewed their commitment to increase aid. The
pledges made at these summits, combined with other commitments, implied lifting aid
from $80 billion in 2004 to $130 billion by 2010 (2004 constant prices).
Despite these commitments, there is no doubt by now that all financial flows to de-
veloping countries, including ODA, are set to be negatively affected by the current crisis.
23Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo have had zero and negative per capita growth, respectively,
over 1950-2001, period over which they benefited from financial support (Easterly, 2006).
24See Figure 1 in the Appendix of this chapter.
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At the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to review the
implementation of the Monterrey Consensus in Doha in December 2008, it was made clear
that only a few countries were still on track to meet their stated commitments. However,
even if donors maintain their aid contributions, with the falling of their GNP, the absolute
volume of aid will also fall. Following the Doha Declaration on Finance for Development,
most donors renewed their commitments to maintain, and, where possible, increase their
aid contributions. The current crisis has revealed that assistance is more crucial than ever,
with aid the only option left for many nations which have seen drastic decreases in private
financing such as foreign direct investments (FDI), portfolio investments, trade credits and
remittances (Naude´, 2009) .
The scaling up of ODA has provided prospects for a better future for many developing
countries and raised challenges for policy-makers in donor and recipient countries, as well
as for international financial organizations. However, the success of scaling up aid transfers
depends on how these policy challenges are addressed, given that past experiences with
aid allocation have not always delivered the expected results (Gupta et al., 2005; Heller,
2005). Furthermore, increasing aid by itself is not enough, and should not be at the core
of the development debate (Cornia, 2005). The fundamental question that dominates the
current debate is “how to make aid effective in achieving its development objectives?” In
the context of the adoption of MDGs, the question is rather about “how to make aid
effective in reaching the MDGs?”.
While for a long time aid mostly concerned the developing countries, twenty years ago,
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which brought several important changes in the geopoliti-
cal reality of the world, a reorientation of aid flows towards Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) took place. The
success of Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of developed economies destroyed by the
World War II, led the international community to the belief that a Marshall Plan for
transition economies might be the appropriate instrument to successfully complete their
transformation from centrally planned system to market economy. This required reforms
designed to liberalize, privatize and stabilize (Washington Consensus), as well as establish-
ing new institutions and regulations appropriate for a market economy (post-Washington
Consensus). But the transformation was most of the time accompanied by imbalances
including the collapse of production; the increase in inflation; the depreciation of the
national currency; large fiscal deficits; and the worsening of the social conditions.
The reforms designed to transform the economic systems and handle the imbalances
proved to be costly; weak growth, together with low revenue inherited from communist
times, stopped these economies from releasing enough funds to set up all the necessary
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changes. The need for external financing became rapidly apparent. Besides FDI and other
private financial flows, aid was considered as an important source of financing, provided
to support macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms, in order for these coun-
tries to achieve self-sustained grow and converge to the level of development of the West.
The stabilization and structural adjustment programs were mainly supported by interna-
tional organizations, most often the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
the European Union (EU), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), especially created to support transition. Bilateral donors, members of the De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) have also made contributions to the reform programs in these
countries.
Despite the common aim of creating a market economy, and the similarities in the
adopted programmes, the approaches to stabilization, privatization and restructuring that
these economies followed, varied from country to country, and so did the effects of these
approaches. Overall, the region has grown relatively fast, even faster than anticipated.
But, on average, a clear divide appears between, on one hand, the more advanced countries
- i.e. the new members of the EU and South Eastern European countries (SEE) - and on
the other hand, the CIS countries. For some of these countries (e.g. the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic), the transition has so far brought
great achievements and unprecedented success, while for others (i.e. most CIS countries),
a lot of disappointment has ensued from excessive income disparities and poverty. In
these countries growth was often strangled by high inflation, black markets, corruption,
and inefficient public services.
How did the front runners succeed in achieving high growth rates? And why did the
less fortunate fail? The development of the financial and banking sector, trade openness
and investments are some of the factors which led to growth in these countries. More-
over, institutional capacity and sound macroeconomic policy are pointed out as important
prerequisites for successful performance in transition economies. It is clear by now, after
twenty years of reforms, that all these economies undertook changes. The effects of these
transformations however, were disparate. Several factors are held responsible for these
different results. First, the transition did not start at the same time - the end of 1989
and beginning of 1990 for CEECs, and later for the CIS countries - the end of 1991 and
beginning of 1992.
Second, the initial situation varied a lot among these countries; this had a major in-
fluence on their output paths, and explained, to a certain extent, the differences that
continue to exist nowadays in the region. Some economies resemble market economies
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more and more, while others are still lagging behind in their transformation process. The
distortions inherited from centrally planned economy which characterized the beginning
of the transition process were more pronounced in former Soviet Union republics than in
CEECs. They include over-industrialization and poor specialization of large size indus-
trial enterprises; underdevelopment of the service sector; and perverted trade flows among
the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). As a consequence,
economic recession occurred in the early years of transition; this was characterized by a
sharp contraction in output, following the disruption of traditional trade (between CAEM
members) and financial links, and the abandonment of the centrally planned lines of pro-
duction (Havrylyshyn et al., 1998). Additionally, the rapid dismantling of old institutions
before the creation of new market institutions, in particular in the former Soviet Union,
was pointed out as a cause of poor output performance. The lack of means to enforce
rules and regulations did not create a business climate conducive to growth.
Third, the reform strategies chosen to implement the market economy were also differ-
ent. While a consensus emerged among economists with respect to transition tasks (e.g.
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, trade openness, banking and financial system
restructuring, implementation of new institutions and regulatory framework), a debate
occurred as to the most appropriate way to set up reforms. Two reform strategies were
proposed: shock therapy25 and gradualism26. Very costly in social terms, shock therapy
was considered unbearable in the long run; while, less costly and long lasting, gradualism
often led to excessive public expenses and budget deficits. In practice, most of the time,
a mix of these two strategies was implemented.
In this context of on the one hand, policy debate on the effectiveness of aid, and on
the other hand, attempts to understand the success and failures of transition, we want
through this dissertation to identify the role of foreign aid in the transformation process of
CEECs and CIS countries. Firstly, we will examine aid from both recipients’ and donors’
sides. From the recipients’ side we will investigate the effectiveness of aid with regard to
growth, while focusing on conditionality issues. From the donors’ side, we will look at aid
allocation patterns, while stressing the importance of the quality of governance in recipient
economies. Secondly, we will place aid, in the context of the so-called Policy Coherence
for Development (PCD), in particular in its relation to migration. The PCD debate has
emerged in OECD countries with regard to their foreign policies vis-a`-vis developing and
transition economies with respect to trade, investment and migration. It is supported
by the view that aid policy is not the only development policy likely to contribute to
25This shock therapy consisted in setting up all reforms as soon and as fast as possible.
26Counter to shock therapy, gradualism recommended undertaking reforms considered as crucial first,
consolidating them, and only afterwards implementing other reforms.
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growth and poverty reduction in recipient countries. Other policies with respect to trade,
investment and migration might positively impact growth and development, and moreover,
reinforce the impact of aid. We have chosen to investigate the relationship between aid
and migration since this is an aspect that has been explored less in the literature. There
are reasons to believe that these two should be explored jointly. As a matter a fact, the
first purpose of aid is to help in promoting economic and social development, and economic
motivation represents one important driver of migration. Since aid might contribute to
accelerating economic reforms in recipient countries, therefore improving welfare, this
might impact the migration behavior of aid recipient countries.
For the first two analyses, the sample of recipients will consist of CEECs and CIS
countries, while for the last analysis, since we only have one observation in time (for year
2000) we will keep the sample as large as possible and will include both developing and
transition countries. In accordance with the types of data explored in this dissertation,
several empirical methods will be used, including panel data analysis, generalized method
of moments (Chapter 2 ), Heckman’s method (Chapter 3 ) and three stage least squares
(Chapter 4 ).
Most of the existing studies in aid literature analyze aid effectiveness and allocation
in the case of developing countries. Little discussion has been made about transition
economies. This is partly explained by the fact that these countries do not have a very long
history of receiving aid; they were added to the list of aid recipients, only recently, after the
collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Some of them changed their position from aid
recipients to donors starting 2004, with their integration into the EU. However, we consider
that their experience represents an opportunity to shed light on the ongoing debate about
the role of aid in enhancing growth and welfare, and in promoting development.
In summary, this dissertation attempts to answer several research questions:
• Is there confirmed evidence that the positive impact of aid on growth is enhanced
by the presence of sound macroeconomic policy in transition economies? Does the
quality of a recipient’s institutions matter for the returns to aid? Do initial conditions
explain the different performances achieved so far among these countries? Did these
conditions influence the effectiveness of aid?
• Is aid allocated according to the needs of recipient countries; or are aid allocation
patterns oriented more towards donors’ interests ? Is the quality of governance
(considered as a signal that aid is being put into good use) a determinant of aid
allocation patterns in transition economies? Do aid allocation patterns differ among
donors?
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• Do aid and migration influence and reinforce each other? Are they substitutes or
complements? What are the channels through which aid affects migration?
The dissertation is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1 is a preliminary chapter and
introduces readers to some major issues aimed at creating a better understanding of the
complex topic of foreign aid. It offers an overview of the evolution of aid over time, while
providing some insight into changes in its role and objectives. Chapter 1 also discusses
some methodological issues related to definitions and measurements. Finally, this chapter
presents the trends and geographical distribution of aid flows with a focus on transition
economies.
Chapter 2 empirically analyzes the relationship between foreign aid and economic
growth in 25 transition economies over the period 1990-2004. Particular importance is
given here to the effectiveness of aid, a central and recurring topic in aid literature which
has been discussed and revisited with various findings depending on the employment of
different empirical methodologies. The impact of aid has been evaluated either at macroe-
conomic or microeconomic level; in cross-country comparisons or individual country case
studies; in qualitative and inter-disciplinary broad surveys, as well as quantitative econo-
metric studies.
Here, we propose an empirical analysis which investigates the effectiveness of aid, while
controlling for several factors, such as the quality of macroeconomic policy and institutions;
progress achieved in reforming the economy; and the structural characteristics of recipient
countries. The starting point for our analysis is the debate opened by the findings of
Burnside and Dollar (2000) on the conditionality of aid with regard to growth. Much of
this debate has focused on whether aid has a positive impact on growth independent of
the quality of economic policy in recipient countries, or whether the effectiveness of aid
depends on the quality of policy (Tarp, 2006). By introducing an interaction term of aid
with an index of economic policy, whose coefficient appears to be positive and significant,
Burnside and Dollar (2000) conclude that aid stimulates growth in countries with good
macroeconomic policies. They recommend a selective pattern of aid allocation, in favor to
countries that have adopted sound policies.
These findings have been a subject of research and debate among scholars and policy-
makers for the last ten years. They have provoked a lot of criticism and disagreement with
regard to identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions needed for aid to positively
contribute to growth. The main critique concerns the conditionality issue itself, with
some expounding that this contradicts the very first development objective of aid, namely
to help the poorest nations to grow. Another critique concerns the three components
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of the economic policy index, i.e. inflation, budget balance and openness; these are not
considered to be the most appropriate measures of macroeconomic policy (Berthe´le´my
and Varoudakis, 1996; Lensink and White, 2000; Amprou and Chauvet, 2004). Finally,
the econometric specification is not considered appropriate nor the results robust (Hansen
and Tarp, 2000, 2001); the validity of the results is criticized as sensitive to the inclusion
or omission of observations (Roodman, 2003; Easterly et al., 2003; Jensen and Paldam,
2003).
By using an advanced econometric technique, i.e. the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM), which allows us to obtain estimators that are consistent in the presence of both
endogenous regressors and country specific effects, we refute the findings of Burnside and
Dollar (2000). A sound policy environment, or the progress in implementing reforms and
institutions indeed raise a country’s growth, but they do not enhance the positive effects
of aid with respect to growth. Furthermore, our results are in line with the literature on
transition economies which assigns an important role to initial conditions in the process of
macroeconomic adjustment and restructuring. These conditions also seem to play a role
with regard to the effectiveness of aid, which is higher in countries with bad initial con-
ditions. However, changes in the effect of initial conditions occur over time; as transition
proceeds, the impact of these initial conditions seems to decrease.
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the specific patterns of aid allocation, with a focus
on the role of governance among the criteria of aid allocation; the analysis is carried out
on the same 25 transition economies from Chapter 2, but over the period 1996-2004. The
data span is not the same as in the previous analysis, because it is constrained by the
availability of governance indicators (Kaufman et al.’s (2005) indicators). This analysis
complements the previous (Chapter 2 ) by looking at foreign aid from the perspective of
donor countries. The process of aid allocation has sometimes revealed certain limits with
regard to the procedure of selection of recipients and the distribution of funds. Donors’
real motivations for providing aid have often been questioned; it has been argued that aid
is often provided according to donors’ self-interests (e.g. commercial, political), and this
might account for those times where aid has failed to achieve its development objectives.
Over time, the allocation of aid has been justified by either purely altruist motivations, or
by shared benefits of economic development in recipient countries, and further by political
ideology, foreign policy and donors’ commercial interests (Tarp, 2006).
Based on the existing aid allocation literature, in Chapter 3, we present a pattern of
aid allocation that takes into account the main determinants identified by this literature:
(i) donor interests ; (ii) recipient needs, and (iii) recipient performances. Our results point
out that, on average, bilateral donors do take into account the recipient needs. Moreover,
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the quality of governance seems to be rewarded by donors, since they consider it as a
signal of the way that aid will be put into use, and further of improving their allocation
strategies. Overall, bilateral aid allocation patterns do not differ from multilateral ones
which, as would be expected, take into consideration recipient needs and merits, but to a
lesser extent.
While the first two analyses address the complex issues of aid effectiveness and allo-
cation, in Chapter 4 we empirically examine the relationship between aid and migration.
This study investigates the complementarities that may exist between migration and for-
eign financial assistance, and it contributes to the debate on policy coherence for develop-
ment. The determinants of migration and the determinants of aid allocation are jointly
examined using a recent data set of bilateral migrations from the World Bank (origin-
destination migrant stocks, by level of qualification, for the year 2000). Our sample is
restricted to 187 aid recipient (migrant sending) countries, which are developing, emerg-
ing and transition economies and 22 aid donor (migrant receiving) countries, which are
DAC members (OECD).
The main objective of this analysis is to clarify how aid affects migration, by testing
the existence of two channels: (i) the effect of total aid (bilateral and multilateral) on mi-
gration, referred to as a push effect ; (ii) the effect of bilateral aid on migration, referred to
as an attraction effect. The relationship between aid and migration is studied in a simul-
taneous equation system of two equations - migration gravity equation and aid equation,
estimated with the three-stage least squares method (3SLS). Our results illustrate that
total aid stimulates migration by increasing expenditure financing and by that increasing
wages in the home (aid recipient) country. Moreover, bilateral aid influences migration by
enhancing information about labor market conditions in host country. Finally, it seems
that aid and migration are substitutes above a threshold of about $7300 US per capita
(PPP 2000 prices). For poor developing countries which fall below this threshold, increases
in income per capita (as a consequence of efficient aid policy) initially stimulate rather
than dampen emigration; for these countries there is a trade-off between aid and migra-
tion policies. With respect to the level of migrants’ qualifications, it appears that skilled
migrants are more sensitive to the attraction effect than unskilled migrants.
This dissertation adds to the literature on the subject in three ways:
• It analyzes a sample of countries that have not been explored to a great extent
in the previous literature because of data availability, namely transition economies.
It provides results with regard to aid effectiveness and allocation which might be
compared with those for developing countries.
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• It contributes to the policy coherence for development debate by analyzing an as-
pect that has been given less discussion in the literature, namely the substitutabil-
ity/complementarity between aid and migration. It identifies two channels through
which aid influences migration (the push effect and the attraction effect).
• From a policy recommendations perspective it proposes an aid allocation pattern
that considers mainly recipient needs and merits (as measured by the quality of
governance). Finally, it underlines the importance of a coherent implementation of
these policies, and the necessity to deal with their potential shortcomings, so that
these policies have beneficial implications for developing countries.
Following this brief introduction, lets dive into the core of the subject!
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Appendix of General Overview
Figure 1: Net ODA flows from DAC members, 1990-2007 and simulations to 2010.
Source: OECD-DAC (2008).
Note: 2008 data are preliminary.
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Chapter 1
Preliminary Chapter
T
his first chapter of the dissertation provides readers with a framework of the origins
and evolution of foreign aid, and the motives of aid allocation. Moreover, it discusses
the main methodological issues related to the definitions and measuring methods of foreign
aid. Finally, it presents some stylized facts regarding trends and geographical distribution
in aid flows, with a focus on transition economies.
1.1 Foreign Aid: The Story
The origins of foreign aid go back to the colonial period. At that time aid was
granted to colonies in order to set up the required infrastructure that would allow them
to finance their trade (importations). This aid was subject to the economic and political
considerations related to the interests of the “Me´tropoles”. This changed once the ex-
colonial powers lost their financial and political influence both at a local (as the ex-colonies
began to fight for their independence) and international level.
In its modern form, foreign aid emerged in the post World War II period. TheMarshall
Plan offered unprecedented US assistance1 to Western European countries, targeted for
post war reconstruction. Increased production and income in rich countries devastated
by the war was a priority. The Marshall Plan was a success, showing the importance of
relying on financial and technical assistance in order to undertake a rapid transformation
of economies; it brought a lot of optimism with regard to the future effectiveness of foreign
aid and lead to a shift in the focus of aid from developed to developing countries (Tarp,
1The 1950s were considered “a decade of US hegemony”, since the US aid accounted for two third of
total aid designed for the reconstruction of Europe (Hjertholm and White, 2000).
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2006). An overview of the main developments and objectives of foreign aid is provided in
Table 1.1, modified and amended from Hjertholm and White (2000).
Achieving growth was, in the 1950s, the macroeconomic priority of economic policy,
and investment was largely accepted as an important growth driver. The Harrod-Domar
growth model dominated the development paradigm of the 1950s; it identified aid as
a source of capital which triggered growth through increased investment (by filling the
investment-savings gap). The two-gap model (Chenery et Strout, 1966) which became
dominant in the 1960s, added to the model of Harrod-Domar the foreign exchange gap;
and the role of aid became that of fillings these two gaps.
The 1970s brought, in addition to the main objective of aid, i.e. enhancing growth,
another development objective, namely poverty reduction which translated into the satis-
faction of basic human needs. The concern of the impact of aid was being redefined in terms
of rising living standards of the poorest populations in developing countries, by assuring
equitable income distribution and equal employment opportunities. Major donor agencies,
both bilateral and multilateral, were involved in projects financing education and health2,
agriculture and rural development, and projects providing technical assistance and direct
assistance to benefit the poor (Brown, 1990).
The emergence of external debt crises and large deficits of balance of payments of
developed countries, in the early 1980s, (the consequence of oil shocks, of increasing raw
materials prices, and of the decline in global demand, which strongly affected the ex-
portations of developing economies) shifted the focus of aid towards the role of economic
policy, with an emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization. In this context, the development
strategy focused on internal policy failures and the achievement of a macroeconomic equi-
librium3 which became a priority for subsequent development. Aid was seen as a support
for managing external debt and encouraging the implementation of appropriate macroeco-
nomic and structural adjustment policy through a conditionality mechanism4 attached to
program lending. However, the structural adjustment programmes generated high human
costs and the cutting-down of assistance to sectors, such as health and education. Be-
cause of these considerations, they were the target of sharp criticism (Cornia et al., 1987;
Grant, 1990). A characteristic of this period was the emergence of non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), which became agents of aid delivery. More and more bilateral donors
2For example, USAID’s Office of Population began in 1972 the Demographic and Health Surveys, a
training for reproductive health (Thorbecke, 2000).
3This implied controlled inflation through restrictive monetary policy, budget surplus and financial
liberalization. These policies were advocated by major donor agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions,
i.e. the IMF and the World Bank.
4Conditionality describes the use of conditions attached to a loan, debt relief, bilateral or multilateral
aid. Policy conditionality is most often associated with the IMF and the World Bank, but all donor
countries use conditions to some extent.
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agencies gave up their role in the implementation of foreign assistance projects and started
to channel their resources through NGOs5.
The end of the Cold War (the 1990s) came with several important changes in foreign
aid industry. First, poverty reduction reappeared on the agenda of donor agencies6, as
a consequence of the rising criticism of the macroeconomic and structural adjustment
programmes of the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, the quality of governance in recipient
countries became an issue of serious concern for the donors. In this new emerging context,
donors began to award or withdraw aid on the basis of an expected quality of governance7.
The effectiveness of aid became the priority of the allocation process in this context.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) findings that “aid works in a sound policy environment” are
central to the ongoing debate with regard to the role of aid and its effectiveness 8. The
World Bank recognized the importance of their findings and the Report, “Assessing Aid”
(1998) became a sort of “guidelines” for aid donor strategy.
In recent years, the role of aid in the eradication of poverty in all its dimensions (mone-
tary poverty, poor health and education) has been reaffirmed. The new millennium started
under the sign of a new partnership between developed and developing countries, with the
United Nations’ Millennium Assembly, in September 2000. This largest gathering of world
leaders in mankind history adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The In-
ternational Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (2002), re-addressed
the debate on the challenges of providing the financial means for economic progress and
underlined the necessity for coherence among development policies: “For many countries
[...], ODA is still the largest source of external financing and is critical to the achievement
of the development goals and targets of the Millennium Declaration and other interna-
tionally agreed development goals.” (United Nations, 2002: paragraph 39); “It is vital
to build support to ODA, by increasing partnerships and cooperation between developed
and developing countries in order to further improve the policies and the development
5In the UK, since 1996, the Department for International Development has worked with more than
120 NGOs. Likewise, USAID currently works with more than 3500 companies and 300 private voluntary
organizations, while EUROPEAID, through the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development
(CONCORD), presently works with 20 international networks and 22 national associations from the
European Member States and the candidate countries, which accounts for 1600 European NGOs.
6The turning point for poverty alleviation reappearing on the agenda of donor agencies was the World
Development Report (World Bank, 1990). It designed the New Poverty Agenda. Moreover, the DAC
Report “Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation” (OECD, 1996) repre-
sented a turning point in the emergence of a consensus concerning the objectives of development strategies
and the new mission of foreign aid.
7During the Cold War period, donors did not give much consideration to the quality of governance,
but rather supported any “friendly regime” (to the West).
8For other contributions to the aid effectiveness debate see also Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard
and Hansen (2001), Lensink and White (2000), McGillivray and Morrissey (2000), and Guillaumont and
Chauvet (2001).
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strategies, both nationally and internationally, and to enhance aid effectiveness.” (United
Nations, 2002: paragraph 41).
Additionally, the concern about “good governance” continues to remain on the agenda
of donors’ criteria for aid allocation. Donors understand that macroeconomic policy is
certainly important, but also the role of institutions in determining policy outcomes is
essential. This led to the so-called “performance-based” allocation of aid. Donors need
a way to reassure themselves that aid is put into good hands. Also, they hope that, by
rewarding some recipients for good performance they will create better incentives for other
countries (Klitgaard et al., 2005).
Currently the financial and economic crisis is raising a lot of concern regarding the
capacity of donors to live up to their commitments. The crisis is expected to undermine
donors’ efforts which they have been urged by the MDGs to raise aid for poverty reduction,
health, and education programs, to 0.7 percent of the their GNI by 2015. Reductions in
aid budgets would be unwelcome, especially at just the moment when more aid is needed.
Eventual cuts in aid would negatively affect poverty and unemployment in recipient coun-
tries which are very much dependent on international aid. Moreover, not only is official
assistance expected to decrease, but also private capital flows (an additional source of
finance in certain developing countries) is likely to be difficult to mobilize. Declines in
remittances and trade flows are also expected to impact on developing economies (Naude´,
2009). It is therefore important to address the current crisis by increasing development aid
in order to meet the financial needs of recipients. However, besides increasing the aid flows,
finding new means of making aid more productive is another key that should challenge the
current aid allocation. “Mobilizing and increasing the effective use of financial resources
and achieving national and international economic conditions needed to fulfil internation-
ally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration,
to eliminate poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and protect our
environment, will be our first step to ensuring that the twenty-first century becomes the
century of development for all.” (United Nations, Monterrey Report, 2002: paragraph 3).
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1.2 Foreign Aid: How is it Measured?
The standard definition of foreign aid, widely accepted in the development commu-
nity, is the one proposed by the DAC9 of the OECD. DAC introduced the concept of
Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Official (OA) in the 1970s. According to this
definition, ODA consists of official grants10 and concessional loans11 from bilateral or mul-
tilateral donors to emerging and developing countries12 which aim to promote economic
development and welfare (OECD, 2001). The distinction between ODA and OA concerns
the type of recipient country. OA consists of aid flows that meet the eligibility conditions
for inclusion in ODA, but whose recipients are countries in transition, mainly CEECs and
CIS countries, and countries whose per capita income has been higher than the threshold
of about $9000 fixed by the World Bank for “high income” countries for three consecutive
years (e.g. Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel and Singapore).
In order for financial flows to be considered as ODA/OA, they should verified the
following criteria: (i) the flows must to be provided by the official sector of the donor
country; (ii) the flows must be designed to promote economic development and welfare
in recipient countries; (iii) the flows must have a grant element of at least 25 percent
(the present value of the loan must be at least 25 percent below the present value of a
comparable loan at market interest rates13). ODA/OA also includes grants for technical
cooperation14; it excludes aid for military purposes, political development programs, trade
9The Development Assistance Committee (OECD), deals with development co-operation matters, and
is in charge of the management of foreign aid committed by rich developed countries to developing and
transition countries.
10Grants cover the transfers, in money or in kind, for which no repayment is required. It includes grants
for technical co-operation, grant-like flows, i.e., loans extended by governments or official agencies in the
currencies of the donor countries but repayable in the recipients’ currencies and the transfer of resources
through sales of commodities for recipients’ currencies, less local currency balances used by the donor for
anything other than development purposes. It excludes any reparations and indemnification payments
to private individuals, insurance and similar payments to residents of developing countries, and loans
extended in and repayable in the recipients’ currencies (DAC Glossary, OECD, 2007).
11Loans are transfers for which repayment is required. Concessional loans are loans with a certain
concessionality level that reflects the benefit to the borrower compared to a loan at market rate. Non-
concessional loans include loans that carry market or near-market terms and they are counted as part of
official development finance.
12The potential recipient countries have to be registered on the DAC recipient list, that is updated
every year. The list shows the developing countries and territories eligible to receive ODA/OA.
13DAC assumes that the market interest rates are 10 percent with no grace period. Accordingly, the
grant element is zero for a loan carrying a 10 percent interest rate, 100 percent for an outright grant, and
an interest rate somewhere in-between for other loans.
14“This is defined as activities whose primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills,
technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries, i.e., increasing
their stock of human intellectual capital, or their capacity for more effective use of their existing factor
endowment. Accordingly, the figures relate mainly to activities involving the supply of human resources
- teachers, volunteers, experts in various sectors; and action targeted on human resources - education,
training, advice. (DAC Glossary, OECD, 2007).
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credits debt forgiveness for military loans assistance, assistance from NGOs, other private
organizations or bank loans.
ODA/OA might be bilateral or multilateral. It is considered bilateral when it is pro-
vided directly by a donor country (developed country) to any given aid recipient country
(emerging and developing country). It is multilateral when it is provided by donors, but
channeled via international organizations which are active in development, like develop-
ment banks - the World Bank; the African Development Bank; the Asian Development
Bank; the IMF; the United Nations agencies and regional groupings, such as the EU and
Arab agencies.
ODA/OA can be measured as commitments or disbursements. Commitments are de-
fined by the DAC as “a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary
funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country
or a multilateral organization. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of
expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements”.
Disbursements stand for “the release of funds, or the purchase of goods or services for
a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual in-
ternational transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to
the donor.”. (DAC Glossary, OCED 2007). Additionally, disbursements can be measured
in gross or net terms. Gross ODA disbursements capture all disbursements from donors
to recipients, while net ODA disbursements represent gross transfers after subtraction of
amortizations (i.e. loan repayments). When analyzing aid flows the distinction between
commitments or disbursements has to be considered with respect to the objective of the
study. If the objective is to analyze aid effectiveness, disbursements are generally used
since they represent the aid flows actually transferred to recipient countries and they
depend only on the administrative capacity and willingness of recipients to receive and
manage the money. While investigating the determinants of aid allocation, on the other
hand, commitments are generally preferred, since they better reflect the decisions over
which donors exercise full control (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; McGillivray and
White, 1995).
An important aspect that should be taken into consideration when measuring aid flows,
is whether one should look at aid flows measured (i) in volumes; (ii) as a share of GDP, or
(iii) in per capita terms. The measurement in level is important, but it does not say much
about the amount of aid flow with respect to the size of a country (in terms of population
size). In fact, it has been observed that, while considering aid in volumes, big countries
seem to receive more aid in absolute terms. On the contrary, considering aid per capita
allows one to test whether small countries get more per capita foreign assistance than big
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ones. Aid measured as a share of the GDP of a recipient displays the size of aid flows
relative to the wealth of the recipient economy. Nevertheless, it can also show a distorted
picture when the GDP of recipients is low or the amounts of aid flows are very large. In
either case, the computed share of aid to GDP appears to be high.
Although the ODA/OA definition of DAC is the most commonly used in the litera-
ture, several researchers emphasize some weaknesses in using this approach to define and
measure foreign aid. According to Chang et al. (1999), ODA does not precisely measure
the exact value of foreign aid flows and that the evolution of net ODA over time, and
across donors and recipients, provides a distorted picture of aid trends. They show that
this distortion arises because the aid content is underestimated due to netting out; loans
with low concessionality15 are under-represented, while loans with high concessionality
are over-represented; official technical assistance grants are included with their full value;
using constant discount and interest rates (the rates are constant all along the life span of
loans) instead of actual market rates (credit risks are not accounted for - the interest rate
is always 10 percent whatever the real opportunity cost of donors, which depends on the
currency risk, maturity and period of time).
To adjust these limits, they propose a new approach for measuring foreign aid flows, the
so-called Effective Development Assistance (EDA). As reported by Chang et al. (1998),
EDA is composed of the grants and grant shares of official loans (even those with a grant
element of less than 25 percent), calculated on a basis of actual interest rates (market
rates). Technical assistance flows are excluded from their definition. They show that over
the last few years, conventional net ODA flows have overstated EDA flows by 25-30 per-
cent16. However, some of their points are problematic and lead to the underestimation of
the actual value of aid flows. In particular, the exclusion of official technical assistance
grants from aid flows goes against some of initial rationales for foreign aid and, conse-
quently, underestimates the actual value of aid flows received. According to Dalgaard and
Hansen (2001), discussions of consistency and changes in aid flows are irrelevant. They
note that there certainly is a difference between ODA and EDA17, but that this difference
is likely to be only a simple transformation18.
15Loans with a grant element generally equal to zero, or less than 25 percent.
16They graphically represent net ODA and EDA flows for 1975-1995 period and note that the two
graphs are parallel, with the graph of ODA higher by 25-30 percent, compared to the graph of EDA.
17They compare ODA and EDA flows as a ratio of GDP and they find a certain proportionality between
the two of them, with ODA being slightly superior to EDA.
18This is demonstrated by a correlation coefficient of about 0.98 between the two measures (the corre-
lation coefficient was computed with both Pearson’s standard and Spearman’s.)
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1.3 Trends in Aid Flows
This section reviews trends in aid flows regarding aggregate volumes and geographical
distribution by sources (donors) and destinations (recipients) with a focus on bilateral and
multilateral aid in transition economies.
Aggregate Aid Flows
Figure 1.1 presents the aggregate trends in net ODA given to developing countries for
the period 1960 to 2007. Over the whole period, the total net ODA increased from only
$32.6 billion to $72.9 billion (constant 2007 prices). The overall trend in total ODA flows
is clearly upward. Aid increased almost every year between 1960 and 1992, with a peak in
1991, when the total net ODA in constant 2007 prices reached $59.8 billion. The decline
between 1992 and 1997, from $59.8 billion to $43.2 billion (constant 2007 prices), was a
consequence of the end of the Cold War, the weakening of the relationships between the
former colonial powers and their ex-colonies, but also donors’ concern about the credibility
of governments in recipient countries, with regard to governance and corruption. Also, the
“aid-fatigue” manifested by cuts in the aid budgets of most of the donors, a consequence
of the increasing pressure on their national budgets (in the context of Maastricht criteria)
explains the decline in aid volumes. Donors like Italy, Sweden and Finland added to the
expense of their aid recipients, the large fiscal deficits they ran. However, donors with
smaller budget deficits, like Norway, Japan and Ireland managed to increase their aid
budgets in real terms (OECD-DAC, 1997, 2000). The adoption of MDGs (in 2000), and
donors commitment to scale up aid translated in increasing aid flows that reached $90.3
billion in 2005 (constant 2007 prices). The same upward trend is observed in aid per capita
flows; it increased from $2 to $19.8 over the period (1960-2007), whit a first peak in 1991,
$14.5, and a second in 2005, $20.8.
The trends in the average ratio of net ODA flows to recipients’ gross national income
(GNI) are shown in Figure 1.2. The whole period average is about 1.4%. The overall
trend is clearly downward over the entire period; the ratio decreased from 2% in 1960 to
0.9% in 2007, with its lowest value in 1997, 0.8%. These figures illustrate that, even if in
terms of volumes or in per capita terms, aid might look important, it only represents a
small share of recipients GNI.
A comparison between multilateral and bilateral aid flows (Figure 1.3) shows that the
former are almost two times lower than bilateral aid flows. However, the general trend
in multilateral ODA flows is, on average, upward. The increase in the 1970s and 1980s is
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Figure 1.1: Net ODA to developing countries, 1960-2007 (constant 2007 billion US$).
Source: OECD-DAC.
Figure 1.2: Net ODA to developing countries, 1960-2007, % of recipients’ GNI.
Source: OECD-DAC.
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partly explained by the reorientation of aid towards poverty alleviation19. The decision
of the international institutions (i.e. the World Bank, the IMF) to financially support
developing countries that were facing losses due to oil price shocks and debt crises also
contributed to an increase in the share of multilateral assistance (White, 2003).
Figure 1.3: Share of multilateral/bilateral ODA, 1960-2007 (period averages, %).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Besides ODA, recipients might benefit from other financial flows, in particular private
flows. During 1960-1969, private flows represented about 45% of the total flows, official
and private, to developing countries (Figure 1.4), which is relatively high compared to
official flows. Private flows have experienced both phases of expansion (1975-1979; 1990-
1997; 2004-2007) and decline (during the 1980s). The expansion of private flows was
the consequence of increases in financial resources from oil producers (following the oil
price shock in 1973), as well as of the high inflation rates and low returns to capital
experienced by developed countries, which actually lead banks to look for new investment
opportunities in developing countries (OECD-DAC, 2000). While at times the decrease in
official aid flows was compensated by the expansion in private financial flows, there were
occasions when both official and private aid flows expanded or declined simultaneously.
For instance, in the 1970s, official aid flows increased, while private flows simultaneously
experienced an expansion. During the 1980s, while official aid flows remained relatively
stable, private flows declined. Moreover, the sharp decrease in official flows between 1990-
1997 was compensated by a strong expansion of private flows.
19In practice, the size of poverty-focused concessional financing increased from 5 percent in the late
1960s to 30 percent in the early 1980s (Thorbecke, 2000).
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Figure 1.4: Total Official and Private Flows, all donors (period averages, %), 1960-2008.
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Allocation by Donor
Figure 1.5 shows the allocation of bilateral ODA by donor. While net ODA flows
from the United States have declined over time, relative to the total aid flows from DAC
members, aggregate aid flows from EU members have been steadily increasing. However,
in recent years, the United States is the world’s largest aid donor in terms of volume. In
2008 according to preliminary data from OECD, the United States provided $25.4 billion
(constant 2007 prices), followed by Germany ($13 billion), the United Kingdom ($12.2
billion), France ($10.2 billion), Japan ($18.3 billion) and the Netherlands ($6.5 billion).
Figure 1.5: Net ODA by donor (DAC members), 1960-2008 (constant 2007 billion US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
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Allocation by Recipient Region
Figure 1.6 gives the geographical allocation, by region, of net ODA disbursements.
Sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the priority regions for the donors since the early
1970s, with about one third of total ODA going to countries in this region. Countries from
South and Central Asia have seen their total aid flows decline since the 1970s. However,
this region still receives a lot of attention from donors. One reason for the decline in the
Asian-Pacific share of total aid was the successful development efforts of countries like the
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and China.
Figure 1.6: Regional allocation of net ODA, 1960-2007 (constant 2007 billion US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Allocation in Eastern Europe
Since 1990, after the fall of the Berlin wall, changes in the international financial
architecture have occurred, specifically with the addition of CEECs and CIS countries to
the list of DAC recipients. While Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian-Pacific regions remain
important aid recipients, CEECs and CIS countries have also become favored destinations
for aid. Analysts talked about a reorientation of aid flows from developing to transition
economies.
Figure 1.7 shows the shares of net ODA disbursements from all donors to CEECs and
CIS countries over the period 1990-2004. Note that, starting 2005, ten of the CEECs
countries were removed from the DAC recipients list when they became members of the
EU. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are the only CEECs that are still receiving DAC
support. Here we only present the evolution of aid flows for the period 1990-2004, period
over which data on aid flows are available for all the countries in the region.
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Figure 1.7: Net ODA/OA, All donors, 1990-2004 (constant 2007 million US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
The volumes of net ODA fluctuated quite a lot; increase phases alternated with decline
phases. The most spectacular increase was in the early years of transition. This substantial
effort of donor countries to provide assistance to this region proves that the international
community recognized the need for transition economies to restructure and to implement
reforms during the transformation process from planned to market-based economy. The
economic situation of these economies did not allow them at that time to cope with these
challenges and provide all the financing required for the transformation. Aid given to these
countries was mainly designed to support at first, the democratic development and then
the process of implementing reforms aimed at changing and improving economic and social
infrastructure. A lot of aid was given in the form of technical assistance. For example,
the average share of technical co-operation received by CEECs countries, over the period
1990-2004, was about 22% of the total net ODA disbursements; for CIS countries this
share was 36% (OECD, 2007).
The support came mainly from international organizations (the EU, the IMF, theWorld
Bank), but also bilateral donors (DAC members). Looking at the share of net ODA by
group of countries - CEECs and CIS and type of donor - multilateral and DAC donors
(Figures 1.8 and 1.9) - one could notice that aid has been quite unevenly distributed.
Overall, CEECs enjoyed special treatment, particularly from multilateral donors. How-
ever, while at the beginning of transition, CEECs initially got almost tow times more
financial assistance from multilateral donors, as transition advanced the multilateral as-
sistance to CIS countries increased. Bilateral assistance in the region was more equitable,
with CIS somehow better positioned.
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Figure 1.8: Net ODA/OA, Multilateral donors, 1990-2004 (constant 2007 million US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Figure 1.9: Net ODA/OA, DAC donors, 1990-2004 (constant 2007 millions US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
In terms of aid per capita20 (Figure 1.10), the picture is similar, CEECs appear to
have received overall more aid; in 2004 for example, CEECs got almost two times more
aid (60.3 $US per capita) than CIS (29.22 $US per capita).
20Aid per capita includes both ODA and OA. It is calculated by dividing total aid by the midyear
population estimate.
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Figure 1.10: Aid per capita, average by region, 1990-2004 (current US$).
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
One argument brought up in favor of the important aid flows towards CEECs was the
preparation of their integration within the EU. The aid from the EU, via the European
Commission (EC), the largest multilateral source of finance and technical assistance to
CEECs, was considered as an efficient mechanism that allowed CEECs to successfully
complete their transformation by acquiring the capacities to satisfy economic and political
criteria that follow from the statute of a future EU member. The EU pre-adhesion aid
was provided through several instruments, namely: (i) PHARE 21, designed to support
economic restructuring and prepare the adhesion; (ii) ISPA, relative to environment and
transports; (iii) SAPARD, relative to agriculture and rural development. For the period
2007-2013 these three instruments have been replaced by a single one, IAP (instrument
for pre-adhesion aid) which benefits to candidate countries, i.e. Balkan countries and
Turkey. This aid has been provided conditional on the progress achieved and the needs of
recipients. The EU aid to CIS countries has been provided through TACIS 22 programme,
which aims to promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy
and the rule of law.
21PHARE programme is the main pre-accession instrument of the European Union. It was set up
in 1989 and started operations in January 1990, with the objective of achieving market economy based
on free enterprize and private initiative for supported countries. It initially covered only Poland and
Hungary. Later it was gradually extended; the candidate countries that have benefited from PHARE are
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia.
22TACIS programme was established in July 1991 to help the Soviet Union in its efforts to implement
reforms. After the dissolution of USSR it supported the twelve CIS countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
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Chapter 2
Aid Effectiveness, Policies and
Institutions
T
he debate about foreign aid and its effectiveness goes back decades. Whether foreign
aid has effectively achieved its objectives so far is still an unanswered question that
has been raised in both the academic and international aid community. Success stories
support the role of aid in enhancing growth, while aid failures raise questions about it.
The core of the analysis of aid effectiveness in enhancing growth has became dominated
by the debate about whether the positive impact of aid is conditioned by the quality of
policy in recipient economies, or on the contrary, whether this impact is independent
of the quality of policy (Tarp, 2006). If aid works only in sound policy environments,
a selective allocation of aid in favor of good performers is appropriate. Otherwise, the
scenario of a selective allocation of aid should be treated with concern. The starting point
of this debate relies on the recent findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000). Their study
highlights that in a sound policy environment characterized by low inflation, low budget
deficits and trade openness, the impact of aid is greater than in a poor policy environment.
According to them, if aid sometimes failed to achieve its goals in the past it was because
the allocation criteria did not consider this aspect. The policy implication of their findings
is that “making aid more systematically conditional on the quality of policies would likely
increase its impact on developing country growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, p. 864).
Questioning the effectiveness of aid is a topic that has most often been addressed in
the case of developing countries; the evidence for transition economies is scarce. As a
matter of fact, these countries do not have a long history as aid recipients. Aid started
to be provided to them only after the collapse of communism being designed mainly to
support reforms and restructuring of centrally planned economies in order for them to
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achieve market economy. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to fill the gap, and to
investigate the effectiveness of aid in transition economies - Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) and Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS); in light of Burnside
and Dollar’s findings, the macroeconomic effect of aid on growth is analyzed by taking
into account the policy environment.
In addition, we consider the effects of aid with respect to the institutional environ-
ment and the progress in implementing reforms. The transformation of centrally planned
economies required, among others (stabilization, liberalization and privatization), new
institutions and new regulations proper to market economies. Transition literature has
payed a lot of attention to the institutional approach. Here we adopt this approach and
we analyze whether the positive impact of institutions enhances aid’s impact on growth.
Moreover, we consider the idea that structural characteristics of recipient countries, as
measured by the conditions at the beginning of transition, affect the effectiveness of aid in
promoting growth and development. In particular, this region is characterized by the high
heterogeneity of its economies. They range from low income (most of the CIS) to more
advanced economies (the new members of the EU). Ever since the beginning of transition
process these economies displayed considerable differences in their level of development,
macroeconomic imbalances, and degree of integration into the socialist trading system;
also in geographical location and in natural resource endowments (De Melo et al., 1997b).
Even though the time-lapse since the transition started is relatively small (for CEECs,
only fifteen years of experience in receiving aid), an analysis of the impact of aid in these
economies might shed light on the effectiveness of aid in achieving its objectives. Some
of these countries have recently become new EU members; they have been successful in
reforming their economies and have taken advantage of the integration prospect. It is
therefore interesting to find out whether aid has provided support through the complex
process of transformation from planned to market economy undertaken by these economies.
The main focus of this chapter is on how the impact of aid on growth in transi-
tion economies varies with different indices that measure the quality of macroeconomic
policy, the progress in implementing reforms (both structural and institutional) and the
initial conditions. The starting point for our analysis is Burnside and Dollar (2000)1 who
stress the importance of aid conditionality. We will adapt their methodology to transition
economies and make some additions regarding the conditionality of aid impact with re-
spect to variables other than the macroeconomic policies. In order to empirically validate
our hypotheses we will run the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which is the
1Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) methodology and results are provided in section 2.2.1.
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most appropriate estimation method that suits our data. We will carry out our empirical
analysis on a sample of 25 transition economies over a fifteen-year period (1990-2004).
This chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature.
First, we have shown that the positive impact of aid on growth conditioned by the qual-
ity of macroeconomic policies is not significant. Aid appears to positively affect growth,
but the presence of sound macroeconomic policies do not enhance this positive impact.
Our results do not validate Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings on aid conditionality;
and they are in line with all the subsequent literature that rejects the role of economic
policies in the effectiveness of aid with respect to growth.
Second, we have found that the quality of institutions and reforms do not play a signif-
icant role in enhancing the effect of aid on growth either. In transition economies, struc-
tural and institutional reforms indeed contribute to growth and economic development.
However, their contribution to the positive impact of aid on growth is not noticeable.
Finally, we have shown that the starting point of transition economies, as measured
by the initial conditions (see Falcetti et al., 2002) matters for the returns to aid. We
have found evidence that aid is more effective in spurring growth in countries with bad
initial conditions in terms of level of development, macroeconomic distortions, degree of
integration into the socialist trading system, the extent of prior reforms, geographical lo-
cation and natural resource endowments. However, the negative effect of initial conditions
on growth appears to decrease over time, which further translates in less effect of aid on
growth as transition proceeds.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of the existing
studies on the effectiveness of aid. Section 2 provides the conceptual framework of aid-
growth relationship in transition economies. It establishes the research question and the
subsequent hypotheses to test. Section 3 presents the methodology employed in foreign aid-
growth studies. It focuses on the neoclassical growth model and the appropriate estimation
technique when dealing with dynamic panel data. Section 4 gives a general overview of
main data trends and measurements. Section 5 outlines the econometric estimation results
and Section 6 concludes.
2.1 Overview of Studies on Aid Effectiveness
The role of foreign aid and its impact on economic growth has become a major
and highly debated topic in both theoretical and empirical growth literature in the last
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decades. In assessing the potential impact of aid two conceptually different approaches
have emerged, for and against foreign aid allocation.
The “for” approaches contend that official foreign assistance is the only source of fi-
nancing in many developing countries. Since these countries lack domestic savings and
have limited or no access to international private capital markets, foreign aid is viewed as
a source of additional finance. Its role is to help fill the financing gap in order to allow
these countries to reach a sufficient investment level that would spur economic growth.
Foreign assistance is valuable to developing countries, as it is “helps to jump-start the
process of capital accumulation, economic growth, and raising household incomes” and if
“is substantial enough, and lasts long enough, the capital stock rises sufficiently to lift
households above subsistence” (Sachs, 2005, p. 246).
The approaches “against” aid allocation argue that committing foreign aid is simply
a waste of money since its premises are wrong even if its objectives are worthwhile. By
enlarging government bureaucracies and enriching the elite in poor countries, aid flows
have already largely contributed (or will contribute) to the failure of development efforts
in many developing countries (Freidman, 1958; Little and Clifford, 1965; Bauer, 1972). The
high level of corruption, unaccountability and poor management of aid delivery mechanism
in recipient countries are some of the factors that lead to aid failures (Easterly, 2003, 2006).
Based on these two approaches, the broad literature that has emerged has attempted to
throw light on the impact of aid on development outcomes, as well as on the determinants
of aid allocation2. Studies have been carried out both at macro and microeconomic levels,
and relayed on either cross-country comparisons or single country case studies, while intro-
ducing various innovative methods and techniques for dealing with the estimation inherent
in assessing development effectiveness. The first main analytical framework used in this
literature is represented by Harrod-Domar growth model and two-gap model. Considering
the capital-output ratio as a key determinant of growth, and assuming the existence of a
savings gap that constraints investment and growth, these models emphasize the role of
aid in financing investment and propose a causal link from aid to savings, investment, and
growth.
The Aid-Domestic Savings Relationship
Most of the studies that analyze the relationship between foreign aid and domestic
savings find a negative correlation; aid and savings are considered substitutes. When
income rises as a result of foreign assistance, part of the additional income goes to current
consumption. Aid enhances consumption rather than investment; consequently, savings
2The literature on the determinants of aid allocation is detailed in Chapter 3, section 3.1.
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increase by less than the value of aid flows (Rahman, 1968; Griffin, 1970; Chenery and
Eckstein, 1970; Weisskopf, 1972; Snyder 1990; Reichel, 1995). Papanek (1972) explains
this negative association between aid and savings, by a set of exogenous factors, such as
political factors (civil wars) or climate, which are likely to cause both high aid inflows and
low savings rates. Critics of aid-savings substitutability, such as White (1992a, 1992b) for
example, argue that the results of these static analyses indicating a negative aid-savings
correlation should be cautiously considered for two reasons. First, the potential feedback
from higher income into future higher savings and higher growth is ignored in a static
analysis. Second, foreign assistance is mostly directed to health and education sectors;
these sectors, even if considered as consumer goods, help to develop human capital which,
in the long run, affect future savings, investment and economic growth.
Other studies confirm this negative relation between aid and savings, but only for some
aid recipient countries, indicating strong heterogeneity among recipients. By analyzing a
sample of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries, Hadjimichael et al. (1995) initially find a
negative relationship between foreign aid and domestic savings. But, when they control
for differences in growth performance and for the degree of progress in macroeconomic
and structural adjustment reforms, they note that the negative impact of foreign aid on
domestic savings concerned only the countries with a negative per capita growth and
chronic imbalances. However, in countries with positive growth rates and sustained effort
in implementing reforms (macroeconomic and structural adjustment), aid seems to have
stimulated domestic savings.
The Aid-Investment Relationship
The relationship between aid and investment has also received notable attention in
such literature. Most studies support the hypothesis that foreign aid raises the level of
investment in recipient countries (Lensink and Morrisey, 1999; Hansen and Tarp, 2000,
2001; Mavrotas, 2003). Levy (1987), using data on 39 least developed countries, concludes
that much of the aid transferred to developing countries finances investment and that a
one point increase in aid to income ratio leads to a 0.86 point increase in investment ratio3.
Hansen and Tarp’s (2000) survey of 7 studies (published between 1972 and 1998) provide
a positive estimate for the impact of investment on aid (fifteen out of sixteen estimates
support this hypothesis).
However, there are studies that report the existence of heterogeneity in the relationship
between aid and investment across aid-recipient countries. For example, Easterly (1999)
3The estimated coefficient of 0.86 is found for total ODA including technical assistance. When estimates
are run with aid net of technical assistance, the estimated coefficient is 0.96. These findings represent an
argument in favor of the importance of aid disaggregation in evaluating the impact of aid on development
outcomes.
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finds that, out of 88 aid recipient countries analyzed over a thirty-year period (1965-
1995), aid has a negative and significant impact on investment in 36 countries, a negative
but insignificant impact in 17 countries, a positive and significant impact in 23 countries
and a positive but insignificant impact in 12 countries. Nonetheless, the results should
be considered with precaution since Easterly (1999) uses a simple ordinary least squares
(OLS) model without allowing for potential sources of bias.
The Aid-Growth Relationship
Later, when the focus shifted away from simplistic Harrod-Domar and two-gap mod-
els towards more sophisticated models based on neoclassical and other growth models,
most of the academic and policy debate on aid effectiveness turned to the analysis of the
relationship between aid and growth. This new approach has produced a broad, but con-
tradictory strand of literature. As noted by Hansen and Tarp (2000), between 1970 and
2000, about 72 cross-country studies have tested the link between foreign aid and economic
growth. And there is still no agreement among researchers on the growth effects of aid.
While some authors argue that aid helped to promote growth and structural adjustment
in a large number of less developed countries, others disagree. Several generations of these
studies have been identified: (1) the first generation which analyze the link between aid,
savings and growth; (2) the second which identifies that aid affects growth only under cer-
tain circumstances; (3) the third which illustrates the impact of aid on poverty reduction
through economic growth.
First Generation Studies
The studies on aid-savings-growth relationships consider capital accumulation as cen-
tral and perceive aid simply as an exogenous net increment to the capital stock of the
recipient country. The results of these studies point out either no effect or a negative ef-
fect of foreign aid in enhancing economic growth, or a positive effect, but with diminishing
returns4 (Radelet et al., 2004).
The most important contribution to the literature that finds no effect or a negative
effect of foreign aid on growth comes from Mosley et al. (1987, 1992). They argue that
the lack of impact found in both cross-section and time series analyses is caused by a
possible leakage of aid into non-productive expenditure in the public sector and a possible
transmission of a negative price effect into the private sector. Boone (1995) also adds an
4The concept of diminishing returns illustrates the idea of absorption capacity constraint, which reflects
the limitations in the infrastructure of both human and physical capital.
33
important contribution explaining the possible failures of aid in promoting growth by the
Dutch disease effect of aid5, corruption, and rent seeking behavior.
In a recent study, Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) found no robust evidence of a posi-
tive/negative relationship between aid inflows and economic growth in recipient countries,
with their conclusion holding across time periods and types of aid. This result is explained
in another study (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b) by the decline in competitiveness (as
measured by the decline in the share of labor intensive and tradable industries) induced
by the effect of an overvaluation of the real exchange rate caused by aid inflows.
Some studies suggest a positive influence of aid inflows on growth in recipient coun-
tries, though with diminishing returns (Durbarry et al., 1998; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001;
Hansen and Trap, 2000, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001, Dalgaard et al., 2004). One of
the most important contributions is that of Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001). By introduc-
ing quadratic aid, they allow for nonlinearities in the aid-growth relationship and find a
positive and significant estimated coefficient of aid term, and a negative and significant
coefficient of the quadratic aid term. They conclude that there is a positive relationship
between aid and growth, but which diminishes as the volume of aid increases. Further
discussion on the assumption of diminishing returns is proposed by Lensink and White
(2001). They show that aid returns are not only diminishing, but, after a certain level,
aid returns become negative. They find a threshold of 50 percent of the ratio of aid to
gross national product (GNP) for negative marginal returns. They suggest scaling down
this threshold since the average aid ratio received by most of aid recipient countries is
below 50 percent of their GNP. Other studies find that this threshold is about 25 percent
(Hadjimicheal et al., 1995; Hansen and Tarp, 2000).
Second Generation Studies
When the new growth theories and the debate on growth determinants factors like
macroeconomic stabilization or structural characteristics emerged they were included in
the analysis of aid effectiveness. Additionally, a variety of innovative techniques have been
used in order to capture individual heterogeneity and to deal with the endogeneity of aid
and policy variables in relation to growth (e.g. two stage least squares (2SLS), GMM)).
Several macroeconomic indicators were used to measure the quality of macroeconomic
policies are growth rate of government consumption or credit growth rate (Kormendi and
Meguire, 1985), inflation rate and budget deficits (Fischer, 1993) or fiscal and budget policy
(Easterly and Robelo, 1993). Four studies constitute the core of all empirical analyses;
5This stands for an appreciation of the real exchange rate due to an increase in aid. This increase
might harm a country’s long-term growth prospects, since the appreciation of the real exchange can slow
the growth of a country’s exports.
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these are the studies by Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. (1998), Hansen and
Tarp (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000).
Hadjimichael et al. (1995) recognize the positive impact of aid on growth and argue
that poor economic policies determine poor economic performance (e.g. Sub-Saharan
Africa countries). Durbarry et al. (1998) find evidence that greater foreign aid inflows
have a beneficial impact on growth and identify the existence of an optimal aid allocation
in terms of growth. Hansen and Tarp’s (1999) findings support the hypothesis of a positive
and significant impact of aid on growth. Technically, their analysis is more advanced than
any others sofar. They use an estimation technique for dynamic panel data models with
country specific effects which takes into account any unobserved country-specific effects
and the endogeneity of both aid and policies.
The most influential study to highlight the dependence of aid effectiveness on the
policy environment is the one by Burnside and Dollar’s (2000). By using an interaction
term between aid and policy, they point out that foreign aid is effective in enhancing
growth only in the presence of sound macroeconomic policies, namely controlled inflation,
budget surplus and trade openness. According to their findings, aid works in “a good
policy environment”, but has little impact in “a poor policy environment”. If foreign
aid stimulates economic growth in countries with good policies, then foreign aid should
be given selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies. Burnside and Dollar
(2000) findings opened a new debate on foreign aid and its effectiveness and shaped the
World Bank’s assessment of aid in the late nineties. The credo that “money matters -
in a good policy environment” (World Bank, 1998, p. 28) subsequently dominated the
debate on aid effectiveness and allocation; Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings became
the officially proclaimed “guidelines” for the World Bank and individual donor countries,
while influencing their aid giving strategies.
However, Burnside and Dollar (2000) are not the only one that used interaction terms
to measure aid effectiveness; the late nineties abounded with such studies. For instance,
Dollar and Easterly (1999) show that in a sound policy environment, foreign aid enhances
private investment. Moreover, foreign aid given to a reforming government can lead to
improvements in the environment for private investment, since it creates “...confidence in
the reform program and eases infrastructure bottlenecks” (Dollar and Easterly, 1999, p.
572). By using a broader measure of the quality of macroeconomic policies, the Country
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index of the World Bank, Collier and Dollar
(2002) confirm the results of Burnside and Dollar (2000). When considering the degree of
democracy in recipient countries, Svensson’s (1999) findings provide empirical support for
the hypothesis that the positive effect of aid is greater in more democratic countries.
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Nevertheless, Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings have opened the way to strong
criticism in the international aid community. They have been reviewed and discussed
extensively in many other papers. The main critique concerns the conditionality issue in
itself. The very first development objective of aid is to help the poorest nations to grow,
and the conditionality of aid contradicts such an objective. “[...] it may well be that many
of those countries where aid works the best are, at the same time, among those that need
foreign assistance the least. In contrast, countries that are less fortunate in having good
policies in place, may need help badly to help bring them on track.” (Hansen and Tarp,
2000).
Other aspects of Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings have been subject to criticism
by subsequent research. First, an important argument against their findings concerns the
policy variable. It has been argued that the three components of the economic policy index
are not the most appropriate measures of macroeconomic policies. Lensink and White
(2000), for example, suggest that the relation between inflation and growth is probably
non-linear and consequently cannot be measured with a fixed index. Amprou and Chauvet
(2004) emphasize that budgetary surplus is not automatically favorable to growth, while
Berthe´le´my and Varoudakis (1996) demonstrate the limited impact of trade openness for
economies with underdeveloped financial systems. Secondly, the econometric specification
is not considered appropriate and nor results robust. Hansen and Tarp (2001) suggest that
the basic Burnside-Dollar results is sensitive to data and model specification. They show
that, by changing the number of observations and the model specification, the relationship
between the aid-policy interaction term and growth might appear to be negative. Jensen
and Paldam (2003) show that the regional dummies used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) to
capture the cross-country differences make the results vulnerable to the omitted variables
bias. Finally, the validity of results is sensitive to the inclusion or omission of data points;
by adding one four-year period (1994-1997)6, the aid-policy interaction term is no longer
significant (Easterly et al., 2003; Jensen and Paldam, 2003; Roodman, 2007).
Other studies have continued the debate on aid effectiveness, suggesting that, there
are some other factors, besides policy, that are likely to influence the effectiveness of aid
and therefore have an impact on economic growth (Gunning, 2001). According to Guil-
laumont and Chauvet (2001), aid works positively in countries with difficult economic
environments7, characterized by unstable terms of trade (i.e. instability of exports rev-
enues) and natural disasters (i.e. instability of the agricultural production). Dalgaard et
al. (2004) show that aid’s impact depends on climate-related factors.
6The sample in Burnside and Dollar (2000) study consists in six four-year periods, from 1970-1973 to
1990-1993.
7See also Collier and Dehn (2001).
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Third Generation Studies
A third generation of studies focuses on aid effectiveness in reducing poverty. Collier
and Dollar (1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2002) extend Burnside and Dollar’s analysis on the impact
of aid allocation on poverty reduction through economic growth. They suggest that aid
should be disbursed depending at the same time on a recipient countries’ poverty index
(CPIA), quality of macroeconomic policies and institutional environment. This specific
criteria for targeting aid is called a “poverty efficient allocation of aid”. It implies that
poor countries with good policy environments should be eligible for aid, while countries
with low CPIA scores should not or should receive less aid.
Other studies focus on aid’s impact on infant mortality. Hudson and Mosley (2001)
show that aid positively affects infant mortality, but with diminishing returns. Moreover,
the worse the economic policy environment, the higher the marginal contribution of aid
to reducing infant mortality is.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we will briefly present, first, Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) main findings.
Then, we will address our research questions and formulate several hypotheses on the
potential determinants of aid effectiveness.
2.2.1 Burnside and Dollar’s Analysis
Burnside and Dollar (2000) focus on the impact of economic policy on aid effectiveness.
By introducing an interaction term between aid and an economic policy indicator, in
growth regressions, they note that, in a neoclassical growth model, the impact of aid on
growth is greater in a“good policy environment”. This is defined as a weighted combination
of low inflation rate, low budget deficits (relative to GDP), and trade openness (as defined
by Sachs and Warner (1995)). The policy is constructed as follows:
Policy = 1.28 + 6.85Budget surplus − 1.40Inflation + 2.16Openness (2.1)
Their findings rely on a panel of 56 countries and six four-year time periods, from 1970-73
to 1990-93. The coefficients of the three policy variables are obtained from a standard
growth equation estimated with OLS method. By introducing aid (as share of GNP) and
an interaction term between aid and the policy index in a standard growth regression8,
8In addition to the central economic policy variables, some other structural, institutional and political
variables are included as control variables: (i) the M2/GDP ratio, as a measure of financial depth; (ii)
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they find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term. Based
on this result they conclude that aid works in countries with sound economic policies.
2.2.2 Hypotheses to Test
Our research questions consist of several hypotheses about the determinants of the
impact of aid on growth in recipient economies. We are using Burnside and Dollar’s (2000)
methodology as a starting point for our analysis. In addition, we are considering the effects
of aid on growth with regard to other factors, such as the quality of reforms (structural
and institutional), and the initial conditions of recipient countries. The hypotheses are as
follows:
H1: The effect of aid on growth is dependent upon by the quality of policy,
institutions and structural reforms.
H2: Initial conditions in recipient countries matter for the returns to aid.
H3: Aid has decreasing marginal returns.
By testingH1 we attempt to identify whether the impact of aid on growth in transition
economies is subject to ex-ante selectivity, which relies on the quality of macroeconomic
and institutional policy. In order to test H1 we will construct three indexes that measure
the quality of macroeconomic policy (Policy), the quality of institutions (Institutional Re-
form, IR) and of structural reforms (Structural Policy Reform, SPR). Furthermore we will
interact each of these with aid (Aid∗Policy, Aid∗SPR, Aid∗IR) to capture the marginal
effect of aid on economic growth which is conditioned by the quality of macroeconomic
policies, and structural and institutional reforms. This hypothesis is supported by the
view that aid has a positive impact on economic growth and that this positive impact is
stronger in countries with sound macroeconomic policies and reforms required to achieve
a market economy.
For H2 we will test whether structural specificities, as measured by the initial condi-
tions do affect the returns from aid. We will follow Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004)
who point out that the degree to which aid enhances growth depends on the structural
characteristics of recipients (as measured by climate-related circumstances) Here we will
use Falcetti et al.’s (2002) aggregate index of different measures of initial conditions9
which is computed through a Factor Analysis method. The importance of considering the
sociolinguistic fractionalization; (iii) political assassinations; (iv) institutions’ quality; (v) the initial level
of per capita GDP, to capture the convergence effects.
9The different components included in the initial conditions indicator are presented in Section 2.4.4.
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initial conditions when dealing with transition economies is supported by the literature
(De Melo et al., 1997b; Berg et al., 1999; Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Falcetti et al., 2002)
and is explained by the existence of considerable differences between these economies at
the beginning of the transition process. In particular, some of them were more market
economy oriented, whilst others had a longer history of communist regime. Differences
were identified in relation to various aspects, such as level of development, macroeconomic
distortions, the extent of prior reforms, the number of years spent under the communism
regime, and natural resources wealth. Each of these factors played an important role in the
subsequent transformation process undertaken by these economies. Our main objective
here is to measure the marginal effect of aid on growth which is conditioned by the initial
conditions of recipients. We will do this by estimating an interaction term between Aid
and Initial conditions (Aid ∗ Initial conditions).
The H3 hypothesis of decreasing marginal returns has been largely tested in the liter-
ature and there is a consensus which supports it (Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Durbarry et
al., 1998; Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Lensink and White,
2001; Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004). It is verified by
a negative and significant coefficient of squared aid in growth regressions. There are two
rationales behind this hypothesis: (i) the absorption capacity - the impact of aid on growth
depends on the absorption capacity of recipient economies; large amounts of foreign aid are
less productive (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Adler, 1965; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Guillau-
mont, 1971a, 1971b); (ii) the Dutch disease effect of aid - large amounts of aid are likely to
determine the appreciation of the real exchange rate via the decline in exportations, which
is not favorable to economic growth. Critics of the hypothesis of diminishing returns, like
Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), do not see any rationale behind introducing non-linearities
(captured by squared aid or interaction terms between aid and policy variables) in growth
regressions. According to them, these are in fact proxies of each other, and therefore,
it is likely that squared aid captures the effect of aid-policy interaction terms, while the
aid-policy term captures the impact of squared aid.
2.3 Methodology, Model and Estimation Technique
This section presents several methodological issues to take into consideration when
modeling growth and aid in transition economies. It also describes the model usually
employed to estimate aid-growth relationships and the empirical specification appropriate
to dynamic panel data.
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2.3.1 Methodological Issues
Most of the empirical research on growth determinants in transition economies rely
on growth regression analysis. A consensus has emerged regarding the most significant
determinants of growth in transition economies. We will take this consensus as a starting
point for the empirical specifications. Note that these growth determinants are not ex-
actly the same as the standard growth determinants which are used to explain growth in
emerging economies.
There are two standard growth determinants that will not be considered in our anal-
ysis, namely human capital and investment. These growth determinants appear to have
a crucial impact on growth only in the long-run. However, when analyzing growth in
transition economies, with only 13-14 years of data available, as in our study, the focus
shifts from the long-term to the short-term or, at best, to a medium-term (Radulescu and
Barlow, 2002). We have however checked the impact of secondary school enrolment, as
a proxy for human capital (Barro and Lee, 2000), but it does not have any explanatory
power over growth in the short term; moreover its inclusion in regressions significantly
reduces the number of countries in the sample (because of the lack of observations).
With regard to investments, in order for them to sustain growth recovery, they need
a specifically market-friendly environment to be previously set up; and this usually takes
longer. This explains why the studies that tested these conventional determinants did
not find much impact on growth. Several papers find no significant explanatory power
for investment, at least during the first 7-8 years of transition (Havrylyshyn et al., 1998;
Wolf, 1999). The lack of effect is also explained by the fact that investment could impact
growth simultaneously by direct and indirect channels, via macroeconomic stabilization
and structural policy reform channels. This double effect could weaken the explanatory
power of investments when considering macroeconomic stabilization and structural policy
reforms’ impact on growth. However, it is expected that these determinants acquire more
explanatory power over growth as the transition proceeds and transition economies become
fully market-oriented economies. We have tested this indicator and found no significant
impact on growth; for the reasons mentioned above, we have decided to drop it from our
regressions.
Another methodological issue that should be dealt with when estimating growth re-
gressions is the potential endogeneity of a set of explanatory variables, such as foreign aid,
economic policy and institutions (Berg et al., 1999; Falcetti et al., 2002; Merlevede, 2003).
The endogeneity of aid in growth regressions has been identified and largely discussed
since Papanek (1972). Most of the recent studies on aid effectiveness have tested for biases
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in their estimated parameters resulting from aid endogeneity. This comes from the fact
that aid is not a simple money transfer, it rather depends on levels of income.
Furthermore, the recent debate about the impact of institutions on growth has added
other variables to the list of endogenous regressors, such as policy and institution vari-
ables. A consensus has emerged about the endogeneity of policy. For instance, Easterly
and Levine (1997) and Temple (1998) point out persistent correlations between macroe-
conomic policy indicators and country specific cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics
in developing countries. Moreover, Heybey and Murell (1999) and Wolf (1999) allow for
feedback from growth to structural policy reforms, in cross-country analytical frameworks,
while Merlevede (2003) models growth and structural policy reforms jointly. However, sev-
eral studies (De Melo et al., 1997b; Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Radulescu and Barlow, 2002)
still consider structural policy reforms as exogenous to growth.
As for the endogeneity of institutional development with respect to growth, this is
less addressed in growth literature. Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) are among the first to em-
pirically investigate the impact of a market-friendly institutional framework on growth in
transition economies and to distinguish between structural policy reforms and institutional
reforms. However, they do not take into account the potential endogeneity that can arise
from better economic performance (i.e. higher GDP growth rates), increased efforts or
resources allocated by transition governments for institution building (i.e. higher scores
for institutional indicators).
In this analysis, we will take the consensus about the potential endogeneity of aid,
policy and structural policy and institutional reforms as a starting point and treat all of
these variables as endogenous.
2.3.2 Theoretical Model
The growth equation (2.2) estimated here is based on a neoclassical growth model
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Barro, 1996), augmented by foreign aid (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000). Foreign aid might have an important impact on growth in a poor country,
since it acts as an income transfer. But, this impact depends on its use. If aid is invested,
it will induce an increase in domestic output; consequently, its use will be effective. Con-
versely, if aid is consumed, no effect on domestic output is likely to be observed.
The aggregate production function in a neoclassical growth model is assumed to take
the following form:
Yt = AK
θ
t (2.2)
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where Yt is the output at time t, Kt the capital at time t, A the level of technology and
economic efficiency (A > 0), θ the elasticity of output with respect to capital (0 < θ < 1).
Let Ft be the foreign aid at time t. It is assumed to be an income transfer which is
employed to increase investment. It is therefore considered as a part of Kt. In order to
capture the impact of aid, a first-order approximation of the effect of aid on growth can
be obtained by computing the first derivative of Yt with respect to Ft, as follows:
dYt = θAK
θ−1
t
δKt
δFt
dFt (2.3)
where dYt stands for the size of output increase generated by the injection of aid;
δKt/δFt stands for the fraction of an additional unit of invested aid, and dFt stands for
the size of the aid injection. Therefore, we may write:
θAKθ−1t =
δYt
δKt
(2.4)
where δYt/δKt represents the marginal product of capital (MPK). According to the
neoclassical theory, production factors are rewarded at their marginal products. The
MPK can be written:
δYt
δKt
= rt + δ (2.5)
where rt is the net rate of return to capital, and δ the capital depreciation rate. Rear-
ranging the terms in (2.5), the increase in output induced by the injection of aid becomes:
dYt = (rt + δ)
δKt
δFt
dFt (2.6)
dYt
Yt
= (rt + δ)
δKt
δFt
dFt
Yt
(2.7)
Finally, the impact of aid on growth is given by the estimate of (rt + δ) (δKt/δFt) in
the derivative equation of growth with respect to aid (2.7).
The empirical model consider the above findings, namely that aid has an effect on
growth through the investment channel. We are testing Burnside and Dollar’s (2000)
hypothesis according to which, in a neoclassical growth model, both the incentive to
invest aid and its subsequent productivity (as a capital transfer) are negatively affected
by various policy distortions. The fewer the imbalances, the greater the impact of aid on
growth. We are extending their analysis by testing the same hypothesis, while considering
42
that structural and institutional reform might also provoke some distortions which could
influence the impact of aid with respect to growth.
2.3.3 Estimation Technique
The most common econometric specification when dealing with growth regressions
that involve aid variable, is the following:
Yi,t = α0 + α1Ai,t + α2Zi,t + εi,t (2.8)
where Yi,t is the real per capita GDP growth (US$ 2000 constant prices) for country i
and time period t; Ai,t stands for the total (multilateral and bilateral) aid flows received
by a country i at time t, as a share of its GDP (%); Zi,t is a vector of growth determinants,
and εi,t is the error term.
The main explanatory variables designed by Zi,t are: the initial level of real per capita
GDP (US$ 2000 constant prices) as a measure of conditional convergence effect; a set
of indexes, i.e. macroeconomic policy (Policy), structural policy reform (SPR) and in-
stitutional reform (IR) as measures of the quality of macroeconomic environment, and
of the progress achieved in implementing structural and institutional reform; the initial
conditions (IC) indicator as a measure of the structural characteristics of a country at
the beginning of the transition process; interaction terms, i.e. Aid ∗ Policy, Aid ∗ SPR,
Aid ∗ IR and Aid ∗ IC that capture the marginal effect of aid on growth through macroe-
conomic policies, structural policy and institutional reform, and initial conditions; general
government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP); and broad money M2 (% of GDP)
as a measure of financial depth.
When dealing with growth estimations of this type (2.8) some econometric issues need
to be discussed. First, as mentioned in the previous section, the endogeneity of growth
determinants should be considered, i.e. a reverse causality between growth Yi,t and the
aid variable Ai,t or other variables, such as policy and institutions. Second, unobserved
individual specific effects are part of the error term and might be the source of a potential
correlation with regressors Ai,t (Policy, Institutions) or Yi,t. In other words, a correlation
between the regressors Ai,t (Policy, Institutions) or Yi,t and the error term, εi,t, might exist
through the presence of unobserved individual specific effects. Not taking into account
this possible correlation would lead to biased estimators.
In order to deal with endogenous regressors and unobserved country specific effects
in the context of panel data models, the appropriate approach to employ is the dynamic
panel estimator.
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We consider the following framework for the growth equation:
Yi,t − Yi,t−1 = αYi,t−1 + βXi,t + λt + εi,t (2.9)
where Yi,t−Yi,t−1 is the growth rate of real per capita GDP; Yi,t−1 is the initial level of
real per capita GDP; Xi,t a set of growth determinants; λt a time-specific effect, estimated
as the coefficient of dummies for each time-period; εi,t is the error term; i stands for the
recipient country and t for the time-period. The error term εi,t can be divided as follows:
εi,t = µi + vi,t (2.10)
where µi is an unobserved country-specific effect (a time-invariant factor that allows us
to seize the unobserved heterogeneity of the countries), and vi,t the error term . Replacing
εi,t (2.10) in (2.9), the growth equation becomes:
Yi,t − Yi,t−1 = αYi,t−1 + βXi,t + µi + λt + vi,t (2.11)
This model formulation shows that the presence of country-specific effects in growth
models leads to a correlation between the regressor Yi,t−1 (lagged income variable) and the
error term εi,t. To deal with this correlation, the classical method used in a static panel
data model is the fixed-effects estimator. This estimator requires strict exogeneity of the
explanatory variables with respect to the random error term. In our case, the fixed-effects
estimator is inconsistent, since aid and other variables (Policy, Institutions) are supposed
to be endogenous. Conversely, the dynamic panel estimator introduced by Anderson
and Hsiao (1981) allows us to deal with this inconsistency. They suggest eliminating the
individual specific effect by first-differentiating. The regression equation in first-differences
has the following form:
Yi,t − Yi,t−1 = α(Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (λt − λt−1) + (vi,t − vi,t−1) (2.12)
Proceeding this way we certainly eliminate the time-invariant specific effects, µi. But
we are left with the lagged dependent variable Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2, at the right-hand of the
equation. The transformation by first-differences induces another source of bias, namely a
correlation between the transformed error term vi,t− vi,t−1 and the endogenous dependent
variable, Yi,t − Yi,t−1. To address both this correlation and the endogeneity problem,
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose to instrument the variable in first-differences Yi,t−1 −
Yi,t−2 by either its lags in level Yi,t−2 or in difference Yi,t−2−Yi,t−3. These two instruments
are strongly correlated with the variable in first-differences Yi,t−1−Yi,t−2 and non-correlated
with the transformed error term vi,t − vi,t−1 (if there is no auto-correlation of errors).
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Arellano and Bond (1991) generalize the dynamic panel estimator of Anderson and
Hsiao (1981) and propose employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mator. This method of moments uses all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged
dependent variable and the error term. All lagged dependent variables, starting with the
second order, are valid instruments for endogenous regressors. For example, for a period
T, the set of valid instruments are Xi,1, Xi,2...Xi,t−2
10. All lagged variables, starting with
the first order, are valid instruments for predetermined regressors11.
The approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) is two-step. The residuals of the first-step
estimation are supposed to be homoscedastic; if this assumption is confirmed, the first-step
estimator is consistent. Conversely, the residuals of the second-step are supposed to be
heteroscedastic. The coefficients of the first-step estimates do not differ much from that of
the second-step, but the standard errors for the second-step estimates are smaller (sample
bias). If the sample is small (T small), the first-step standard errors should be used.
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) method assumes there is no auto-correlation in residuals.
This is a very strong assumption which allows the use of lagged variables as instruments
for endogenous variables. Only first-order auto-correlation is expected in first-differenced
equations, but not higher-order correlation. As a matter of fact, higher-order correlation
indicates that some lags of the dependent variable used as instruments are, in fact, en-
dogenous. In order to test the over-identification restrictions (the validity of instruments),
Sargan test is used for the model derived by Arellano and Bond (1991). The weakness of
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimator, so-called “difference GMM” is that it uses lagged
levels of the variables which are often poor instruments for first differences. Another
GMM estimator that deals with this problem is the one proposed by Blundell and Bond
(1998), the so-called “system GMM”. This adds moment conditions and thus increases
the efficiency of estimations. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest using lagged variables in
difference as instruments for level equations and lagged variables in level as instruments
for first-difference equations. This allows the introduction of more instruments and can
improve the efficiency.
Here we will compute this system GMM estimator in a two-step procedure, which and
yield more efficient and reliable results than the one-step system GMM provided that the
standard errors of the former estimator are corrected for the finite sample bias by apply-
ing the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction; without this correction the standard
10Only lags of order greater than 2 are valid instruments for Xi,t, because later values are correlated
with vi,t. This assumption implies the following set of orthogonality conditions: E[Xi,t−s∆vi,t] = 0 for
t = 3...T and s > 2.
11Predetermined regressors (weakly exogenous regressors) are variables that might be affected by past
realizations of the dependent variable (the past growth rates for example), but not by contemporaneous
or future realizations of the error term.
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errors in the two-step estimation tend to be significantly downward biased because of the
large number of instruments. A important assumption for the validity of GMM is that
the instruments are exogenous; this is tested by the Sargan/Hansen test (for the joint
validity of instruments) and the Difference-in-Hansen test (for the validity of a subset
of instruments). The GMM validity also depends on the assumption that the model is
not subject to serial correlation in the error terms. A common feature of Arellano-Bond
and Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond methodologies is the increased number of instruments,
which according to Roodman (2008), in small samples, can cause problems, such as: the
overfiting of endogenous variables, imprecise estimates of the optimal weighting matrix,
and a weak Hansen test of instrument validity. In order to avoid the proliferation of
instruments we collapse them12 and limiting the lag depth.
2.4 Data
The data used in this chapter has been gathered and compiled mainly from the
DAC-OECD database for aid disbursements, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) database for Transition Indicators, and the World Bank datase,
World Development Indicators (WDI) for all the other variables13. The panel consists
of 25 transition countries14. The time span covers a fifteen-year period (1990-2004). It
is constrained by the limited availability of aid data. “Part II (transition countries) of
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list was abolished in 2005. The collection
of data on Official Assistance (OA) and other resources flows to Part II countries ended
with 2004 data.” The new DAC list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients
“excludes countries that are members of G8, or the EU, or that have a date of admission
to the EU. This means that as at 2005, it excludes the following countries: Russia, and
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia and Slovak Republic.” (DAC List of ODA Recipients as at 1 January
2006, DAC, OECD).
12This means that only one instrument is used for each variable and lag distance, rather than one
instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance. In small samples, this avoids the bias due to
the increasing number of instruments towards the number of observations (Roodman, 2008).
13Details about sources and definitions of the data are provided in Table 3.9 in the Appendix of this
Chapter.
14The countries included in the sample are the following: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan.
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2.4.1 Foreign Aid: Measures and Trends
The aid flows used here are measured as disbursements. We will analyze disbursements
and not commitments since disbursements are more appropriate in an analysis of the
impact of aid in recipient countries. In fact, their effectiveness depends on factors over
which donors have no control, like the willingness and administrative capacity of recipients
to manage the amount of aid and to answer to the conditionalities of donors. We use DAC-
OECD definition according to which disbursements refer to ODA, respectively OA as the
sum of “net disbursements of loans and grants” from 22 official donors, members of DAC
and international organizations, i.e. the EBRD, the European Commission (EC), the IMF
and the World Bank. It therefore includes bilateral and multilateral aid disbursements15.
The aid variable used in growth regressions is the ratio of aid disbursements (current
prices, million US$) over the GDP (current prices, million US$) of recipient countries.
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of aid over GDP (%) by recipient, over the analyzed
period. The average shares of total aid to GDP, by recipient, are presented in Figure
2.1. The main ODA recipients are Albania (13.18%) and some CIS countries: Kyrgyzstan
(12.25%), Armenia (9.95%), and Tajikistan (9.05%). The stylized facts seem to indicate
that the ten new members of the EU, which are considered the most advanced economies
in the region, were not among the countries that received the most aid. It seems that in
transition countries aid has been provided according to the level of development rather
than to the quality of policy and institutions.
Looking at the shares of multilateral and bilateral aid to GDP (Figure 2.2), among
the main recipients, Albania received more bilateral aid, while Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and
Tajikistan, more multilateral aid. Most of the CEECs, except Poland, were supported
most, as expected, by multilateral agencies.
15Note that no distinction is made between the types of aid. We agree that an analysis on the impact
of disaggregated aid flows on growth would be more appropriate, since different categories of aid flows
might not influence growth in the same way and uniformly. However, because of a lack of available data,
in particular for the ten new EU members, such an analysis could not be carried out.
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Figure 2.1: Total ODA over GDP (%) by recipient, 1990-2004.
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Figure 2.2: Multilateral and bilateral ODA over GDP (%) by recipient, 1990-2004.
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
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2.4.2 GDP Growth Rates: Measures and Trends
The measure of economic growth that we are using in this analysis is the annual growth
rate of real GDP. This is computed based on the annual real GDP (PPP constant 2000
international US$) from the WDI database of the World Bank. Although this is the most
common measure in growth literature, it should be treated with caution when analyzing
transition economies. In fact, statistical measurement remains poor, especially for the
early years of transition. In many cases, in particular when dealing with the emerging
private sector, which, to a great extent operates in the informal economy, statistics appear
to be inaccurate (Falcetti et al., 2002).
Looking at the trend of growth rates (Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 in the Appendix) one can
notice that during the initial phase of transformation, all transition economies experienced
negative growth rates. These were lower than most economists expected. The U-shape
pattern of GDP during the first years of transition (1990-1996) is observed for almost all
the countries in our sample. This decline in the growth rates has often been explained
by the collapse of trade among the former members of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA); the deterioration of the demand for domestic goods; the increase in
imports; the decline in the output of state-owned firms and lack of institutions.
When comparing the growth rates of real per capita GDP (Table 2.2) we observe
important differences between Central Europe and the Baltics, and the CIS. While by the
1995, only half of the countries in our sample were already enjoying positive growth rates
(CEECs, Armenia and Georgia), by 2000, we could count all of them. Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia and Romania, experienced a burst of growth in the early years of transition and a
reversal in later years - return to negative growth rates in 1997 for Albania; 1996 and 1997
for Bulgaria; 1999 for Croatia; 1997, 1998 and 1999 for Romania - followed by prospects
of positive growth. All CIS countries, except for Armenia and Georgia, displayed negative
growth rates until 1996. Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine managed to stop the decline
in output only in 1999, while Moldova only in 2000. These differences in the level of
development at the beginning of transition have had consequences on the subsequent
development of these countries and have been perpetuated during all the transformation
processes, so much that they still exist nowadays. Even in the most advanced countries
(except maybe for Armenia, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia) gorwths rates have not been
high enough to allow these countries to catch-up with even any of the low income Western
European countries16.
16Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) estimate that with an annual growth rate of real per capita GDP
about 4.75%, it would take about 20-25 years for the most advanced (the Czech Republic and Estonia)
to catch up with the average OECD level, and 35-45 years for the others.
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2.4.3 Reform Measurements
A consensus has emerged in policy and academic circles about a necessity of setting
up reforms required for the market economy system. A distinction is often made between
the initial phase - the “liberalizing” reforms phase, and the second phase - the “institution-
building” reforms phase. The initial phase includes the liberalization of price and trade,
and small scale privatization. The second phase includes enterprize restructuring, large
scale privatization, competition policy, financial institutions development and infrastruc-
ture reforms; these are more difficult to implement because they focus on the development
of market-based structures and institutions (EBRD Transition Report, 2003).
But, the starting point of reforms was not the same for all transition economies, CEECs
and the Baltics, as well as Albania, Macedonia and some CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan and
Moldova) liberalized domestic prices very early in their transition and sustained these re-
forms. They also liberalized trade and access to foreign exchange, but freed their domestic
markets less progressively. These early and sustained “liberalizers” have maintained mar-
kets and trade free from government administration for more than two-thirds of the period
since the transition began (EBRD Transition Report, 2000). The picture is different for
SEE and CIS countries. Bulgaria and Russia attempted to liberalize both domestic and
external markets relatively early in their transition, but did not succeed and temporarily
moved backwards on these reforms. Russia managed to regain its level of price liberal-
ization of 1997 only by the end of 1999, after the abolition of most of the temporary
restrictions on domestic flows of goods and services introduced after the crisis of August
1998. Foreign trade and access to foreign exchange have also been substantially freed
from restrictions; still, this progress has been partially counterbalanced because of the
reintroduction of some quotas on oil exports.
From a qualitative viewpoint it is difficult to assess the changes in institutions. The
EBRD developed a set of measures, called Transition Indicators. Grouped in eight cate-
gories, these indicators aim at assessing the progress made in achieving a market economy
in some major fields: small and large scale privatization, governance and enterprize re-
structuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy,
bank reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets, and non-bank financial
institutions. The measurement scale for these indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1
represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ the stan-
dards of an industrialized market economy. The explicative notes for these indicators are
presented in Box 1 in the Appendix of this Chapter.
A lot of studies that analyze the impact of structural and institutional reforms on
growth use these indicators (De Melo et al., 1997b; Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Havrylyshyn
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and van Rooden, 2003)17. Typically, these indicators have been used as an aggregated
index computed as a simple average of the eight measures (Havrylyshyn et al., 1998,
Radulescu and Barlow, 2002). The studies argue that a simple average better explains
growth since: (i) none of the subcomponents, taken by themselves, has a stronger explana-
tory power than the average; (ii) the interpretation of any individual coefficient is not as
meaningful, since these indicators exert their effect jointly; consequently, including them
individually in regressions might bias the estimation coefficients (the omitted variables
bias), while using them simultaneously in the same regression induces multicolinearity
which makes the estimation difficult. However, the studies that have employed these in-
dicators one by one, argue that this allows to identify those that best explain growth
performance in transition (Raiser et al., 2001; Falcetti et al., 2002; Merlevede et al., 2003).
Some of the recent studies distinguish between two groups of reforms (1) reflects more
structural policy reforms and includes: small and large scale privatization, price liber-
alization, and trade and foreign exchange system liberalization. The structural policy
dimensions predominantly require the abandon of the state control; (2) reveals more in-
stitutional reforms and considers: governance and enterprize restructuring, competition
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization and securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions liberalization. The institutional dimensions need new rules
which must be credibly enforced by the state (Raiser et al., 2001).
However, none of the studies that used them like an aggregate index, tested whether it
is appropriate to assign equal weights to all eight indicators. To our knowledge, the only
study that has done that is the one by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2004). In order to deal with
this issue, they construct a composite index of all the eight EBRD Transition Indicators,
by using the Factor Analysis method.
Here we adopt the approach that distinguish between structural policy reforms and
institutional reforms. We are making the assumption that both types of reforms have a
positive impact on growth. In order to measure their impact, we will follow Fidrmuc and
Tichit (2004) and we will compute two composite indexes by using the Factor Analysis
method.
17De Melo et al. (1997b) build a structural policy reform index called “liberalization index” by com-
piling three EBRD Transition Indicators: liberalization of domestic prices and abolition of state trad-
ing monopolies (lpc), liberalization of foreign trade regimes (lfex), and privatization of small scale and
large scale enterprizes and banking reform (pbr). Their methodology allows one to compile this index
for every following year after their calculations, by assigning them specific weights. The original lib-
eralization index created by De Melo et al. (1997b) was constructed as a weighted index as follows:
LIi,t = 0.3 ∗ lpci,t + 0.3 ∗ lfexi,t + 0.4 ∗ pbri,t
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Structural Policy Reforms Index
The Structural Policy Reforms (SPR) is computed based on the following four
EBRD indicators: small and large scale privatization, price liberalization, trade and for-
eign exchange system liberalization. The SPR is used to measure the growth-impact of
structural reforms, and to assess whether aid is more effective in recipient economies where
structural reforms are successfully implemented. This marginal effect of aid is captured by
the coefficient of interaction term Aid∗SPR. In order to compute the SPR index with the
Factor Analysis Method we need to verify first the correlations between the four EBRD
indicators. Table 2.3 presents the correlation coefficients between the country averages
of the indicators over the period 1990-2004. As expected, there is a high degree of de-
pendency between the four indicators, with all correlation coefficients positive and above
0.71. In particular, small scale privatization is the most correlated with trade and foreign
exchange system liberalization, and large scale privatization, respectively with correlation
coefficients of 0.85 and 0.84, respectively. It results that these these reforms constitute a
package of reforms that have been implemented simultaneously. They mutually reinforce
and exert a joint impact on growth.
Table 2.3: Common variation between EBRD Structural Policy Reform Indicators.
Small scale Large scale Price Trade and foreign
privatization privatization liberalization exchange system
liberalization
Small scale 1.00
privatization
Large scale 0.85 1.00
privatization
Price 0.79 0.71 1.00
liberalization
Trade and foreign exchange 0.86 0.81 0.82 1.00
system liberalization
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
Institutional Reform Index
The unequal performances among countries has raised over time, questions about
the role of institutions with regard to growth and development outcomes18. North and
Thomas (1973) made one of the most important contributions by pointing out that the
fundamental explanation of countries’ different growth rates lies in the differences in their
institutions. Sharing the same viewpoint, Olson (1996) summarizes the conceptual basis
18 “Why are some countries much poorer than others?” (Olson, 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2004) or “Why
isn’t the whole world as rich as the United States and Switzerland?” (Parente and Prescott, 2002).
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for the role of institutions, such as property rights, the rule of law and corruption19; Clague
et al. (1997) investigate the extent to which differences in property rights and contract
enforcement mechanisms are crucial in explaining the progress and prosperity of some
countries compared to others.
In the case of transition economies, the institutional approach has received a lot of
attention in theoretical papers (Kornai, 2000; Popov, 2000; Roland, 2000). But, mainly
because of data limitations, the empirical research has added only minor contributions re-
garding the role of institutional building in driving growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Olson
et al., 2000). The experience of transition economies in reforming their institutions “...has
very much reinforced the institutional perspective in economics and a shift in emphasis
in economic thinking from the analysis of markets and price theory to that of contracting
and to the legal, social, and political environment of contracting. Transition has forced
economists to think about institutions not as static, but in a dynamic way: how momen-
tum for reform is created and how institutions can evolve, and how momentum can be lost
and one can get stuck in inefficient institutions.”20 (Roland, 2002, p.). The assumption of
intuition building as a major factor of achieving positive and sustained growth emphasized
in theoretical studies has been shared by international organizations - the EBRD, the IMF
the World Bank. They have provided support for this view by increasing the resources
for gathering data and compiling indicators that quantify the progress achieved in the
institutional development.
In this analysis, we will compute a composite index of Institutional Reforms (IR) by
aggregating four EBRD indicators: governance and enterprize restructuring, competition
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions21. As for the SPR index, the same Factor Analysis method is
used to construct the IR index. This index is a measure of the extent to which institu-
tional reforms can directly explain growth. Moreover, when this is interacted with the aid
variable (Aid ∗ IR) it captures the role of institutions in enhancing the impact of aid on
growth. Table 2.4 shows the correlation coefficients between the country averages of the
four transition indicators over the period 1990-2004. The expected positive correlations
between the indicators is confirmed; all correlation coefficients are above 0.76. In par-
ticular, enterprize restructuring correlates most with banking reform (a 0.92 correlation
19Olson (1996) explains that many countries are poor because they waste a lot of resources. Moreover,
there is a negative relationship between this waste and institutional bases of property rights and the rule
of law. The weaker the institutional bases, the higher the waste and the degree of corruption.
20This is in line with North (1990) and Acemoglu et al.’s (2004) viewpoints concerning the two potential
sets of institutions that can emerge and perpetuate themselves, i.e. efficient and inefficient institutions
(the waste of human and natural resources).
21EBRD has also compiled for transition economies another two indicators - overall legal effectiveness
and overall legal extensiveness. Because their availability is only from 1997 for most of transition economies
we cannot use them in our regressions.
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coefficient) and with securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (a 0.81 corre-
lation coefficient). Competition policy generally correlates less to the other three indexes.
The high correlations point out the importance of treating these measures jointly.
Table 2.4: Common variation between EBRD Institutional Reform Indicators.
Governance Competition Banking reform Securities markets
enterprize policy interest rate non-bank financial
restructuring liberalization institutions
Governance 1.00
enterprize restructuring
Competition 0.80 1.00
policy
Banking reform 0.92 0.76 1.00
interest rate liberalization
Securities markets 0.81 0.80 0.80 1.00
non-bank financial institutions
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
Computing SPR and IR with Factor Analysis
Factor Analysis is a method generally used to transform data; it allows a system of
highly correlated variables to be reduced into a smaller number of dimensions, whose
correlation is minimized. The technique produces a linear combination of variables, as
such, it maximizes the joint variance of its components. The scores obtained may be used
in the regression analysis instead of the original variables without much loss of information.
There are several factor models which differ in significant respects. The one which is most
often applied is the so-called Common Factor Analysis or Principal Component Analysis.
This is concerned with identifying the patterns of common variations in a set of variables;
variations unique to a variable are ignored. In contrast, the Component Factor Analysis
is concerned with patterning all the variation in a set of variables, whether common or
unique.
In this analysis we will try to find two good aggregate indicators of the degree of
progress in implementing structural and institutional reforms (SPR and IR indexes).
However, these indicators are unobserved; we only observe individual measures of the
progress in reform implementation (the EBRD indicators). We will use the Component
Factor Analysis which allows us to determine the degree of unique variation for each indica-
tor. Thus, we will investigate whether all EBRD indicators measure the same phenomenon,
i.e. the creation of a market economy, or if they reflect independent information contained
in some of the indicators. This method reduces the dimensionality of the structural pol-
icy and institutional reform indicators and deals with the multicollinearity problem; it
permits us to use all structural and institutional reforms information in order to measure
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their joint impact on economic growth without being exposed to the collinearity problem.
Computing weighted-average aggregated indexes assures about applying the appropriate
weights for the components of the indexes.
The algebraic model involved in a Component Factor Analysis estimation is the fol-
lowing equation system:
Y1 = α1,1F1 + α1,2F2 + ...+ α1,mFm + ε1
Y2 = α2,1F1 + α2,2F2 + ...+ α2,mFm + ε2
Y3 = α3,1F1 + α3,2F2 + ...+ α3,mFm + ε3
...
Yn = αn,1F1 + αn,2F2 + ...+ αn,mFm + εn
where: Yk, with k = 1, 2, ...n, are the observed variables (the EBRD indicatorse); αk,l
with l = 1, 2, ...m are the loadings; Fl are the factors and εk is the variation of Y which is
independent of the factors Fl.
Note that F stands for a function of variables22 and not for a variable. Each loading for
each factor, α1,1, α1,2, ..., αn,m measures how much that specific function (F) is related to
the observed variables (Y). Some of the F functions might be common to several variables.
In such cases they are called group factors. The choice of the number of factors (dimensions
on which the input variables are projected) rests on the criteria of the associated eigenvalue.
If this is larger than 0.5, the associated factor is retained as the principal component. This
means that the first principal component explains more than 50 percent of the variance of
all of the observed variables.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the results of the estimation - the components of the SPR and
IR indexes and the weight of each component in the composite indexes. The eigenvalue
criteria indicates that the first factor should only be taken into consideration. In fact, for
the two indexes the eigenvalue for the first factor is higher than 0.5 (3.42 for the SPR and
3.44 for the IR), while for the other three factors it is below 0.5.
The first column gives the factor loadings, i.e. the correlation coefficients between each
EBRD indicator and the factor. Note that all of the indicators are positively and strongly
related to the factor. This indicates that the factor stands for the same phenomenon,
i.e. the progress towards market economy, for all EBRD measures. The second column
shows the percentage of each indicator’s variation explained by the common factor which
22When Factor Analysis is applied to the known data on the observed variables, Y, several unknown F
functions are defined (the factors).
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Table 2.5: Factor Analysis - EBRD Structural Policy Reform Indicators.
Factor 1 Communality Uniqueness Weights
Small scale privatization 0.9491 90.08 9.92 0.27703
Large scale privatization 0.9105 82.91 17.09 0.26577
Price liberalization 0.8969 80.44 19.56 0.26179
Trade and foreign exchange system liberalization 0.9443 89.17 10.83 0.27563
% of total variation 85.65 14.35
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
Table 2.6: Factor Analysis - EBRD Institutional Reform Indicators.
Factor 1 Communality Uniqueness Weights
Governance and enterprize restructuring 0.9521 90.65 9.35 0.27604
Competition policy 0.9019 81.34 18.66 0.26148
Banking reform and interest rate liberalization 0.9391 88.20 11.80 0.27728
Securities markets non-bank institutions 0.9205 84.73 15.27 0.26687
% of total variation 86.23 13.77
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
is retained. The communality for each variable is computed by multiplying the square of
the loading by 100. All indicators display very high shares of common variation: about
86% of the total variation on average for the components of both the SPR and the IR
index. The third column shows the uniqueness of each variable (the percentage of the
total variation that is autonomous23). The percentages of uniqueness smaller than 50%
suggest that the observed variables are strongly correlated among themselves. The most
independent indicator included in the SPR index is price liberalization (the uniqueness
value is about 20%); for the IR index, the most independent appears to be competition
policy (about 19% of uniqueness). In the last column we find the weights for each indicator
in the aggregate indexes (the scoring coefficients). The weights are quite close, with the
highest assigned to small scale privatization (0.27703) and banking reform and interest
rate liberalization (0.27728).
By multiplying the values of indicators for each country each year by their weights,
we compute the composite indexes that capture the progress towards a market economy
through both structural policy and institutional reforms. The values of the SPR index
range from -2.04 for most countries at the beginning of transition process, to +1.15 for the
Czech Republic starting with 1997, for Estonia starting with 2000, for Hungary starting
with 1997 and for Slovak Republic starting with 2002. The IR index takes values from
-1.37 for most countries at the start of transition, to +2.28 for Hungary in 2004. The
values of the SPR index are higher than those of the IR index; this points out that, as
23The sum of the second and third columns must equal 100 for each row.
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expected, more progress has been assessed in structural policy reform. Indeed, these types
of reform have been implemented more easily and quickly.
Figure 2.3 shows the average level of the SPR index for each country over the analyzed
period (1990-2004). CIS countries progressed more slowly in the liberalization of their
economies. Almost all of these countries have a negative average index, with Turkmenistan
far behind all the others, followed by Belarus and Uzbekistan. This is not surprising
given that from the very beginning of transition these countries displayed lower values
for the SPR. CEECs countries report positive average values of this indicator, with the
Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Poland among the front runners. The
heterogenous economic performance of countries in this region (as noted in Section 2.4.2
when discussing the trends in GDP growth rates) could be explained by the fact that
the factors governing growth are indeed sensitive to progress in implementing structural
reforms. Higher degrees of structural policy reforms are likely to positively affect growth
(De Melo et al., 1997b; Berg et al., 1999; Havrylyshyn et al., 1998). So, we expect the
SPR index to have a positive overall impact on growth. The picture is quite similar for
the IR index (Figure 2.4); CIS countries present, on average, negative scores. Note that
some of the countries that performed relatively well in terms of structural policy reform,
like Romania, Macedonia and Albania, register negative scores in terms of institutional
reform.
Figure 2.3: SPR aggregate index - country average over 1990-2004.
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
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Figure 2.4: IR aggregate index - country average over 1990-2004.
Source: Own calculation based on EBRD Transition Indicators.
2.4.4 Initial Conditions
On the eve of the collapse of communism, significant differences among countries in
the region were noticed with respect to the initial level of development, macroeconomic
imbalances, dependency of trade on the socialist trading system, state capacity, and also
distance from the EU and natural resources endowment (De Melo et al., 1997b). The
level of per capita income in CEECs and the Baltics was higher than those in the CIS
countries. However, some of the CIS (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and
Ukraine) were better endowed with natural resources than the other countries in the region
(Fischer and Sahay, 2000).
The impact of initial conditions on growth was investigated by several researchers -
De Melo et al. (1997b), Berg et al. (1999), Jaros (2001), Fischer and Sahay (2000),
De Melo et al., 2001). They showed that a country’s starting point is likely to have a
strong effect on its subsequent development, at least in the short-term. But, as transition
proceeds, the explanatory power of initial conditions weakens. However, even today, a
positive correlation between a good starting point and the overall growth in transition is
considerable24, suggesting that significant indirect effects of initial conditions on growth
still emerge, probably through the structural policy reforms channel (De Melo et al., 1997b;
Falcetti et al., 2002; Merlevede, 2003).
24See EBRD Transition Report (2004).
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In this analysis, we adopt the approach of Falcetti et al. (2002), which follows the
approach of De Melo et al. (1997b). In order to measure the impact of initial conditions
on growth, they compute a “distortions” index, called Initial Conditions (IC). This
includes several variables that characterize the situation at the start of transition. The list
of variables included in the index, as well as the country scores are illustrated in Tables
2.12 and 2.13 in the Appendix of the Chapter. The index is computed using the Factor
Analysis method25.
Figure 2.5 shows the trend of countries’ scores. Initial conditions deteriorate with
initial macroeconomic distortions, time spent under central planning, distance to EU,
trade dependence on the CMEA and natural resource wealth. It is negatively associated
with initial per capita GDP, degree of over-industrialization and state capacity. CEECs
countries have globally high negative scores, standing for favorable initial conditions. The
front runners are the Czech Republic (-3.53), Hungary (-3.25), Slovenia (-3.18) and Slovak
Republic (-2.95). On the other hand, most of the CIS display high scores in the index,
which indicate“bad”starting positions. Turkmenistan (+3.43) and Azerbaijan (+3.24) had
the worst initial conditions (macroeconomic distortions, a lower level of development).
We will follow the literature which consider the impact of initial conditions on growth
by introducing in growth regressions the IC indicator. Furthermore, we will examine the
role of initial conditions in the effectiveness of aid with respect to growth. We wonder
whether a more favorable starting position allows a country to take better advantage of
foreign assistance received; or whether on the contrary, the impact of aid on growth is
stronger in the countries with bad initial conditions. This will be shown through the
estimated coefficient of the interaction term Aid ∗ IC in growth regressions.
Additionally, in the light of the findings of De Melo et al. (1997b), Falcetti et al. (2002)
and Merlevede (2003) which consider the assumption that the initial conditions play the
same role throughout the whole transition period is inaccurate, we will control for the
changing effects of initial conditions on growth, by estimating the IC indicator when
interacted with a time trend (IC ∗ Time). The time trend is measured as the number of
years since transition started (14 years for CEECs and 12 years for CIS countries). Finally,
25The number of principal components used in the model is determined according to standard eigen-
value criteria. Falcetti et al. (2002) retain only the first principal component (where the corresponding
eigenvalue is higher than 0.5). The variables included in Falcetti et al.’s (2002) initial conditions index
are largely the same as those used by De Melo et al. (1997b). However, there is a difference in relation
to the countries included in the sample. While De Melo et al. (1997b) include countries like China,
Mongolia and Vietnam, Falcetti et al. (2002) do not. With the new sample including only CEECs and
CIS countries, in Falcetti et al. (2002), the first principal component explains around 50 percent of the
total variance over all conditions, and the second 17 percent, whereas in De Melo et al. (1997b), the first
factor accounted for 39 percent of the variance and the second for 28 percent.
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Figure 2.5: IC country scores
Source: Falcetti et al. (2002).
we will test whether this changing impact on growth of initial conditions, further affects
aid’s impact on growth (by estimating Aid ∗ IC ∗ Time).
2.5 Estimation Results
This section outlines the results of the econometric estimations. First, we will compute
the Policy index. Next, we will test the effectiveness of aid on growth conditional on the
quality of policy and structural and institutional reform, as well as initial conditions.
Finally, we will examine the diminishing returns to aid.
2.5.1 Policy Index
Most economists agree about the initial decline in output, and the burst of inflation
and fiscal deficits soon after the beginning of transition process. Since transition involved
fundamental transformation in the economic system, it was expected that disequilibriums
occur; moreover they were expected to last several years. The appropriate solution, largely
agreed on as the best way to help countries to cope with this situation and achieve positive
growth rates, was the implementation of macroeconomic stabilization programmes. The
common belief was that, once macroeconomic stability was established, economies would
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begin to grow rapidly. This stability would further allow the implementation of a new
institutional framework.
Two common ways to capture the effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilization mea-
sures are inflation rate and size of budget balance (relative to GDP). Most empirical studies
find that lower inflation rates and smaller budget deficits are associated with economic
recovery and higher growth rates, whilst high inflation rates appear to be particularly
damaging26 (Fischer, Sahay and Vegh, 1996; Loungani and Sheets, 1997; Berg et al., 1999;
Radulescu and Barlow, 2002; Falcetti et al., 2002; Fischer and Sahay, 2000).
In this analysis, we measure inflation rate with the GDP deflator (%), which captures
the changes in the prices of all new, final goods and services domestically produced in
an economy. We expect this to have a negative impact on growth. Budget balance is
defined as the sum of current and capital revenues including grants, less the sum of current
and capital expenditure and government lending minus repayments; it is measured as a
percentage of GDP and is expected to be positively correlated with growth.
Trade openness has been largely identified as a growth driver. Different measures
have been used to examine the effects of trade openness on economic growth. The most
common measure is the sum of exports and imports over GDP, which is generally positively
correlated with growth27. However, it has often been criticized and categorized as partial
and ambiguous. Some critics have argued that the nominator quantifies a production,
while the denominator an added value (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). It has also been
argued openness is not only explained by a country’s commercial policy; other factors,
such as level of development, size, resources and geographic position of a country also
have an influence.
An alternative measure is proposed by Guillaumont (1994, 2001b); Combes et al.
(2000); Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004). This is computed as the difference between the
observed and the adjusted values of trade openness. It is measured by the residual of the
regression of the observed trade openness variable estimated on a set of structural factors.
In this way, the trade openness measure is adjusted by all the factors that do not depend
on commercial policy. If this residual is positive, i.e. the commercial flows observed are
greater than the anticipated ones, the economy is considered to be open. The greater the
value of the openness indicator, the more open an economy is.
Here, in order to compute the aggregate Policy Index, unlike Burnside and Dollar
(2000) who use the Sachs and Warner (1995) dummy variable, we prefer to follow Chauvet
26According to Loungani and Sheets (1997), a country with 500 percent inflation over one year sees its
GDP decreasing of about 2 percent the following year and 4 percent in the long-term.
27See Harrison (1996) for a review of the studies using this measure of trade openness.
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and Guillaumont (2004) and measure trade openness through the residual of the regression
of the observed openness on structural factors. The empirical framework for the estimation
of observed trade openness is provided in the Appendix of this Chapter.
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), we compute Policy Index as the sum of in-
flation, budget balance and trade openness, all weighted by their respective impact on
growth. This aggregated indicator captures the joint impact on economic growth of the
three measures of macroeconomic policy. Using a single aggregate measure facilitates a
uni-dimensional comparison across countries’ macroeconomic policy quality. The Policy
index is constructed as follows:
Pi,t = c+ β1Ii,t + β2Bi,t + β3Oi,t (2.13)
where Ii,t is the inflation rate (GDP deflator, %) of the recipient country i at time t ;
Bi,t is the budget balance (% of GDP) of the recipient country i at time t ; Oi,t is the
adjusted trade openness variable of the recipient country i at time t ; c is the constant
term. β1, β2, β3 are the coefficients of the three macroeconomic variables estimated from
the following benchmark growth equation:
Yi,t = β1Ii,t + β2Bi,t + β3Oi,t + β4Zi,t + µi + λt + vi,t (2.14)
where Yi,t is the real per capita GDP growth of the recipient country i in period t ; Ii,t
is the inflation rate (GDP deflator, %) of the recipient country i in period t ; Bi,t is the
budget balance (% of GDP) of the recipient country i in period t ; Oi,t is the adjusted trade
openness variable of the recipient country i in period t ; Zi,t is a set of growth determinants
(ratio of broad money over GDP that reflects the development of the financial system, the
general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP); µi is a country-fixed effect,
λt a time-fixed effect and vi,t the error term.
Estimations results are provided in Table 2.7. Note that in general our model performs
well and is consistent with empirical growth literature. It appears that macroeconomic
policies do play a role in growth processes within transition economies. Two of the policy
variables, which are of particular interest in our model, are significant, at 5% and are
correctly signed: negative effect of inflation rate on growth and positive effect of budget
balance. Lower inflation rates and higher budget surpluses are conducive to growth. How-
ever, trade openness appears to be negatively associated with growth28. The countries in
our sample generally display high degrees of openness (e.g. on average, over the analyzed
28We have also estimated the same equation while replacing the adjusted trade openness indicator, by
the observed trade openness. We have found the same negative impact of this indicator on growth.
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Table 2.7: Benchmark growth equation.
(1) (2)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Initial per capita GDP 0.020 0.072**
(0.026) (0.029)
M2/GDP (lagged) -0.007 -0.024
(0.019) (0.030)
Government consumption -0.040 -0.044
(0.048) (0.056)
Inflation -0.026**
(0.038)
Budget balance 0.479**
(0.138)
Openness -0.098**
(0.038)
Policy index 0.911***
(0.134)
Constant -1.80** -0.376
(0.727) (0.241)
AR1 0.033 0.029
AR2 0.865 0.579
Hansen test(2nd step) (p-value) 0.337 0.328
Difference-in-Hansen test
All system GMM instruments (p-value) 0.609 0.664
Countries 25 25
Instruments 23 15
Observations 293 293
Notes: Two-step System GMM with the Windmeijer (2005) correction. The depen-
dent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Endogenous variables are inflation, bud-
get balance, trade openness, financial depth (M2/GDP), government consumption
expenditure and policy. Second and third lags for collapsed instruments are used.
Time dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** significant at
10%, 5%, 1% level.
period Estonia 150%, the Slovak Republic 126% Azerbaijan 121%, Slovenia 118%, Tadjik-
istan 114%). However, most of these countries are generally net importers, rather than net
exporters; the commercial balance deficits, which are relatively high (several exceptions,
like Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which actually are oil
and gas exporters) are not conductive to growth. Moreover, most of their exports consists
in basic products; these kind of exports are not likely to benefit to growth. Note that
government final consumption expenditure and financial depth are negatively correlated
with growth, but their impact does not appear significant.
The Policy index is computed with the estimated coefficients of the macroeconomic
policy variables from the regression (1) as follows:
Pi,t = −1.80− 0.026Ii,t + 0.479Bi,t − 0.098Oi,t (2.15)
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The benchmark growth regression allows us to determine the relative importance of
the three macroeconomic policies with respect to growth. Following Burnside and Dollar
(2000) we interpret the compiled Policy Index as a country’s predicted growth rate, given
its inflation, budget, and trade policies, assuming that it has the mean values of other
characteristics. Since inflation and openness have negative coefficients, the index can have
negative values if these two are high. The same goes for the budget deficit when the latter
is very large.
Regression (2) shows the estimates when the macroeconomic variables have been re-
placed by the Policy index. Note that the aggregated index positively and significantly
affects growth, as expected.
2.5.2 Aid impact on growth
In this section, we will test the three hypotheses described in Section 2.2.2. To do
that, we will introduce in the growth regressions: the aid variable; squared aid (to test
H3); a set of interaction terms between aid and Policy Index; reforms indexes SPR, IR
(to test H1); and initial conditions, IC (to test H2). Estimation results are reported in
Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
In Table 2.8, in regression (1) aid appears to have significantly influenced growth in
transition economies. Policy Index is statistically significant too. In regression (2) we
test the assumption of diminishing returns to aid by introducing the squared aid variable.
This is in accordance with aid effectiveness literature which suggests that a non-linear
relationship between aid and growth29 is probable. The negative and significant coefficient
of squared aid confirms the assumption that large amounts of aid are less productive.
In regression (3) the interaction between aid and Policy index is introduced. While
aid and Policy Index keep their positive significance, the interaction term does not appear
to influence growth and, moreover, it has the wrong negative sign. Our results illustrate
that, in transition economies, aid is a growth driver, but its impact does not seem to
be conditional on the quality of the macroeconomic environment. These results do not
support Burnside and Dollar’s findings, but are instead in line with all the literature that
has criticized them (Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004).
In regression (4), the quadratic aid term and the interaction term are introduced to-
gether. The picture is the same: Policy index, aid and squared aid are still positive and
29See also Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Dunarry et al. (1998), Lensink and White (1999), Hansen and
Tarp (2000, 2001), Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004).
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Table 2.8: Growth equation with aid, policy index, and interaction terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Initial per capita GDP 0.109** 0.061 0.104* 0.096*
(0.016) (0.047) (0.052) (0.048)
Financial depth -0.015 -0.030 -0.059 -0.033***
(0.048) (0.033) (0.060) (0.053)
Government consumption 0.107 0.063 0.113 0.112
(0.100) (0.134) (0.070) (0.073)
Policy index 0.672* 0.936** 1.161** 1.097**
(0.341) (0.307) (0.468) (0.408)
Aid 0.182** 1.148** 0.122** 0.604**
(0.058) (0.512) (0.007) (0.018)
Aid squared -0.389* -0.001**
(0.196) (0.0003)
Aid×Policy -0.309 -0.239
(0.306) (0.368)
Constant -1.383** -1.540 -1.136** -1.687**
(0.399) (0.641) (0.407) (0.687)
AR1 0.098 0.082 0.013 0.020
AR2 0.578 0.328 0.531 0.472
Hansen test(2nd step) (p-value) 0.098 0.149 0.174 0.246
Difference-in-Hansen test
All system GMM instruments (p-value) 0.161 0.089 0.391 0.156
Countries 25 25 25 25
Instruments 15 18 18 21
Observations 290 290 290 290
Notes: The dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth. Time dummies are included
in all regressions. Endogenous variables are financial depth (M2/GDP), Policy index, aid, and
interaction terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level.
statistically significant; the interaction term between Policy Index and aid is still not
significant and has the wrong sign. The hypothesis of diminishing returns to aid is once
again confirmed, while the aid conditionality assumption is not.
In sum, the results of our empirical analysis of the aid-growth relationship in transi-
tion economies do not confirm Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings when considering the
marginal effect of aid on economic growth with respect to the quality of macroeconomic
policy. Nonetheless, aid is found to significantly enhance growth, while the quality of
macroeconomic policies does not affect its impact. Moreover, the assumption of dimin-
ishing returns to aid is confirmed. It seems that the higher the amounts of aid, the lower
their impact on growth.
The next step in the empirical analysis of the aid-growth relationship, and one of the
most important contributions of this analysis, is to estimate the aid impact conditioned by
structural policy and institutional reforms in transition countries (H3). The two indexes,
SPR and IR, have been separately introduced in our regressions, since their partial corre-
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lation is strong (0.82); including them simultaneously in the same regression, would lead to
bias due to multicolinearity. In order to capture the marginal effect of aid on growth with
respect to quality of structural and institutional reforms, two interaction terms Aid∗SPR
and Aid ∗ IR have been introduced to the growth regressions.
Both the SPR and IR indexes are considered endogenous to growth. Higher growth
rates may decrease resistance to structural and, in particular, institutional reforms, by
increasing the amount of resources available to compensate for losses induced by liber-
alization, privatization or institutional reforms. According to Falcetti et al. (2002) and
Merlevede et al. (2003), the further transition countries move away from the beginning of
the transition process, the more reasonable it is to assume that reforms are endogenous
with respect to growth30.
As expected, structural policy reforms determine positive growth rates (regression 1).
Small and large scale privatization along with price and trade liberalization are likely to
positively influence growth rates in transition countries. Our findings are in line with
most of the studies on transition economies, which have found that structural reforms
have a significant positive impact on economic growth (De Melo et al., 1997; Hebey and
Murrell, 1998; Berg et al., 1999). An increase in progress in implementing structural reform
improves output performance. When the interaction term is introduced, (regression 2),
the SPR index is still significant. However, the aid-growth relationship is not likely to be
affected by the increase in the reform scores, as the interaction term Aid ∗ SPR does not
appear to significantly influence growth.
We have found the same results with respect to IR index. This appears to be posi-
tively associated with growth (regression 3). Progress in competition policy, governance
and enterprize restructuring, and banking reform drives growth in transition economies.
However, the effect of IR index is weaker than the effect of SPR index. This might
come from the fact that institutional reforms, by nature, take much longer to develop,
compared with structural reforms, which can be introduced within a short time frame.
In regression (4) the impact of aid does not appear to depend on the progress achieved
within institutions. Contrary to our expectations,
30Other studies that consider reforms to be endogenous are those of Hebey and Murrell (1998) and Wolf
(1999), who allow for a feedback of growth to structural reforms; and of Berg et al. (1999) and Ghosh
(1997), who adopt an instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of stabilization.
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Finally, in order to capture the effect of aid on growth with respect to initial conditions,
we introduced the IC indicator. Recall that the more negative the value of IC indicator,
the better were the initial conditions at the beginning of transition process. The expected
negative impact on growth is confirmed (regression 5), which indicates that a bad starting
point affects the economic recovery; this result is in line with the literature. Interestingly,
it appears that in countries with bad initial conditions aid is more effective in enhancing
growth (regression 6). Further, following Falcetti et al. (2002), we interact IC with
a time trend IC × Time to capture the changing effect of initial conditions on output
performance over time. Recall that Time represents the number of years since transition
started. In regression (7), the positive coefficient of the interaction term of IC with the
number of years since transition started suggests that the impact of initial conditions
on growth is declining over time, as transition proceeds. This results is in line with De
Melo et al.’s (1997b) and Berg et al.’s (1999). When interacting IC with Time and aid
variable (regression 8), the effect on growth is positive. We interpret this as evidence that,
the declining effect of initial conditions on growth, influences also aid’s impact in terms
of growth. We can conclude that transition countries’ specificities at the beginning of
transition period in relation to aid effectiveness are highly important.
2.6 Conclusion
Over the past few years, since Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) influential study, a dom-
inant paradigm has evolved on how aid should be allocated. The conventional wisdom
among donors became the view that not only is aid effective in spurring growth, but that
it is more effective in recipient countries with sound policy and good institutions.
This analysis adds to the existing literature by examining the effectiveness of foreign
aid allocation on economic growth in transition economies. It raises the question of a
consistent relationship between economic growth and foreign aid, paying special attention
to the macroeconomic policy environment, progress in implementing reforms and recipient
countries specificities at the beginning of transition process. Growth equations are esti-
mated using the two-step GMM estimator on a dynamic panel data set, across 25 Central
and East European countries, over 14 years (1990-2004).
Our results show a positive impact of aid on growth, but the result is not robust once
we take into account the quality of economic policy. Our findings support Hansen and
Tarp (2000), Clemens et al. (2004), Dalgaard et al. (2004) and other similar studies which
question the results of the “conditional” literature, such as Burnside and Dollar’s (2000),
which claim that aid works only in recipient countries with “good policy environment”.
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Aid conditionality with regard to the quality of institutions and the progress of reforms,
is also rejected. There is no evidence of a enhanced impact of aid in when progress has been
made on implementing structural policy and institutional reforms. However, in line with
transition literature, these two measures of the quality of institutions have positive effects
on growth, they are therefore considered important determinants of output performances
in transition economies.
Finally, we have tested the hypothesis that the impact of foreign aid is a function
of differences across recipient countries, as represented by the initial conditions at the
beginning of the transition process. We have found a strong interaction between aid and
initial conditions. We interpret this as evidence that aid is more effective in promoting
growth in countries with bad initial conditions. Hover, the effect of initial conditions
on growth has declined over time, meaning that countries are converging in terms of
growth rates regardless of their initial conditions. We have underlined the importance of
structural characteristics for the returns to aid. Similar conclusions were made by Dalgaard
et al. (2004) who found that climatic variables (which represent structural characteristics)
appear to have a direct bearing on the growth process. Consequently, the degree to which
aid enhances growth depends on climate-related circumstances.
Motivated by the findings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), the dominant rhetoric of the
policy debate on foreign aid changed. The quality of governance became the core question
of the debate on foreign aid. In this context, an increasing concern became the allocation
of aid towards countries with poor governance. These are countries that have been exposed
to low development performance in the last several decades, and undoubtedly, the people
in these countries are the most in need of foreign aid. In order to add to this subsequent
debate, the next chapter of this dissertation deals with the criteria of aid allocation with
an emphasis on the quality of governance in recipient countries.
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Appendix of Chapter 2
Box no.1: EBRD Transition Indicators.
Large-scale privatisation 1 Little private ownership. 2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 3
More than 25 percent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of being privatised (with the process having reached a
stage at which the state has effectively ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate governance.
4 More than 50 percent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and significant progress with corporate governance of
these enterprises. 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 percent of enterprise assets in private
ownership with effective corporate governance.
Small-scale privatisation 1 Little progress. 2 Substantial share privatised. 3 Comprehensive programme almost ready for implementation.
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights. 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial
economies: no state ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land.
Governance and enterprise restructuring 1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline at the
enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance. 2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement
of bankruptcy legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance. 3 Significant and sustained actions to
harden budget constraints and to promote corporate governance effectively (for example, privatisation combined with tight credit and subsidy
policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation). 4 Substantial improvement in corporate governance and significant new investment at
the enterprise level, including minority holdings by financial investors. 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies:
effective corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring.
Price liberalisation 1 Most prices formally controlled by the government. 2 Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-
market prices for the majority of product categories. 3 Significant progress on price liberalisation, but state procurement at non-market prices
remains substantial. 4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; state procurement at non-market prices largely phased out; only a small number of
administered prices remain. 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete price liberalisation with no
price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies.
Trade and foreign exchange system 1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange. 2
Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime
that is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates). 3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and
export restrictions; almost full current account convertibility. 4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions
(apart from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned
trading companies; no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full and current account convertibility.
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariff barriers; membership in WTO.
Competition policy 1 No competition legislation and institutions. 2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction
of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms. 3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a
competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial reduction of entry restrictions. 4 Significant enforcement
actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive environment. 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced
industrial economies: effective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.
Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation 1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 2 Significant liberalisation
of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate ceilings. 3 Substantial progress in establishment of
bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to
cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks. 4 Significant movement of banking laws
and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to
private enterprises; substantial financial deepening. 4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence
of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services.
Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 1 Little progress. 2 Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers;
some trading in government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and trading of securities.
3 Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprizes; establishment of independent share registries, secure clearance and settlement pro-
cedures, and some protection of minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions (for example, investment funds, private
insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) and associated regulatory framework. 4 Securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO
standards; substantial market liquidity and capitalisation; well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and effective regulation. 4+ Stan-
dards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards;
fully developed non-bank intermediation.
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Figure 2.6: Growth rate of real per capita GDP (1).
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Figure 2.7: Growth rate of real per capita GDP (2).
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Figure 2.8: Growth rate of real per capita GDP (3).
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Methodology for computing Trade Openness indicator
The empirical framework for the estimation of observed trade openness is as follows:
Oi,t = α0 + α1Yi,t + α2Popi,t + α3Li + εi,t (2.16)
where Oi,t represents observed trade openness measured by the ratio of exports and
imports over GDP (current prices US$) of country i and year t. Yi,t is the per capita GDP
(current prices, US$) of country i and year t and is a proxy for the level of development.
Popi,t is the population size. Li is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country i is
landlocked31 and 0 otherwise and is a proxy for transportation costs. εi,t is the residual
that will stands for our adjusted trade openness variable.
Several alternatives are possible for estimating the equation 2.16:
• the OLS estimator, if there is no individual effect, no heteroscedasticity and no cor-
relation. In such cases, a standard regression is estimated once the data is considered
as N × T non panel observations.
• the GLS estimator, if there are individual effects, but no heteroscedasticity and no
correlation.
• the FGLS estimator in all other cases. This estimator takes into account the het-
eroscedastic error structure between panels, as well as panel specific autocorrelation
(Wooldridge, 2002; Ouellet, 2005).
In order to choose the appropriate estimation method, we run the Hausman test which
allows us to differentiate between random and fixed effects. The result of this test indicates
that random-effects suit our data. Furthermore, we run the Breusch-Pagan test which
indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity. Next, the hypothesis of the autocorrelation
of errors is tested by the Wooldridge test. The result of this test indicates the existence
of autocorrelation among errors. The appropriate estimator when dealing with both both
heteroscedasticity and error autocorrelation. is the FGLS estimator.
The estimated coefficients32 of the regression of trade openness are given by the equa-
tion (2.17). Note that all variables of interest have the expected sign, negative for popu-
lation and landlockness, and positive for per capita GDP.
Oi,t = 6.256 + 0.118Yi,t − 0.162Popi,t − 0.213Li (2.17)
31A landlocked country is commonly defined as a country enclosed or nearly enclosed by land.
32The coefficients of all the three variables are significant at 1% level of significance.
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Chapter 3
Aid Allocation Determinants and
Donor Objectives
W
hile there is a consensus among donors about the necessity to enhance growth and
reduce poverty, the aid allocation patterns and aid practices have not always been
targeted towards these development objectives. Not only has the efficiency of aid allocation
models been questioned, but also the real motivations of donors to give aid. Donors have
often been suspected of using aid more for their own interests, political, strategic and
commercial) than for recipients’ needs.
The debate on the real motivations for providing aid is rooted in the literature about
effectiveness and the conditions under which aid is more likely to enhance growth (Burnside
and Dollar, 2000). The adoption by multilateral donors of the idea of aid conditionality
(World Bank, 1998) which further oriented bilateral donors strategies towards selective aid
allocation patterns, and, at the same time, the failures of aid in achieving its objectives,
have raised questions in academic and policy circles as to the factors that determine the
allocation of aid.
In the attempt to explain the main motivations of donors for providing aid, the empir-
ical literature has come up with various conclusions. However, a consensus has emerged
as to the key determinants of aid allocation decisions. Three main factors have been
identified: (i) donor interests ; (ii) recipient needs and, (iii) recipient performances.
Donor interests have often been qualified as either strategic and political (related to
political alliances intended to contribute to changes in international situations), or com-
mercial (where the objective would be to expand donor’s markets and/or create cheap
sources for their imports). Recipient needs are related to the very first purpose of for-
eign aid, namely promoting economic development and welfare in recipient countries. The
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initial debate focused on the question whether the aid allocation patterns were driven
by recipient needs or donor interests. Two types of donor behavior have been identified:
“altruistic” - oriented uniquely towards recipient needs; and “selfish” - oriented entirely
towards donor self-interests (political, strategic and commercial). However, most of the
contributions to the aid allocation literature suggests that donors appear neither entirely
altruistic, nor completely selfish. In addition, recently, donors have started to pay atten-
tion to the economic and social merits of recipients; these have been progressively added
in aid allocation models. Mostly, donors have focused on “good performance” with regard
to several aspects such as governance, corruption, institutional development, etc.
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate the criteria of foreign aid al-
location in transition economies. We will present a pattern of aid allocation that takes
into account donor interests, and recipient needs and merits, with a focus on the quality of
governance in recipient countries. More precisely, we will ask whether donors reward“good
governance”. One important aspect of the quality of governance is the quality of institu-
tions and the regulation. It is largely recognized that weak institutions and inadequate
legal frameworks can be harmful to development. In transition economies, undertaking
institutional changes was a necessary condition for achieving market economy. Without
market-friendly institutions and a well regulated market system that would attract foreign
capital, and without preventing corruption, it is unlikely that such countries would achieve
economic development. Additionally, our analysis will compare multilateral and bilateral
aid allocation patterns, at an aggregate level. Finally, it will look at the patterns of bilat-
eral aid allocation by donor (for some major donors) and of multilateral aid allocation of
the European Commission (EC) (the most important multilateral donor for CEECs and
CIS countries) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
We contribute to the empirical literature, by adding on the determinants of aid alloca-
tion in transition economies, which has been given little discussion in the literature so far.
Our results indicate that donors, besides their own interests, do pay attention to recipients
with regard to their needs. Moreover our findings indicate that the quality of governance
is important in the eyes of the donors, since they need to be confident about the way their
money is managed, and the use that is given to it. This lack of confidence actually leads
donors to apply conditionality to their aid.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main findings of the
literature on the determinants of aid allocation. Section 3 sets up a model of aid selection
and allocation process, and discusses the econometric procedure and data used. Section 4
presents and interprets the results and, finally, Section 5 concludes.
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3.1 Literature Review
3.1.1 Donor Interests vs Recipient Needs and Merits
Research on bilateral aid allocation programmes started in the mid 1950s and, since
then, several theoretical studies have attempted to explain the aid allocation decisions
made by various bilateral donors, mostly from Western Europe or the United States. Yet,
it was only in the late 1970s that the allocation behavior of donors was empirically tested
in a series of studies by McKinlay and Little (1978a, 1978b, 1979). Their findings stand
as a benchmark for subsequent research, providing a dominant paradigm of aid allocation
patterns. They investigate US aid allocation models including recipient needs and donor
interests. Their model estimates two distinct equations; one controls only for recipient
needs, while the other deals exclusively with donor interests. Their results point out that
US aid allocation was motivated by political reasons and security rather than humanitarian
criteria.
Later, other studies also found evidence of aid allocation models which were mostly
oriented towards the strategic and political interests of the donors. For instance, Maizels
and Nissanke (1984), who studied the behavior of donors like the United States, France,
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom agree that bilateral aid allocation is more likely
to be determined by donor interests (strategic and commercial), while multilateral aid
donors support a model based on recipient needs. Gounder (1994), studying Australian
aid allocation, is one of the first to underline the importance of both types of determinants.
By exploring US aid allocation Apodaca and Stohl (1999), illustrate that, while the impact
of recipient needs (measured by GNP per capita) on the aid allocation decision is positive
and statistically significant, US national security interests play a more prominent role in
the allocation of aid. Countries that are considered of vital importance to US national
security, along with Latin America, therefore receive aid regardless of other factors.
As described above, the early empirical literature on aid allocation was mostly dom-
inated by studies analyzing the self-interests of donors and the needs of recipients sep-
arately. The usual control variables used in empirical studies to express donor interests
are political similarity, arms transfers, military presence, religious similarity, geographic
proximity, share of a donor exports or imports traded with a particular recipient country,
stock of private direct investment from a donor to a recipient country. Per capita income
is often included in empirical analysis to control for recipient needs; other variables such
as infant mortality, life expectancy at birth, and literacy rate are also widely used in aid
allocation regressions for this purpose.
Further research has displayed in recent years, a preference for models which combine
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both types of aid allocation behavior, while arguing that previous results suffered from
the omitted variable bias (McGillivray, 2003). Criticism has emerged with regard to the
specification of these models. Henceforth, models including both determinants have been
developed (McGillivray and Oczkowki, 1992; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Boone, 1996;
Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alsesina and Weder, 2002; Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004). For
instance, McGillivary and Oczkowski (1992) in a study on UK allocation, find that the
allocation of aid favors the distribution of assistance to its former colonies (commonwealth
countries). Trumbull and Wall (1994) explore the variations in per capita aggregate ODA
across recipients and find that ODA allocations are essentially determined by the needs of
recipients, such as infant mortality, and political and civil rights. For Alesina and Dollar
(2000) the allocation of bilateral aid is determined as much by political and strategic
considerations, as by the economic needs and performances of recipients. Berthe´lemy
and Tichit’s (2004) findings support the importance of a country’s colonial past and of
bilateral trade, as key criteria for aid allocation decisions. Moreover, they point out that
good economic and political environments have been rewarded by donors since 1990.
Until the seminal contribution of Burnside and Dollar (2000), with regard to the im-
pact of aid on growth depending on the quality of economic policy, the international donor
community did not pay attention to recipient performances. Henceforth, the belief that
“good performers” should be rewarded has become common sense for donors. The devel-
opment of aid effectiveness literature encouraged researchers to explore the behavior of
donors with regard to the performances of recipients. Variables related to recipient merits
have been added in the aid allocation models, such as:
• economic growth (a measure of economic performance);
• governance, political and civil rights, corruption (measures of institutional quality);
• democracy (a measure of political openness);
• inflation, budget balance, trade openness (measures of economic policy).
Among all these factors, more attention has been given to the quality of governance.
It has been recognized that governance is one of the drivers of a stable development and a
sound investment climate. Neither donors, nor foreign investors, are likely to be interested
in investing or financially supporting countries with low governance or bad institutional
quality. The lack of confidence in the capacity of recipients to manage the funds or in the
commitment and willingness to do it represents is the main concern that actually leads
donors to apply conditionality.
The existing literature provides various indicators of the quality of governance in recip-
ient countries, such as political and civil rights (Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Svensson, 1999;
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Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003), rule of law and corruption (Alesina and Dollar,
2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002; Neumayer 2003) or personal
integrity rights (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999). By exploring the impact of varying degrees
of corruption on aid in recipient countries, Alesina and Weder (2002) find no evidence of
a negative impact. Scandinavian aid seems to be directed towards less corrupt countries,
while large donors, i.e. France, Japan, USA and UK do not appear to consider the level of
corruption as a major factor in the allocation of aid. However, Alesina and Dollar (2000)
find that, developing countries that support political rights and civil liberties receive more
bilateral aid, ceteris paribus. Knack (2000) examines the interdependence between aid
and the quality of governance, measured by a Governance index (including bureaucratic
quality, rule of law and corruption) and finds evidence that higher levels of aid erode the
quality of governance.
An important contribution to this literature comes from Guillaumont and Chauvet
(1999, 2001), who suggest that as well as the quality of economic policy, the aid allocation
models should also consider the vulnerability of developing countries when facing external
shocks. They point out the protective role of aid with regard to economic growth, against
the negative impact induced by external shocks. Neumayer (2003) compares the impor-
tance of “good governance” for donors in the selection phase and in the allocation phase
of the allocation process. He examines democracy, human rights, corruption, regulatory
burden and rule of law. He shows that almost all aspects of “good governance” have con-
sequences for a donor’s decision in the selection phase . The results are similar for the
allocation phase, except for one indicator, the rule of law.
Some recent studies investigate incentives in the donor-recipient relationship, and their
possible influence on the implementation of policy reforms intended to reduce poverty and
promote development. For example, Svensson (1998) uses a game theoretical model in
which an altruistic donor gives aid according to recipient needs. The results illustrate that
aid allocation rules adversely affect recipients’ incentives to carry out policies in order to
promote human development indicators (infant mortality, life expectancy at birth, and
primary school enrollment). The empirical tests show that recipient needs and the size of
population are the main determinants of aid allocation patterns. However, aid flows have
no statistically significant impact on the promotion of human development indicators.
3.1.2 Different Donors, Different Aid Allocation Patterns
Analyzing bilateral aid allocation patterns at an individual level has lead to an iden-
tification of important differences among donors allocation behaviors. Nordic countries,
i.e. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden appear to allocate more aid to recipients
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with less per capita income, open economies and democratic governance. The the United
States seem to behave similar to Nordic countries, but only marginally, because it also
gives a lot of aid to political allies, like Egypt and Israel. Large donors, like France and
Japan allocate more aid to their political allies and to their former colonies. They care
only to a small extent about recipient needs and good governance. Most of the donors,
except for Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands, consider the openness policy a
criteria of allocation (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Furthermore, level of corruption is likely
to positively influence the allocation of US aid and negatively influence the allocation of
both Austrian and Scandinavian aid (Alesina and Weder, 2002).
According to Berthle´my and Tichit (2004) political and civil rights positively influence
the allocation pattern of aid for most of the donors, with Austria and the United States
relying on this criteria the most, Belgium and France the least. Moreover, social perfor-
mances (e.g. infant mortality) are considered in the aid allocation models of Germany
and Italy, while they are not for most of the other donors, like Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway and the United States.
Despite their altruistic or selfish behavior, there is evidence of some coordination
amongst donors. This coordination was first identified in the literature by (Dudley and
Montmarquette, 1976). It appears that, on average, donors pay attention to the total
amount of aid received by a recipient from the rest of the donors. In fact, a donor might
expect that the impact of its aid in a recipient country would be higher, the greater the
amount of aid the rest of the donors grant to that recipient. In other words, the more aid
a recipient receives from the rest of the donors, the more effective the aid received from a
specific donor will be. Furthermore, a sort of “alliance” is identified among large donors.
In a study about Japanese allocation of aid, Katada (1997) observes that as well as its
own political and economic interests, Japan also considers alliances with the the United
States and improvement of the United States-Japan relationship, by satisfying the United
States interests in Asia-Pacific region,s in support of the United States maintenance in the
developing world.
While a lot of consideration has been given to bilateral aid allocation, multilateral aid
allocation has been discussed only marginally. The common belief is that multilateral aid
is more poverty-focused oriented and more predictable than most bilateral aid. Neumayer
(2003), in a study on the determinants of aid allocation of four regional multilateral devel-
opment banks1 and United Nations Agencies2, argues that banks focus on the economic
1African Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank.
2United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Regular
Programme of Technical Assistance.
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needs of recipients, whilst agencies focus on human development aspects. Consequently,
political freedom, political rights and civil liberties do not play an important role for the
agencies, whereas they do more for the banks.
The ongoing debate on the behavior of donors, which has often pointed to the “selfish”
motives of donors, has lead them to state their commitment to improve the aid allocation
decisions (World Bank, 2000, 2002). Whether they have delivered on these commitments
or not is a subject of current debate. Researchers have carried out empirical analyses
in order to identify changes in the allocation behavior of donors. Berthe´lemy and Tichit
(2004) identify an improvement in multilateral donors allocation practices (and to a lesser
extent for bilateral donors) towards greater selectivity between the 1980s and the 1990s.
Dollar and Levin (2006) advance a similar conclusion when comparing between the late
1980s and the years 2000-2003. Democracy, rule of law and GDP per capita are used as
selectivity criteria for recipients. Conversely, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) and Easterly
(2007) find evidence of a weak improvement in aid allocation in recent years. While some
improvements are identified, i.e. greater regard for the GDP per capita after the late
1970s, and a decline in aid tying, factors such as democracy, corruption, inflation, and
openness do not appear to benefit of an increased preoccupation from donors (Easterly,
2007). The response of both bilateral multilateral donors to changing institutional and
policy conditions in recipient countries proved to be weak (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006).
3.1.3 Bias in Aid Allocation Patterns
The patterns of aid allocation bring out several identification issues that should be
taken into consideration in empirical studies. For example, bilateral donors are likely to
provide a positive amount of aid to some recipients and nothing to others. Large donors
like France, Japan, UK and USA tend to reward most of the recipients, while small donors
like Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Norway tend to concentrate their aid only on few
recipients (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003).
This is actually the consequence of the two-step aid allocation procedure, which consists
of (1) a selection phase, when recipients are selected with regard to given criteria, and of
(2) an allocation phase, when recipients are provided with aid.
Since donors exclude some countries from the recipients’ list, empirically investigating
the process of aid allocation with the classical OLS might suffer from bias. This is because
the OLS method does not account for the non-linearity between dependent and indepen-
dent variables. In the case of a two-step allocation process, the choice of the estimation
method is constrained by the nature of the dependent variable, which is the amount of
aid. This is only partly continuous with a zero positive probability (Neumayer, 2003). The
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existing literature suggests using sophisticated estimation techniques in order to deal with
this issue. Several alternatives might me applied: the two-part model (Dudley and Mont-
marquette, 1976; McKinlay and Little, 1978; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Svensson 1999;
Neumayer, 2003), the Heckman method (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1992; Tarp et al.,
1998) and the Tobit model (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Weder 2002; Berthe´lemy
and Tichit, 2004)3.
Empirical studies have also pointed out certain systemic bias in aid allocation models.
Two such bias have been identified by the literature: (i) the population bias, and (ii) the
income level bias.
The population bias was first identified in aid allocation patterns by Dudley and Mont-
marquette (1976). It attests the fact that small countries receive more aid than big coun-
tries. Since Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), most of the studies on the determinants
of aid allocation have tested this bias. More recently, Neumayer (2003) shows that there
is no population bias at the eligibility stage. Nonetheless, at the level stage, all donors
have population bias, indicating that small countries receive more aid per capita. Several
reasons are provided by the literature as an explanation for this the bias: (i) the decreasing
marginal benefits of aid allocation as population size increases; (ii) the potentially higher
effectiveness of aid in small countries; and (iii) the relatively limited absorbtion capacity
of more populous countries (Neumayer, 2003).
The income level bias denotes the fact that very poor countries tend to receive less aid
than less poor countries. However, there is a threshold above which richer countries do
receive less aid. One explanation for this is that less poor countries have more economic
and political power in the international community, than very poor countries. Another
explanation is the lack of confidence of donors in the administrative capacity to manage
larger aid inflows int very poor countries (Neumayer, 2003).
3.2 Conceptual Framework and Methodology
In this section we will formulate a set of hypotheses about the potential factors that
guide the decisions of bilateral and multilateral donors when providing aid. Then, we will
discuss the theoretical benchmark model and the appropriate estimation technique when
dealing with aid allocation patterns. Finally, we will present our data and the variables
used in the econometric specification.
3A discussion about these estimation techniques is given in Section 3.2.3
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3.2.1 Conceptual Framework
As previously indicated, the literature on aid allocation point to two main groups of
motives for providing aid, namely recipient needs and donor interests. Recipients need
foreign assistance to finance development and growth; donors, on the other hand may pur-
sue their own political and economic interests through providing aid. The basic approach
from the early literature is the so-called recipient need and donor interest (RN − DI)
approach (McKinlay-Little, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Grounder, 1999; Grounder
and Sen, 1999). It relies on the estimation of two separate equations, one including only
indicators that reveal the needs of recipients and, the other, only indicators that reveal
the interests of the donors. However, recent research suggests that estimating separate
equations brings about an omission bias. If the variables related to recipient needs are
relevant to aid allocation and are not considered in the equation modeling donor interests,
then the latter provides biased results. Similarly, if variables related to donor interests are
relevant to aid allocation, and they are not included in the equation of recipient needs,
then this too provides biased results.
In this analysis, we will combine these two groups of potential aid determinants. We
consider that donors, besides pursuing their selfish motivations, also have the desire to
contribute to development in poor countries; donors believe that better development out-
comes and less poverty, provide a more secure and stable environment. Recent empirical
evidence has questioned whether donors have become more selective in allocating aid across
countries on the basis of equity and merit criteria. The results are mixed; for instance,
Dollar and Levin (2004), and Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout (2007) show that
donors have become more selective in giving aid to countries on a needs basis (measured by
GDP per capita), as well as on policy performance and institutional quality. Conversely,
Easterly (2007), and Easterly and Pfutze (2008) report different findings. Following the
literature that identifies recipient performances as determinants of current aid allocation
decisions, we will add in our analysis, variables related to the quality of governance. We
will use the governance indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2005). We will also control for
the two biases largely identified in the existing literature on the allocation of aid, namely
population bias and income level bias.
In sum, throughout the empirical analysis we will test the following hypotheses:
H1: Donors consider their own interests in their decision to allocate aid.
H2: Donors pay attention to recipient needs in their aid allocation patterns.
H3: Governance quality impacts upon aid allocation decisions.
H4: Smaller countries receive more aid.
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3.2.2 Theoretical Model
Most empirical studies on aid allocation patterns do not explicitly present the theo-
retical model embodied in the regressions. Nevertheless, it is possible to incorporate them
into the theoretical benchmark framework proposed by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976)
and later extended by Trumbull and Wall (1994). This model is based on the standard
microeconomic theory of utility maximization under a budget constraint and attempts to
explain the allocation of bilateral donors in a two-step approach:
• a selection (eligibility) phase ;
• an allocation (level) phase.
The eligibility stage corresponds to a donor’s decision to give or not give aid to a
specific recipient. The level stage corresponds to a donor’s decision with regard to the
amount of aid granted to the recipients selected in the first step. According to this model,
a donor maximizes the relative impact of its aid in the recipient country. This impact
is measured by the ratio of per capita aid to per capita income and weighed by the size
of the population of recipient. In each period, each donor tries to achieve the maximum
utility from the impact of the aid allocated, under the constraint of its limited aid budget.
The main assumptions of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) model state that, when
a donor decides to provide aid, he might expect that:
• the recipient will behave more favorably towards the donor, by supporting the po-
litical interests of the donor (selfish vision);
• the recipient will confer economic benefits towards the donor, by increasing its im-
ports from the donor country (selfish vision);
• the population welfare of the recipient will be improved (altruistic vision).
By maximizing the utility function under the budget constraint, Dudley and Montmar-
quette (1976) derive two econometric specifications, which allows them to test the relative
importance of a set of factors, for a donor’s decision. The model attempts to explain the
individual aid allocation decisions that donors make, assuming that they have different
subjective measures regarding the impact of aid in a recipient country. Trumbull and Wall
(1994) extended this model to allow optimization by multiple donors. They assumed that
all donors have the same subjective measure of the impact of aid in a recipient country. As
in Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), a donor maximizes the weighted sum of the total
impact of its aid in all recipients, subject to its budget constraint.
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In this analysis, as with most of the studies on aid allocation criteria, we will depart
from the deterministic model of aid allocation introduced by Dudley and Montmarquette
(1976) and extended later by Trumbull and Wall (1994). The next sections present this
benchmark model first and then our model, which is extended by introducing the quality
of governance as a measure of recipient merits. Moreover, our model controls for the
heterogeneity among donors.
Trumbull and Wall’s (1994) Benchmark Model
Trumbull and Wall’s (1994) model assumes that in each time period t, each donor
i allocates its aid budget Yi,t among N recipients, with the objective of maximizing the
weighted sum of the total impact of their aid on the recipients. The model makes a strong
assumption, by supposing that all donors have the same subjective measure of the impact
of their aid on a recipient. This is captured by the variable wj, which measures the weights
assigned by donors to each recipient j. The weights reveal the relative degree to which
donors are concerned with the recipients. The assumption is that all donors assign the
same set of weights to recipients.
For a given time period t, the per capita impact of aid within a recipient j is hj. It is
a function of the per capita aid received aj , the per capita well-being, proxied by the per
capita income, xj, and the size of the population, Nj, as follows:
hj =
aβj
xγjN
τ
j
(3.1)
where 0 < β < 1, 0 < |γ| < 1 and 0 ≤ τ < 1.
Donors expect that the total impact of aid will increase with the per capita aid. The
effect of the income of recipients on the total impact of aid might be either positive or
negative, depending on the assumed substitutability/complementarity between aid and
the income of recipients. If aid is considered complementary for low levels of income, the
impact of income will be positive. Conversely, if aid is considered a substitute for poor
levels of income, the impact of income will instead be negative. The expected effect of the
size of population on the impact of per capita aid is negative, since donors might expect
that the positive impact of aid is easier achieved in smaller countries. Each donor will face
the following maximization problem:
maxHi =
wja
β
i,j
xγjN
τ
j
(3.2)
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under the budget constraint: ∑
j
ai,j = Yi (3.3)
Making the assumption that aid is perfectly fungible, Trumbull and Wall (1994) apply
the Lagrangian to obtain the equilibrium values of the marginal effect of an increase in
the aid budget and per capita aid for each year and each donor. By introducing the
time dimension, making the log transformation and some algebraic transformations, they
obtain the following linear form of the equation:
log a∗j,t = α0 + α1logXj,t + α2Nj,t + ηj + µt (3.4)
where a∗j,t stands for equilibrium values of per capita aid. Since aid allocation decisions
are independent for each time-period, time effects (µt) are the same for all recipient coun-
tries within a given year. Moreover, each recipient country is assigned different weights.
To control for that, recipient fixed effects (ηj) are used. Consequently, the equation (3.4)
allows to control for both unobserved recipient effects and time-period effects.
Our Model
As highlighted earlier, the most important assumption of the model developed by
Trumbull and Wall (1994) is that all donors have the same subjective measure of the
impact of aid on a recipient. We consider this assumption too strict since in reality,
differences between donors are likely to occur with regard to the subjective measures of
the impact of aid on different recipients. There are several factors that might lead to
differences in aid giving policy of donors. Therefore, the weights assigned to recipients are
likely to vary for individual donors, based on the relative importance of a given recipient in
the eyes of the donors. These weights might be determined by historical, cultural, ethnic,
political, strategic, or geographic factors that affect the amount of aid. In econometric
terms this translates into a possible correlation with right-hand variables. Not taking this
into account introduces heterogeneity bias.
For instance, donors might be biased in their behavior towards recipients that are im-
portant trade partners. This may determine donors to assign these particular recipients
higher weights. This might be taken into consideration to some extent by including vari-
ables that control for common language, colonial history, etc. However, cultural, historical,
and political factors are often difficult to observe and quantify. The fixed-effects model
allows us to control for these factors by assuming that there are fixed donor-specific factors
that may be correlated with both the levels of bilateral aid and right-hand-side variables.
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Since we cannot tell which variable might be responsible for the heterogeneity bias, we
simply include fixed donor-specific effects (ρi). Contrary to Trumbull and Wall (1994), in
this analysis we consider that donors have different subjective measures of the impact of
aid given to a recipient. This is our first addition to Trumbull and Wall’s (1994) model.
The second addition consists in introducing the quality of governance into the aid allo-
cation model. If donors believe that aid is properly used in countries with good governance,
they will expect the total impact of aid to increase the better the quality governance. We
therefore expect that donors give more aid to countries with better governance. The
marginal impact of governance on per capita aid should be positive, ceteris paribus.
Considering these two additions, we can re-write the allocation equation of our model,
for a donor i, a recipient j and a time-period t, by introducing donor fixed effects (ρi),
governance indicators and other control variables, as follows:
Aidi,j,t = α0 + α1Xj,t + α2Zi,j,t + α3Gj,t + ρi + ηj + µt + εi,j,t (3.5)
where Aidi,j,t is the aid per capita from a donor i to a recipient j at time t. X is a
matrix of control variables for recipient j at time t, including GDP per capita, foreign direct
investment inflows (% of recipient’s GDP), population size, secondary school enrolment,
and total amount of aid received from other donors (bilateral and multilateral). Z is
a matrix of control variables that characterize the relationship (economic and strategic)
between a donor i and a recipient j, at time t; it includes the export flows from a donor to a
recipient (% of donor’s GDP) as a proxy for commercial links; the distance between a donor
and a recipient; the linguistic proximity index as a measure of cultural proximity between a
donor and a recipient. Gj,t stands for the quality of governance as measured by Kaufmann
et al.’s (2005) indicators; several aspects of governance are compiled into six indicators:
voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption.
This specification of the aid allocation equation allows us to estimate the marginal
effects of the three groups of variables (donor interests, recipient needs and merits) on aid
allocation, while isolating unobserved donor, recipient and time-fixed effects. The model
assumes that for each period, each donor maximizes the sum of the total impacts of its
development assistance on the recipient countries, under the overall budget constraint.
Following the consensus which confirms that aid allocation decisions entail two steps,
we should consider the selection phase, before estimating the allocation equation (3.5)
The selection phase would consist in estimating the probability of giving aid. Here, the
dependent variable would be a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is selected as a
recipient country, and 0 otherwise. A country is consider eligible to receive aid if it receives
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a positive amount of aid. The allocation phase consist in providing a certain amount of
aid to the selected recipients. The dependent variable at this stage is the amount of aid
allocated to eligible recipients.
3.2.3 Estimation Techniques
When dealing with aid allocation models, an important aspect of the model specifi-
cation is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (omitted variable effect). As noted in
the previous section, here we will use three types of fixed effects:
• time-fixed effects to control for temporal events that might affect aid allocation; they
are the same for all the recipients within a given year;
• recipient-country effects to capture the heterogeneity among recipients; this lies in
the differences in donors’ behaviors vis-a`-vis recipients, given the fact that each
recipient is assigned a different weight by each donor;
• donor-country effects to capture the heterogeneity among donors; this appears from
the differences in the aid allocation policy, i.e. differences in measuring the impact
of aid on each recipient.
Another issue that has to be considered when dealing with this kind of model, is
the truncated nature of aid variable. Aid commitments cannot be negative4. They are
either positive - if the given recipient is among the selected recipients - or zero. The
censored nature of aid variable implies that OLS estimates are biased because they do
not take into account the non-linearity induced in the estimated relationship. In order to
correct this selection bias and model data with a censored character, the previous literature
(Neumayer, 2003; Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; Berthe´lemy, 2006) provides several limited
variable modeling techniques: (i) the two-part model ; (ii) the Heckman’s method ; and (iii)
the Tobit model.
• Two-part model ⇒ involves a selection equation and an allocation equation. The
selection equation is estimated with a Probit technique that determines the proba-
bility of a potential recipient country to receive assistance. The allocation equation
is given by a linear estimation (OLS estimates) that determines the amounts of aid,
based only on positive observations.
4However, in practice, when measuring aid disbursements, negative amounts of aid might occur. This
has nothing to do with the decision of donors. It is rather a consequence of the recipient repayments of
loans from the previous period.
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The equations of the two-part model can be written as follows:
P (Ai,j,t) > 0 = Φ(cZi,j,t) + vi,j,t
Ai,j,t = βXi,j,t + ui,j,t
Cov(u, v) = 0
where i, j and t denote the donor country, the recipient country and the given year;
Ai,j,t stands for the amount of per capita aid commitments allocated by the donor i to
the recipient j for the year t; Zi,j,t and Xi,j,t are vectors of explanatory variables and
β and c are the associated coefficients. Φ(.) stands for the cumulative distribution
function (cdf); ui,j,t and vi,j,t are the independent and normally distributed error
terms.
The drawback of this method is that it assumes the independence of the two error
terms (given by the Cov(u, v) = 0). In other words, the choice of the recipient is
presumed to be independent from the amount allocated to this recipient in the second
step. This means that it considers that the amount of allocated aid is not affected
by unobserved factors that might determine the selection decision of a country as
an aid recipient. However, if the choice of the recipient is likely to depend on the
amount of aid allocated to the given recipient, estimating the two equations while not
accounting for the correlation between their error terms would introduce a selection
bias in the second step of the estimation.
• Heckman method⇒ is similar to the two-part model, except that the two error
terms ui,j,t and vi,j,t are no longer assumed to be independent. They are correlated,
with Cov(u, v) = ρ. The two phases of selection and allocation are supposedly tied.
This method can be implemented either in a two-step or in a one-step maximum
likelihood procedure. When implemented as a two-step procedure, the selection
equation in the first step is estimated with a Probit, as in the case of the two-
part model. Then, in the second step, the so-called Mill’s ratio ( 1
φ
), is computed
using the residuals of the selection equation. The inverse Mill’s ratio (λ), which is a
selection bias control factor, is used to control for bias due to censorship. This factor
is a summarizing measure which reflects the effects of all unmeasured characteristics
related to the decision of aid allocation (the selection phase). In the second step, this
factor (λ) is introduced as an additional independent variable, together with other
explanatory variables in an OLS regression model using only uncensored variables.
The objective is to correct both the selection bias and the endogeneity biases, due to
the possible correlation between the independent variables and the error term from
the selection stage.
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The Heckman model has the following expression:
P (Ai,j,t) > 0 = Φ(cZi,j,t) + vi,j,t
Ai,j,t = βXi,j,t + ρσφ(cZi,j,t + vi,j,t)/Φ(cZi,j,t + vi,j,t) + ui,j,t
Cov(u, v) = ρ
where ρ stands for the Cov(u, v), σ for the variance of u, φ(.) for the partial distri-
bution function (pdf), and φ(.)/Φ(.) for the inverse Mill’s ratio.
Implemented as a one-step maximum likelihood procedure, all parameters, including
the correlation between the error terms of the two equations, are estimated in a one-
step maximum likelihood (ML) procedure.
• Tobit model ⇒ is a one-step procedure estimated using the ML method that
allows one to control for both the censored nature of the dependent variable and the
endogenous nature of the selection phase. The difference with Heckman’s method
is that the independent variables are assumed to have a similar impact on both the
probability of receiving aid and the amount of aid allocated. Therefore, the aid
received is described as a maximum value between zero and a linear combination of
explanatory variables as follows:
Ai,j,t =
{
A∗i,j,t if A
∗
i,j,t > 0
0 if A∗i,j,t ≤ 0
where A∗i,j,t is the latent variable:{
A∗i,j,t = βXi,j,t + ui,j,t
Ai,j,t = max(0, A
∗
i,j,t) = max(0, βXi,j,t + ui,j,t)
where ui,j,t ∼ N(0, σ2).
The existing literature has not come to an agreement as to the most appropriate method
to use when estimating aid allocation patterns. However, it is acknowledged that the as-
sumption of independence of the error terms is not likely to hold in the two-part model.
As for the other two methods, no consensus has been reached. For instance, McGillivary
(2002) argues that the Heckman method is more appropriate because it allows the de-
terminants of the selection of recipients to be different from those of the allocation. An
important condition for the use of this method is that the selection equation contains at
least one variable which is not related to the dependent variable in the allocation equation.
If such a variable is not present, multicollinearity may arise; furthermore, the addition in
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the allocation equation of the λ factor may lead to difficulties in the estimations. Conse-
quently, Heckman estimators can loose their robustness. The drawback of this method is
that it does not allow one to take into consideration the heterogeneity among donors by
introducing fixed effects. In fact introducing such fixed effects into the selection equation
(which is estimated with a Probit) likely creates consistency problems which are impos-
sible to eliminate in parametric models when the data set has a limited number of time
observations. These consistency problems are known as “incidental parameters problems”.
According to Grenne (2004), although they are not likely to seriously affect Probit/Tobit
estimates, they do however affect the variance estimators (Greene, 2004).
In our analysis, since we want to control for donor-specific effects, recipient-specific
effects, and period-specific effects, we will run panel fixed effects estimates for the allocation
equations, while ignoring the selection equation. Alternatively, since censored observations
represents about 30% (1506 out of 4950) in the dataset of bilateral aid flows, we will run
Heckman’s method. But we will follow Berthe´lemy (2006) who identifies that the selection
bias is of second order5 (the correlation coefficient, ρ is about 0.35) and consequently we
will concentrate only on the allocation equation. For the multilateral aid allocation, since
we examine aggregate flows, we do not have any single negative flows; the dependent
variable is not censored. We will therefore run only fixed effects estimates, with recipient
specific effects and time-dummies. and heteroscedasticity and serial correlation standard
errors. All estimations include donor-country effects, recipient-country specific effects and
time-fixed effects.
3.3 Data and Variables
3.3.1 Data
Data on bilateral and multilateral aid flows come from the OECD Geographical
Distribution of Financial Flows database. Aid flows are measured by commitments. We
consider (i) bilateral commitments, which are allocated by 22 donors6, member countries
of DAC (OECD), to 25 CEECs and CIS recipients7; and (ii) multilateral commitments
(aggregate and European Commission aid flows) to the same 25 recipients.
5We will make the same assumption in the analysis in the next chapter.
6Bilateral donor countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, United States.
7Recipient countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
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Note that we are following the literature on aid allocation which is in agreement as to
measuring aid by commitments. Aid commitments are viewed as the decision to supply aid;
they better reflect the donors’ decision, since donors have more control over commitments
than disbursements. Sometimes it happens that the amounts disbursed are lower than
the committed ones. This difference can be explained by some subsequent failures in the
recipient economy, such as recipient capacity of absorption or administrative capacity to
manage the flows.
Aid commitments include grants or loans whose objective is to promote economic
development and welfare; technical assistance is also included. The nominal aid flows
are converted to constant US$ flows at 2000 prices, using the GDP deflator of DAC
members, in order to control for the effect of inflation. Furthermore, we compute per
capita commitments. According to McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) and Neumayer
(2003) donors are more likely to allocate aid on a country basis than on a per capita basis.
However, while using per capita aid allows us to find out whether smaller countries get
more aid.
Data on the explanatory variables, such as the GDP per capita, the exports flows, the
FDI inflows, population, school enrolment, and life expectancy at birth are taken from
the WDI database (World Bank). For governance indicators we use Kaufmann et al.’s
(2005) database (World Bank), while data for the distance between countries comes from
the CEPII database.
The time span covers the period from 1996 to 2004. We will take 1996 as the starting
year of the analysis since the governance indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2005) are only
available from this year. As noted in the previous chapter on the effectiveness of aid,
the end date is the year 2004, since this was the last year that OECD collected data for
CEECs which became EU members starting with 2005.
Who Gives, To Whom and How Much?
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below report the average amounts of aid committed by the 22
DAC donors to all recipients over the analyzed period (1996-2004). The major destination
of bilateral flows appears to be Russia, with an amount of total bilateral commitments
over the period, of about 1189 millions $US (constant 2000 prices). Other important
destination for bilateral aid commitments are Ukraine (347 millions $US), Poland (339
millions $US), Kazkhstan (191 millions $US), Albania (186 millions $US) and Uzbekistan
(184 millions $US).
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In per capita terms, the countries that get the most appear to be Macedonia, Albania,
Armenia, and Georgia (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Bilateral per capita commitments, constant 2000 $US (period average, 1996-
2004).
The average aid per capita by recipient from the most important donors are shown
in Figures 3.6-3.11, in the Appendix. Note that Macedonia is a favored destination for
all large donors. The United States and Japan reward ex-Soviet Union Republics, like
Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan the most. Conversely, CEECs
countries seem to be awarded more by the EU. For example, the largest French aid flows
go to Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Donors like Germany, France and United Kingdom
appear to allocated aid to almost all the recipients in our sample, while others, such as
Denmark for example, concentrates on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and allocates almost
nothing to any of the other recipients.
Looking at total and per capita commitments, by donor, multilateral and bilateral
(Figures 3.2 and 3.3) it is clear that multilateral flows are largely higher. This is not
surprising at all, since the European Commission (EC) - on behalf of the European Union,
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are the two biggest
multilateral donors for CEECs and CIS. Bilateral donors, which are EU members might
display a preference for providing more aid through the EC.
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Figure 3.2: Bilateral and multilateral commitments, constant 2000 millions $US (period
average, 1996-2004).
Figure 3.3: Bilateral and multilateral per capita commitments, constant 2000 $US (period
average, 1996-2004).
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Table 3.3: Multilateral Aid Flows and share of Total Multilateral, constant 2000 millions
$US.
EC EC EBRD EBRD Other Other Total
Aid flows % of total Aid flows % of total Multilateral % of total Multilateral
1996 70.6 80.0 4.0 4.5 13.7 15.5 88.3
1997 51.9 62.4 3.5 4.2 27.7 33.4 83.1
1998 62.6 70.6 3.4 3.8 22.6 25.6 88.6
1999 88.8 73.7 2.4 2.0 29.2 24.3 120.4
2000 129.8 89.5 1.8 1.1 35.7 9.4 167.3
2001 145.5 95.2 3.4 2.1 13.4 2.7 162.3
2002 147.3 99.1 2.5 1.7 -3.2 -1 146.6
2003 158.5 89.0 1.7 0.9 18 10.1 178.2
2004 103.9 83.7 2.3 1.9 17.9 14.4 124.1
Source: Own calculation based on OECD-DAC database.
Table 3.3 reports the average annual multilaterak flows from the EC and the EBRD,
as well the shares in the total multilateral. Note that the share of the EC aid is relatively
high, between 62% and 99% over the period. This aid is allocated mainly through two
technical assistance schemes - PHARE and TACIS, as well as in the form of humanitarian
assistance, food aid and financial assistance on commercial terms.
Compared to the amount of aid provided by the EC, the multilateral aid from the
EBRD is small, but it is not negligible. The EBRD assistance takes the form of project
financing, primarily in the private sector - banks, industries and businesses (both new
ventures and investments in existing companies). As a development bank, the EBRD
seeks to support projects that are assisting development and that are also commercially
viable. Actually, the creation of such an international financial institution represented the
collective response of Western Europe to unprecedented transformations and challenges in
CEECs in 1989, in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall. The very first objective of the EBRD
was to assist the countries in the region in undertaking the necessary changes required
to move from systems based on centrally planned command economies to free democratic
institutions and market economies. Since the start of the transition process, the EBRD
has been involved in the liberalization of prices, the privatization and the reforming of
banking systems, and setting up new legal frameworks.
Looking at the EC aid flows, by destination (Figure 3.4) one can notice that current new
EU members have benefited the most. During the analyzed period, Poland was on average
the largest beneficiary in terms of aid volumes (570 million $US 2000). It was followed by
Romania (511 million $US 2000), Bulgaria (248 million $US 2000), Hungary (181 million
$US 2000) and Russia (154 million $US 2000). EBRD aid flows were committed mostly
to Russia (22 million $US 2000). Ukraine ranked second (7 million $US 2000), followed
by Romania (4 million $US 2000) and Poland (3 million $US 2000) (Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.4: EC aid (average 1996-2004, millions $US 2000).
Figure 3.5: EBRD aid (average 1996-2004, millions $US 2000).
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3.3.2 Variables
The choice of our control variables is guided by this previous literature. They are
discussed in the following sections.
Donor Interests Variables
Economic and strategic self-interests that motivate donor countries’ development
assistance policies are the promotion of trade by the intensification of commercial links
with recipients; the strengthening of relationships from past colonial ties; the creation of
political alliances; the promotion of democracy and civil liberties in recipient countries,
etc.
Here we consider the following variables that measure such interests:
• Xi,j,t ⇒ the total exports of goods and services from a donor i to a recipient j for
year t, measured as share of the donor’s GDP.
This variable captures the commercial link between donor and recipient. Donors
aid allocation policy are generally biased towards recipients that tend to trade more
with them than others. Export flows are calculated in thousands of US dollars, at
2000 constant prices, deflated by the GDP deflator of the donor country. Then, they
are expressed as a ratio of the total exports of the donor over its GDP. We expect
this variable to positively impact upon the allocation of aid.
• Di,j ⇒ the distance between a donor i and a recipient j.
Initially used in gravity models, this variable represents a proxy for the transporta-
tion costs of bilateral trade. This suggests that partners that are geographically close
to each other trade more. In the same way, the distance is included in aid allocation
models. It is expected to negatively affect aid allocation, since donors are expected
to allocate more aid to countries that are geographically closer. The variable is taken
from CEPII database and is defined as the sum of bilateral distances between the
biggest cities of the two countries, weighted by the share of the cities in the overall
population of the countries.
Note that we do not control for the common language as is usually done in aid
allocation literature in order to capture the cultural similarity between a donor
and a recipient. In the literature, this proximity is usually measured by a dummy
that equals 1 if a donor and a recipient speak the same language and 0 otherwise.
However, this is difficult to apply to our sample because it does not include countries
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that have important cultural ties. In fact, in our sample, no single pair of countries
share a common language. Using this kind of dummy would not be appropriate
(it would take only zero values). We do not either consider variables to capture
the colonial ties since we do not have donors’ ex-colonies in our sample of recipient
countries.
Recipient Needs Variables
In addition to the economic and politico-strategic interests of donors, developmental
motives and humanitarian concerns are mentioned among the motives of donors allocation
programmes. Here we use the following variables to capture the needs of recipients:
• GDPj,t ⇒ the per capita GDP of the recipient j at time t.
The income is measured in constant US dollars, at 2000 prices and stands for the
material well-being of the population in a recipient country. It is expected to nega-
tively influence the allocation of aid, since the poorest countries should get the most
aid.
• SEj,t ⇒ the secondary school enrolment rate of the recipient j at time t.
This is measured by the percentage of individuals enrolled in secondary school. It
reflects the social needs of the recipient country and is expected to have a negative
impact on the aid allocation. A higher rate of secondary school enrolment would
reduce aid flows, since donors would perceive this as an improvement in human
development, which, generally, is associated with the alleviation of monetary poverty.
We have also used another two measures of recipient needs, namely life expectancy
at birth and infant mortality rate, but they do not appear to significantly influence
aid allocation. This might be due to the lack of available data. Dropping them from
regressions saves about 500 observations.
Recipient Performances Variables
Additionally, we introduce variables that capture the performances of recipient coun-
tries, since we are relying on the role these factors play in enhancing the effectiveness of
aid allocation and welfare improvement. These variables are as follows:
• FDIj,t ⇒ the foreign direct investment inflows of recipient j at time t as a share of
its GDP.
This captures the economic performances of the recipient countries. It is expected to
have a positive impact on the allocation of aid. The larger the FDI inflows, the better
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the development outcomes. FDI inflows as a means of acquiring technologies, skills
and access to international markets are one of the drivers of growth in an economy.
Therefore, they represent a good indicator of the health state of an economy.
• Govj,t ⇒ Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) aggregate governance indicators for recipient j at
time t. They cover the following six different aspects of the governance performance:
– voice and accountability ⇒ includes indicators measuring various aspects of the
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure
the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection
of governments. Moreover, they measure the independence of the media, which
plays an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them to
account for their actions;
– political stability⇒ includes indicators which measure the perception of the
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by
possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means (including civil violence and
terrorism);
– government effectiveness ⇒ includes measures of the quality of public service
provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the
independence of the civil service from political pressure, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to policies. It focuses on the quality of good
policy and public service delivery;
– regulatory quality ⇒ measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such
as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as the perception of
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and
business development;
– rule of law ⇒ includes indicators that measure the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, such as the perception of the
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts. It focuses on the success of a society in developing
an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic
and social interactions, and the extent to which property rights are protected;
– control of corruption ⇒ measures the perception of corruption, conventionally
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect
of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from
the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to the effects of
corruption on the business environment, to measuring“grand corruption” in the
political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.
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The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both
the corrupter (i.e. private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (i.e. public official
or politician) for the rules which govern their interaction, and hence represents
a failure of governance (according to this definition).
These governance indicators are computed from data gathered from various sources,
such as international organizations, survey institutes, risk-rating agencies, and think-
tanks. They are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 for our sample. Higher
values correspond to better governance outcomes. They are available for the pe-
riod 1996-2004, but only every two years until 2002, with missing observations for
1997, 1999 and 2001. Therefore, we will replace the missing observations with the
constructed mean of the previous and next year values. For example, for 1997, the
indicator will be computed as the mean of the indicators for 1996 and 1998.
Donors might tend to reward countries with high political stability, effective gov-
ernments and sound policy, and low levels of corruption. Nevertheless, aid is also
meant to reduce political instability and civil conflicts8. In our aid allocation model
we use these governance indicators in order to control whether donors reward good
governance in transition economies or, whether on the contrary, they give aid to help
improve the quality of governance in these countries.
3.4 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis of the behavior of bilateral donors proceeds in two steps. First,
we will analyze the average behavior of all 22 bilateral aid donors (DAC members) in both
a static and a dynamic model. Subsequently, we will conduct a donor-by-donor analysis
in order to examine the extent to which their policies converge or diverge. However, we
will not analyze all of the 22 DAC donors, but only five of them, namely those which
are the major donors for CEECs and CIS. Furthermore, we will test the determinants of
multilateral aid allocation provided by the EC, the major multilateral donor for CEECs
and CIS countries, and the EBRD.
Since the donors’ decisions about the allocation of aid are based on the past level of
performance or needs of recipients, or on commercial flows with recipients, the follow-
ing variables are lagged one period: per capita GDP, secondary school enrolment, FDI,
governance indicators, exports. This allows us to avoid simultaneity bias.
8See Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002).
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3.4.1 Bilateral Aid Allocation Determinants
Average Bilateral Aid Behavior
Table 3.4 reports estimation results of the aid allocation equation for bilateral ag-
gregate aid flows. Regressions are run using panel fixed effects. Note that a regression
is estimated for each variable of governance quality. We only show here three out of six,
namely voice and accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption. Estimates for the
other variables of governance quality are not shown since they test insignificant.
Our results suggest that both needs and merits of recipients, as well as donors interest
are important factors that guide the bilateral allocation of aid at the aggregate level. Note
that per capita GDP is always negative and statistically significant, proving that poorer
countries receive more aid. Population size is negatively correlated with the amount of
aid committed, and it does appears significant; the population bias is confirmed in our
analysis.
School enrolment ratio is never significant. However it has the right negative sign (if
considered as an indicator of needs). Note that this variable might also be considered as
an indicator of social performance of recipients. If it is given such an interpretation, then
its impact is expected to be positive with respect to aid allocation.
The variables that measure the quality of governance have all the expected positive
sign. This is evidence that the quality of governance affects the aid allocation decision of
donors. Recipients with more respect for civil liberties and political rights, for the rule of
societies and property rights, and for the market-friendly policies, and with better control
of corruption seem to get more aid from the donors. Similar results are obtained for voice
and accountability and regulatory quality in Chapter 4 about aid and migration patterns.
Bilateral trade, proxy for the donor strategic interests, measured by the exports from
a donor to a recipient is positively correlated with aid. Donors tend to reward trade
partners. This result points out that donors interests matter. Moreover, geographical
proximity from the donor appears to play a role in the allocation of aid. Donors allocate
more aid to recipients that are geographically closer.
Two variables are introduced in order to test for the complementarity/subsitutability
between the allocation of aid of a given donor and the allocation of aid from the other
bilateral/multilateral donors. These are: the total aid received by a given recipient from
all bilateral donors and the total aid received by a given recipient from all multilateral
donors. The results show that, while the bilateral aid allocation of other donors is a
substitute of the allocation of aid from a given donor, multilateral aid allocation appears
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as a complement of the latter. In other words, a donor is likely to give less aid to a recipient
if this gets more aid from other bilateral donors. This results is in line with Berthelemy
(2006) who found, after introducing recipient-fixed effects in the allocation equation, that
bilateral aid flows of donors are substitutes of each other. However, a donor is likely to
give more aid to a recipient if this gets more aid from multilateral donor agencies.
Table 3.4: Aid Allocation Equation (fixed effects estimates).
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE FE
GDP per capita -0.887** -0.736* -0.589*
(0.434) (0.434) (0.433)
Population -0.456** -1.642** -1.772**
(1.925) (1.949) (1.896)
Secondary school enrolment -0.010 -0.010 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Exports 0.263*** 0.260*** 0.260***
(0.30) (0.030) (0.030)
FDI 0.010 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Distance -1.132*** -1.137*** -1.137***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Aid per capita other donors -4.002*** -3.996*** -3.996***
(0.869) (0.864) (0.863)
Aid per capita multilateral 0.028** 0.008* 0.018*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Voice and Accountability 0.573**
(0.203) (3.52)
Regulatory quality 0.062*
(0.174)
Control of corruption 0.542***
(0.225)
No of obs 3093 3093 3093
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65
FEi yes yes yes
FEj yes yes yes
Notes: ***, **,* denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. Regressions include time-dummies, donor fixed
effects (FEi), and recipient fixed effects (FEj), not reported here.
In Table 3.5 estimates were run with Maximum Likelihood Heckman one-step and
two-step procedure. The correlation coefficient, ρ, between the errors in the selection and
allocation equations is not very high (0.35) however it is not insignificant. Note that the
estimations lead to similar results.
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Table 3.5: Aid Allocation Equation (Heckman).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
MLa two-step MLa two-step MLa two-step
GDP per capita -0.732*** -1.134** -0.901*** -1.161** -0.526*** -0.794*
(8.29) (2.45) (10.46) (2.48) (6.49) (1.70)
Population -3.769*** -3.094* -3.749*** -3.195* -3.995*** -2.980*
(16.98) (1.44) (16.81) (1.47) (18.02) (1.39)
Secondary school enrolment -0.024 0.004 -0.028 0.0008 -0.014 0.0003
(5.08) (0.62) (6.01) (0.11) (3.11) (0.05)
FDI -0.020 0.004 -0.017 0.004 -0.019 0.006
(2.73) (0.52) (2.31) (0.11) (2.63) (0.77)
Exports 0.687*** 0.726*** 0.686*** 0.719*** 0.686*** 0.730***
(22.41) (11.17) (22.31) (10.98) (22.90) (11.61)
Distance 0.222 -1.195*** 0.270 -1.181*** 0.191 -1.214***
(4.07) (14.63) (5.06) (14.47) (3.60) (14.89)
Aid per capita other donors -2.869*** -4.649*** -2.814** -4.614*** -3.031*** -4.594**
(12.75) (4.96) (12.49) (4.92) (13.56) (4.92)
Aid per capita multilateral 0.247*** 0.076* 0.179*** 0.036 0.263*** 0.081**
(6.30) (1.86) (4.63) (0.89) (7.93) (1.98)
Voice and Accountability 0.539*** 0.703***
(5.11) (3.52)
Regulatory quality 0.216** 0.373**
(2.45) (2.22)
Control of corruption 1.161*** 1.297***
(10.04) (5.55)
Lambdab 4.130* 4.680** 3.452*
(1.92) (2.09) (1.69)
No of obs 3768 2738 3768 2738 3768 2738
Censored obs 1030 1030 1030
ρ 0.35 0.35 0.35
Notes: ***, **,* denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. z or t-statistics in parentheses.
ρ stands for the correlation between residuals of selection and allocation equations.
a Regressions are run using maximum-likelihood Heckman one-step procedure. b Inverse Mill’s ratio.
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Dynamic Bilateral Aid Allocation
The next step in our analysis is introducing dynamics in the aid allocation equation.
That means we include the lagged dependent variable (per capita aid lagged one period)
among the regressors. This allows us to detect the short term influences of aid allocation.
There are reasons to believe that the allocation of foreign aid might be dynamic in nature.
The assumption which allows us to introduce dynamics in the aid allocation pattern is
that donors take into consideration the past allocation patterns when taking their present
decision about the amounts of aid to allocated to a certain recipient. Consequently, we
estimate the allocation equation by using system GMM estimator9 of Blundell and Bond
(1998).
Estimation results are reported in Table 3.6. The main result concern the lagged
endogenous variable, Aid per capitat−1. As expected donor countries that financially
support a given recipient country, continue to do so. In other words, present aid allocation
decision depends on past aid allocation decision. This might be driven by the creation of
a sort of networks between donors and recipients which would allow a better distribution
of funds between them.
Overall, the results of the dynamic estimation are rather similar to those of static
estimation, which indicates that our results are robust. Donors tend to provide larger
amounts of foreign aid to the poorer nations which are in a greater need for development
assistance. Moreover, the population bias is once again confirmed. The quality of gov-
ernance remains an important criteria of aid allocation. The same results is found for
donor interests, as measured by the commercial ties with recipients. Donors appear to
financially support their trading partners. The impact is almost the same as the one in
the static estimation. Additionally, both the substitutability with respect to bilateral aid
and the complementarity with respect to multilateral aid are reaffirmed in the dynamic
estimation.
Bilateral Aid Allocation by Donor
Next, we analyze the behavior of the five largest donors for CEECs and CIS. As
described in section 3.3.1 the major donors in per capita terms for transition economies
are United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and France. Table 3.7 reports the
estimation results considering the amounts of aid committed by each of the five donors.
Regressions shown here are run only for one indicator of governance quality, namely voice
and accountability. Similar results have been obtained for regulatory quality and rule of
9Details about GMM estimator have been provided in Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.
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Table 3.6: Dynamic Aid Allocation Equation.
(1) (2) (3)
SYS-GMMa SYS-GMMa SYS-GMMa
Aid per capitat−1 0.226*** 0.228*** 0.215***
(4.08) (4.12) (3.86)
GDP per capita -0.801*** -0.952*** -0.545***
(5.35) (6.13) (3.95)
Population -5.516*** -5.451*** -5.778***
(9.00) (8.83) (9.58)
Secondary school enrolment -0.023 -0.026 -0.012
(4.01) (4.67) (2.15)
FDI -0.010 -0.008 -0.009
(1.32) (1.07) (1.17)
Exports 0.627*** 0.622*** 0.640***
(7.81) (7.58) (17.62)
Distance -0.162* -0.122* -0.202**
(1.86) (1.45) (2.29)
Aid per capita other donors -4.830*** -4.749*** -5.020***
(8.17) (7.97) (8.71)
Aid per capita multilateral 0.184*** 0.127*** 0.223***
(4.30) (3.11) (5.30)
Voice and Accountability 0.392***
(3.64)
Regulatory quality 0.096*
(0.89)
Rule of law 1.132***
(5.897)
Hansen testb 0.606 0.613 0.502
Serial correlation testc
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.207 0.208 0.228
No of obs 2412 2412 2412
No of groups 452 452 452
No of instruments 27 27 27
Notes: ***, **,* denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. z -statistics
in parentheses. Time dummies are included in all regressions but not
reported.
a Regressions are run with system GMM estimator (two-step). b The
null hypothesis of Hansen test: instruments not correlated with the error
term. c The null hypothesis of serial correlation test: no first and second
order serial correlation of errors.
113
law, while for the others, the estimates are not significant. Here we do not have to deal
with the censored nature of the dependent variable, since the five major donors that we
analyze reward most of the recipients, even with small amount of aid. Consequently, we
do not need to use Heckman’s procedure. Regressions are run with recipient-country fixed
effects.
The results are overall in accordance with those for aggregate aid flows, with some
exceptions. Per capita GDP is negatively correlated with aid flows for all the five donors
which suggest that each donor has a poverty-oriented aid allocation pattern. Social needs,
as measured by the secondary school enrolment, are not taken into consideration by these
donors. However this result should be taken with precaution because of the quality of data
on this indicator. Consistent with previous findings, “good governance” is rewarded by four
of the donors. Only the United States shows a negative but not significant relationship
between voice and accountability indicator and aid flows.
Donors interests, captured by the commercial links with recipients appear significant
only for the United States, Japan and France. This result is consistent with the result
obtained by Berthe´lemy (2006) which identified these three donors as “egoistic” (or “mod-
erately egoistic”) based on a positive and significant correlation between the exports to
the recipient country and the aid committed to the same recipient. We conclude that
these donors use aid also to strengthen commercial ties with their recipients. However,
Germany shows a negative relationship, suggesting that its aid allocation decision are not
dominated by selfish motives.
The substitutability between the aid of a given donor and the total aid given by the
other donors appears to work only for Germany and the UK, while the Japanese aid seems
to be a complement for the total recipient’s bilateral aid. The complementarity with the
multilateral aid appears to be significant only for the US and the UK aid.
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Table 3.7: Aid Allocation Equation by Donor.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US aid German aid Japanese aid French aid UK aid
GDP per capita -0.691** -0.159 -0.773*** -0.273** -0.130
(2.98) (1.01) (2.74) (1.24) (0.42)
Population -0.889** -0.234** -0.999** -0.356** -0.210**
(3.45) (1.12) (4.36) (2.67) (1.34)
Secondary school enrolment -0.035 -0.024 -0.026 -0.022 -0.017
(2.77) (3.79) (1.87) (2.37) (1.72)
FDI -0.012 -0.007 0.059** 0.002 -0.029
(0.67) (0.73) (2.63) (0.20) (1.58)
Exports 0.199*** -0.337** 0.128** 0.323** 0.464
(0.72) (2.99) (1.31) (2.34) (2.16)
Distance 1.598 -0.365** -3.036*** 0.339* 0.530**
(1.82) (2.69) (5.55) (1.66) (2.18)
Aid per capita other donors 0.167 -0.206** 0.306* 0.246 -0.604**
(0.92) (1.77) (1.89) (1.59) (2.52)
Aid per capita multilateral 0.209** 0.031 0.157 0.051 0.203**
(2.08) (0.56) (1.35) (0.65) (2.16)
Voice and Accountability -0.317 0.622*** 0.468** 0.691*** 0.613**
(1.01) (3.56) (1.44) (2.52) (2.14)
Constant 7.319* -6.035** 22.329** -14.42*** -1.779
(1.88) (2.22) (3.48) (4.39) (0.46)
No of obs 171 176 176 175 167
R2 0.53 0.60 0.44 0.65 0.40
Notes: ***, **,* denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses. Recipient-
specific fixed effects and time-period fixed effects not reported.
3.4.2 Multilateral Aid Allocation Determinants
Average Multilateral Aid Behavior
Table 3.8 provides estimations results for the aggregate multilateral aid flows. Re-
gressions are run with recipient-country fixed effects (since the dependent variable is not
censored (all recipients in our sample get multilateral aid) we do not need to take into
consideration the selection phase; we do not need to use Heckman’s method). Note that
the variables Exports, FDI and Distance were taken out from the estimations since they
should not play a role in multilateral aid allocation. In fact they characterize the patterns
of bilateral allocation - Exports and Distance are a proxy for commercial links between a
recipient and a donor, while FDI stand for the economic performance of the recipient. To
avoid multicollinearity the indicators of governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 2005) are
entered separately in the regressions. Moreover, a dummy variable to control for the ties
between the new members of EU and the EU, since they were receiving more assistance
in preparation for their integration in 2004 and 2007, respectively.
The two recipient needs variables, per capita GDP (constant $US 2000), and secondary
school enrolment have the expected negative sign. This is evidence that multilateral aid
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Table 3.8: Total Aid Multilateral Flows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita -1.062*** -1.209*** -0.994*** -1.185*** -1.043*** -1.181***
(7.29) (8.26) (6.18) (7.47) (7.38) (8.25)
Population -0.416** -1.639*** -0.385** -1.143*** -0.309*** -1.077**
(5.70) (3.85) (4.86) (4.58) (4.17) (3.51)
Population squared 0.191*** 0.238*** 0.176**
(3.61) (4.37) (3.34)
Secondary school enrolment -0.041** -0.043** -0.052* -0.052* -0.036** -0.038**
(4.41) (4.74) (5.19) (5.45) (3.81) (4.19)
Dummy EU 0.504** 1.029** 1.426*** 1.895*** 0.933** 1.354***
(1.52) (2.93) (4.86) (6.35) (3.30) (4.49)
Voice and Accountability 1.439* 1.188*
(6.65) (5.40)
Government effectiveness 1.074** 0.813**
(4.25) (3.29)
Regulatory quality 1.099* 0.917*
(7.14) (5.77)
Constant 9.577** 8.191*** 7.188** 8.128*** 3.14 9.098**
(3.09) (4.21) (2.17) (4.76) (1.09) (3.49)
No of obs 176 176 176 176 176 176
R2 0.69 0.71 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.72
Notes: ***, **,* denotes significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level). t-statistics in parentheses.
Recipient-specific fixed effects and time-period fixed effects not reported.
is poverty oriented. We find that poorer countries get more multilateral assistance that
richer countries. A one percent decline in per capita GDP associates with 0.9 to 1.2
percent increase in per capita aid committed by multilateral agencies (depending on the
specification of the model). The elasticity of per capita aid committed by multilateral
agencies with respect to secondary school enrolment varies from 0.036 to 0.052. Overall,
the multilateral aid allocation in the case of CEECs and CIS appears to be responsive to
recipient needs.
Multilateral donors, similarly to bilateral donors direct more aid to smaller countries,
given by the negative coefficient of population size variable. However, the bias towards
smaller countries might be reversed after a certain threshold of population size. To capture
this, the quadratic term of population size is introduced in regressions (2, 4, 6). Estima-
tions results confirm the assumption of non-linearity in the population size variable10. As
noted by Neumayer (2003), the population bias at the multilateral level of aid allocation is
not completely justified. There is no reason for multilateral agencies to believe that poor
people in large countries are less in need of aid than poor people in small countries.
The estimation results also suggest that the quality of governance as measured by
Kaufmann et al. (2005) indicators matter for multilateral aid allocation. Three out of
10The U-shaped is sometimes confirmed for per capita GDP. In our estimations we find no evidence of
the non-linearity in the per capita GDP - if included in the regressions, the quadratic term of per capita
GDP does not test significant.
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six indicators appears to have a significant positive effect on the amount of per capita
multilateral aid flows: voice and accountability, government effectiveness and regulatory
quality (the other three indicators of the quality of governance - political stability, rule of
law and control of corruption if included in the regressions test insignificant, and therefore
not reported). Our results are in accordance with much of the existing literature. “Good
governance” is rewarded by multilateral agencies. In practice, the strength of the role of
good governance on the development agenda of the donors has been often underlined in
recent years.
3.5 Conclusion
Over time, the challenges of development lead to shifts in aid architecture. Recently,
donors have pledged to reach the target level of committed aid of 0.7 percent of their GNI.
However, increasing the amounts of aid is only the starting point. Donors have to achieve
efficient allocation of aid flows among recipients in order to ensure that aid resources will
help to promote development and welfare in recipient countries.
The analysis of the allocation of aid in the case of transition countries reveals that,
overall, there are not so many differences between bilateral and multilateral aid allocation
patterns. It appears that both allocation pattern take into consideration recipients needs
and merits. However, when compared to multilateral aid allocation patterns, bilateral
aid allocation looks inferior with respect to social needs of recipients as measured by the
secondary school enrolment.
In accordance with much of the literature, per capita GDP capita is an important de-
terminants of foreign aid flows for both bilateral and multilateral aid allocation. Monetary
poverty remains one of the motivations of aid giving. The population bias is confirmed
at both bilateral and multilateral level of aid allocation. However, at the multilateral aid
level this might seem surprising.
Finally, recipients with better governance receive relatively higher per capita aid. The
quality of governance matters for donors’ aid allocation patterns, as it is seen as a signal
of aid being put to good use, and consequently of donors’ improving their aid allocation
towards recipients that perform best.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Figure 3.6: United States per capita aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
Figure 3.7: Japanese per capita aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
Figure 3.8: German per capita aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
118
Figure 3.9: Danish per capita aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
Figure 3.10: French per capita aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
Figure 3.11: British per capita bilateral aid (average 1996-2004, $US).
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Chapter 4
Aid and Migration: Substitutes or
Complements?
M
igration has become a significant aspect of globalization (O’Rourke and Williamson,
1999; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). Movement of labor has to some extent been
liberalized throughout the globalization process. Nevertheless, some governments have
raised various barriers to international labor movements in order to deal with undesired
international immigration pressure. However, such restrictive policies have two potential
shortcomings. First, they stimulate illegal immigration, which is often costly, difficult
to prevent, and in turn, might create severe social and political tension. Second, they
are potentially inconsistent with other foreign policy instruments, such as development
assistance policies, which are used vis-a`-vis potential immigrants countries of origin. For
example, in Europe, it would have been inconsistent to assist neighboring countries in their
development, whilst also preventing the migration of workers from those same neighbors.
However, in spite of tough immigration policies implemented by several governments of
developed countries, the percentage of international immigrants in developed countries has
doubled during 1970-2000.
Recently, immigration policy has become a core concern in the ongoing debate that
has emerged in OECD countries with regard to their foreign policies vis-a`-vis developing
and transition economies (OECD, 2006). The necessity of jointly implementing develop-
ment policies has been determined by the increasing interdependencies between countries
consequence of the globalization process. For instance, OECD countries depend upon
developing countries with regard to their exportations and fuel consumption, while de-
veloping countries are linked to developed countries mainly through their importations
of basic products. Actually, aid, trade, investment and migration constitute key policy
areas which define a country’s international economic relations. Hence, the opening up of
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trade, facilitation of international investment, foreign aid, and migration controls all form
a complex mix of policies that cannot be considered in isolation. They interact with each
other, and to be efficient, they must be designed and implemented in a coherent manner.
Several aspects of the policy coherence debate have been largely discussed in the previ-
ous literature. Substitutability or complementarities between trade and factor movements
have been a recurring theme in the international economics literature since the seminal
work of Mundell (1957). Based on Heckscher-Ohlin model, Mundell shows that trade and
labor movements are likely substitute each other. More precisely he finds that: (i) an in-
crease in trade barriers determines a reduction in trade flows and an increase in migration
flows, and (ii) an increase in migration barriers reduces migration while increasing trade.
However, this is a theme that has been revisited with new results, suggesting possible com-
plementarities between labor flows and trade in particular (Markusen, 1983). Additional
results have since been obtained. Schiff (2006) provides a survey of recent developments
on the nature of the relationship between trade and migration. He illustrates that, in the
case of trade protection, complementarity is likely to hold only at low tariffs, while sub-
stitution holds at high tariffs. Moreover, it is argued that the nature of this relationship
is likely to depend on the type of policy changes in both the origin and the host country,
as well as on the type of shocks that can occur in these countries.
In this analysis, we will consider another aspect of the policy coherence debate, namely
whether aid and migration policies are substitutes or complements. To our knowledge,
very few empirical papers have addressed this question precisely. Faini and Venturini
(1993), writing on Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, constitute one notable exception.
They first assumed that aid policies to these countries were favorable for growth. Then,
using migration data, they showed that growth would not necessarily reduce the incentive
to migrate. This counterintuitive outcome is explained by the so-called “hump-shaped
pattern” of migration, which implies that at very low levels of income per capita, growth
translates into more migration by allowing poor migrants to afford the costs associated
with migration.
One main objective of this study is to clarify the influence of aid on migration. We
will consider not only the effect of total aid on migration, following the previous literature,
but also that of bilateral aid:
• First, we will test the effect of total aid on migration as a component of gross national
expenditure. Instead of assuming that aid influences migration through a growth
effect1 we will merely assume that aid, which contributes to the financing of gross
1The literature on aid effectiveness is very rich in results, as presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Still, no consensus has emerged regarding the impact of aid on growth in developing countries. In a recent
meta-analysis Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) found that it is at best insignificant.
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national expenditure in the recipient country, increases its domestic wages, and in
turn its migration. We will refer to this relation between total aid and migration as
a “push” effect;
• Second, we will test for the possibility of a direct positive effect of bilateral aid on
bilateral migration through what we call an“attraction”effect, i.e. more bilateral aid
given to a country intensifies the attractiveness of the donor country for citizens of the
recipient country. At a theoretical level, we can assume that more bilateral contacts
through aid policy implementation increase the information about the donor country
that is available to potential migrants of the recipient country. This additional
information reduces the transaction costs attached to the considered migration flow.
The existence of this attraction effect will be empirically tested through a gravity
model. For instance, it might come from contacts with the donor country’s experts
and visits of the recipient country’s nationals to the donor country. It could also be
somewhat associated with the part of official assistance which consists of financing
scholarships for foreign students and support granted to refugees in donor countries,
which is sometimes quite large2. This attraction effect is expected to be stronger
amongst skilled migrants.
Conversely, bilateral aid flows may not be independent from bilateral migration. Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller (2000) have shown that the lobbying activities of migrants can
influence the geographical aid pattern through a networking mechanism. This means that
we have to deal with a simultaneity problem. In other words, there might be a direct
two-way causality from migration to aid, as well as from aid to migration, We propose to
solve this problem through a simultaneous equation system explaining bilateral migration
and bilateral aid, in which we will include other, exogenously determined, explanatory
variables, that will allow us to properly identify both equations.
This chapter adds to the existing literature on the subject in at least three ways.
Firstly, we have shown that aid and migration are substitutes above a threshold of
US$7348 (PPP 2000 prices). For a majority of sending countries there is, therefore, on
average, a combination of generous aid policies and restrictive immigration policies that
are not necessarily at odds with one another: increasing aid will help reduce migration
pressure from all sending countries above the threshold. However, this policy combination
is inconsistent when implemented vis-a`-vis poor countries. These findings underline the
importance of a coherent implementation of development policies, while considering their
potential shortcomings.
2For instance, in France, these two components have accounted for about 25% of the total Official
Development Aid (ODA) in recent years.
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Secondly, we have found a significant influence of migrants on aid allocation, as sug-
gested by the model of Lahiri and Raimondos Møller (2000). We have gone further by
analyzing the other way around, i.e. the causality running from aid to migration. We have
identified, two components of this causality: (1) one running from bilateral aid to bilateral
migration, which reflects the attraction effect ; this appear to be all the more significant
for skilled migrants; and (2) one running from total aid to migration, which reflects the
push effect ; any poverty reduction that would be induced by aid may help alleviate the
budgetary constraint faced by the poor and then translate into more migration.
Finally, regarding the differences between skilled and unskilled migration behavior,
we have pointed out that unskilled migrants are attracted to more redistributive welfare
states, while skilled migrants gravitate towards countries that offer better opportunities
and greater expected earnings. Moreover, we have shown that the complementarity be-
tween trade and migration is higher for skilled than for unskilled migrants, a fact which
is consistent with Markusen’s model of a technological superiority in rich countries. This
complementarity explains the fact that rich countries export skilled labor-intensive goods
and host relatively more skilled individuals.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the concept of Policy Coherence
for Development and stresses the importance of analyzing the relationship between aid
and migration in the context of this debate. Section 2 reviews the main findings of the
literature on migration and aid. Section 3 derives a “gravity”model of migration, which is
jointly estimated with an aid bilateral allocation equation. Section 4 provides a discussion
of data, and Section 5 outlines the econometric estimation results. Section 6 extends the
analysis to the migration of skilled migrants versus unskilled migrants. The last section
concludes the analysis.
4.1 Policy Coherence for Development
This section provides some insight into the concept of Policy Coherence for Devel-
opment (PCD) and subsequently, into the potential interactions and impacts of several
development policies set up by developed OECD countries vis-a`-vis developing countries.
The PCD concept was born from the debate that has emerged with respect to the neg-
ative effects in developing countries of trade policies implemented by developed countries.
Presently, the PCD mainly takes into consideration interactions between four major poli-
cies related to aid, investment, migration and trade. The definition considered by OECD
for PCD is the following: “the pursuit of development objectives through the systemic
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promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions on the part of both OECD and devel-
oping countries.” (OECD Development Centre, 2006, p. 6). Simply defined, PCD refers
therefore to the fact that the gap between the intent and the outcome of policy can be
significantly reduced or even eliminated if mutually supportive approaches are used in re-
lated policy areas in pursuit of a common goal, that is development. Thus, when relevant
policies are working together in the same direction, it can be claimed that coherence does
exist (WTO, 2004). Working together at cross purposes for development, sound policies in
one area need to be supported by appropriate policies in other ares, and more important,
their impact should not been studied separately or independently of each other.
While there is a consensus about the interactions between policies, an ongoing debate
has emerged about how to implement them in a coherent manner in order to maximize their
joint positive impact in developing countries. Each policy should enhance the objectives of
the others and avoid inconsistencies among their objectives. Incoherences are well-known;
for example, migration policies aiming to promote the migration of skilled health-care
professionals by providing powerful incentives for them to leave their home countries and
migrate to developed countries (the so-called brain drain phenomenon3) might reduce
the impact of aid policies designed to increase the supply of health-care services, and
to consequently improve health-care systems in those same developing countries. Also,
certain permissive migration policies towards IT workers from developing country (e.g
India), accentuate brain drain, and consequently might not be consistent with the objective
of fighting against poverty in these countries. Another case of incoherence characterizes
the aid and trade policies of several donor countries; in particular, increased aid flows
designed to enhance development in developing countries, might be offset by the use of
trade restrictions on their exports, since these trade barriers, in turn, induce costs which
almost equal the flows of aid.
To illustrate the importance of a coherent implementation of development policy we
show in Table 4.1 the possible interactions between the policies related to aid, investment,
migration and trade, given the objective of each policy (in columns) and the effects of each
policy on the objectives of each other (in rows).
3This stands for the migration of high-skilled labor force.
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One important issue required for an efficient joint implementation of policies is to iden-
tify whether the interaction between them works either as a complement or a substitute in
their effects on a given objective. Two policies are to be considered as complementary if an
increase in one is likely to induce an increase in the other. For instance, more permissive
migration towards a developed OECD country increases the inflows of remittances to de-
veloping countries. This migration policy might be combined with increased, but targeted
aid to a migrant source country. This aid can help spread the benefits of migration more
equitably. In such a case, the two policies - migration and foreign aid - work together as
complements (Dayton-Johnson and Xenogiani, 2006). Two policies are to be considered
as substitutes if an increase in one is likely to induce a decrease in the other. For example,
providing more aid might induce restrictions in legal immigration. That is, higher aid
transfers are likely to prevent the need to migrate.
Moreover, the efficient joint implementation, which enhances the positive effects of the
development policies, requires both developed and developing countries to get involved
(See Figure 4.3 in the Appendix of the chapter). This means that PCD implies reciprocity.
While developed countries should make sure that their policies do not harm beneficiary
countries, developing countries should improve their capacity to benefit from the favorable
policies set up by developed countries. The effectiveness of policy coherence depends on the
degree of international cooperation desired by the countries and their willingness to shape
their policies around a common approach jointly determined by the countries involved.
4.2 A Review of the Literature
Since in this analysis we examine the relationship between aid and migration, and
since we have provided, in the first two chapters of this dissertation some insight about aid
issues (effectiveness, allocation criteria), we have considered important to briefly outline
the main findings of the literature on international migration. A particular emphasis is
given to the relationship between migration and aid.
4.2.1 Migration: Main Findings
International migration is a complex phenomenon that has drawn the attention of
economists, researchers, policy makers and international agencies. From mass migration
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to new trends in migration flows, the
phenomenon has been greatly analyzed. The literature on international migration has
emerged in two main directions. One focuses on the impact of migration either within
host countries or home countries, while the other focuses on its determinants.
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For decades, research analyzed the consequences of migration in receiving countries,
specifically the effects of international migration on labor markets. The integration of
immigrants within the society of host countries was also widely addressed. Several positives
aspects of migration in destination countries have been identified. It has been argued
that immigrants help to maintain a low ratio of capital to labor, provide semi-skilled
and skilled labor in industries where the local labor force is inadequate, and perform the
traditional role of a labor reserve by keeping wages low (Petras, 1984). A more recent
body of literature suggests that immigration in countries where migrants are net fiscal
beneficiaries of transfers, reduces the welfare of the native population (Wildasin, 1994;
Michel, 2003). However, the net loss in the welfare of natives, because of immigration,
in particular that of low-skilled workers, might, under certain conditions, transform into
net benefits for natives (Razin and Sadka, 2004). Moreover, as noted by Epstein and
Wildasin (1999), unemployed immigrants receiving transfers can be profitable for both
native workers and employers. In a study on developed European countries, Razin, Sadka
and Swagel (2004) observe that, the higher the share of low-educated migrants in the total
population, the lower the tax rate on income and transfer rate. Conversely, Carrington
and Detragiache (1998), and Bauer and Kunze (2004) argue that high-skilled migration is
more likely to be accepted by developed host countries because these migrants are among
net fiscal contributors.
It is only recently that economists and researchers have drawn attention to aspects
related to the impact on sending countries. The consequences in source countries concern:
(i) outcomes, such as income and growth; these effects are related to remittances and
lost labor forces; (ii) consumption and investment; (iii) trade-related outcomes and brain
drain/gain issues; these are related to lost high-skilled labor forces.
Since migration might generate important gains in terms of growth, poverty reduction,
insurance against risk and the accumulation of human capital, it has been perceived as
an engine of growth and convergence (Faini, 2006). Through remittances generated by
migration, living standards in home countries are likely to improve and might lead to a
rise in the capital available for investment. Moreover, when migrants return to their home
countries, they are generally more skilled and can spend larger amounts of financial funds
on investment. This might induce changes in the structure of both human and physical
capital in the home country. Also, social and political reforms might be encouraged when
migrants return home with new knowledge and experience.
An issue of great importance for both origin and host country that has been paid
an increasing amount of attention in the international community, is the migration of
highly-qualified workers. Policy-makers, economists and international agencies currently
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consider skilled migration a significant aspect of globalization. While high-skilled work-
ers are being attracted in developing countries in order to sustain the economic growth
of these “knowledge intensive” economies, sending countries have to deal with the losses
of their skilled and educated workers. Both negative and positive consequences of brain
drain phenomenon for sending countries have been identified in the literature. Faini (2006)
points out one negative impact. The social marginal productivity of skilled workers even
when unemployed at home, is not necessarily zero, since they could move to other regions
(e.g. rural) instead of migrating abroad. Some studies advanced arguments to illustrate
the positive aspects. First, migration of skilled individuals might increase the returns to
education and, in the long run, might lead to an increase in the number of educated indi-
viduals in the source country (Stark et al. 1997, 1998). Second, skilled migrants earn more
and may therefore remit more (World Bank, 2006). More remittances to home countries
are likely to relax the foreign exchange constraint, and further enhance growth. Third,
skilled migrants might be helpful in establishing commercial contacts and investment links
with their home country; this might make the home country more attractive for foreign
investors (Griswold, 2003).
The most important contributions to purely economic determinants of migration have
been proposed by Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989, 1994). According to their model,
migration is positively influenced by the income per capita in the country of destination,
relative to the income per capita in the country of origin. Migration is also a decreasing
function of migration costs. In addition, migration depends upon the payoff to the observed
and unobserved characteristics in the host country relative to the payoff in the source
country. Observed migrations fit relatively well the predictions of the model (Massey et
al., 1998), but the model fails to explain one stylized fact: the “hump-shaped” pattern.
The “hump-shaped” pattern hypothesis, which can be found in the empirical literature
(Faini and Venturini, 1993; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Hatton and Williamson,
2002; Adams and Page, 2003), refers to a positive correlation between GDP per capita
and migration for relatively low levels of GDP per capita, and to a negative correlation
for relatively high levels of GDP per capita. In fact, in the early stages of development,
migration is likely to increase since aid relaxes financial constraints and individuals find
the means to migrate. At a certain development level, when income reaches a critical
threshold, migration is likely to decrease, since potential migrants are less willing to move
(as they find good work opportunities in their home countries).
Several factors might explain the “hump-shaped” relationship between economic de-
velopment and migration. First and foremost, the “hump-shaped” pattern can be related
to the existence of migration costs, which reduce the possibility of emigration from the
poorest countries. Migration costs include many elements. Such costs can be reduced
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by geographical proximity (closer countries are generally more open to bi-directional mi-
gration) and common language, as well as historical ties, which may imply an overall
knowledge of the habits of the destination country.
The migration hump has also been explained by other factors in the literature. First,
the poorest countries are also the youngest, and old adults are less likely to migrate than
young adults. This is a demographic factor (Hatton and Williamson, 1994). Second, the
rural population is reputed to be more reluctant to undertake international migration (ac-
cording to Hatton and Williamson (2002) this factor is weak). This is an industrialization
factor.
Changes in the fundamental reasons that have driven migration have occurred over
time. Hatton and Williamson (1998, 2002) illustrate that while mass migration from Eu-
rope to the New World during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was driven
mainly by economic considerations, i.e. large income gaps between origin and destination
countries, over time, the motive of income differentials among countries has weaken. So-
cial, cultural and political aspects have been added to the list of migration determinants.
Mass migration from Europe has also been explained by changes in the structure of the
population, notably increases in population growth, the existence of migration networks
(family, friends) and structural economic shifts from agriculture to industry. Examining
more recent migration trends, Griswold’s (2003) findings support the view that the wage
differential is not the only factor which explains migration. Other conditions push people
to leave their home. Such conditions include migration costs, migration networks and the
desire to spread risk and raise capital4 (a more recent motivation, according to the “new
economics of migration”).
4.2.2 Joint Determination of Migration and Aid
As previously highlighted, migration might interact in various and complex ways
with other international flows, such as trade, foreign direct investment and development
assistance. The interaction between migration and aid has been analyzed in several recent
studies. Foreign aid has been considered as a measure that can foster development in
origin countries, by eliminating some of the differentials in welfare between host and home
countries. Furthermore, this reduces the incentive to migrate (Faini and Venturini, 1993).
4When sending some of their members to work abroad, families can actually diversify their risk. They
gain income from aboard when domestic wages decrease or domestic unemployment increases. Conse-
quently, these families might raise their capital and use it for domestic investment in the absence of a
sound banking system or a private equity market.
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Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2005) in analyzing the implications of migration, ad-
dress the welfare implications of aid designed to discourage migrants from moving to
donor countries to receive social benefits. They model migration coming from an aid
recipient developing country, characterized by low income, poor infrastructure and no wel-
fare system, to a rich developed donor country with a sound welfare system. They show
that, when immigration costs decrease as a consequence of greater economic integration
between donor and recipient countries, which, for example, intensifies migration inflows,
it is desirable for donor-host country to increase aid to recipient-home country in order to
co-finance the public infrastructure of the latter and therefore further dissuade migration
inflows.
The interaction between aid and migration has also been analyzed with respect to
donor countries’ wish to deal with unwanted immigration. Gaytan-Fregoso and Lahiri
(2000) examine the impact of foreign aid on illegal immigration. They find that foreign
aid is likely to increase levels of illegal immigration, if the total amount of aid is small.
Conversely, when the level of aid is large, additional aid reduces illegal immigration.
Faini and Venturini (1993) relate the evolution of migration observed in Europe from
the 1960s to the 1980s to this migration hump framework. They find a negative relationship
between migration and development for Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, but not for the more
advanced Spain or Italy. Clark et al. (2002), studying immigration to the Unite States
between 1971 and 1998, find a negative relationship between income and migration for
middle-income and high-income countries that reverses for low-income countries. Cogneau
and Gubert (2005) highlight that Mali and Mexico are two countries where the most of
migration comes from regions not classified as among the poorest.
Aid may influence migration indirectly through its impact on income, but the exis-
tence of direct links between migrations and foreign aid should be consider too. In aid
allocation literature, there is a standard argument, developed by Lahiri and Raimondos
Møller (2000), suggesting that, in developed countries, immigrants act as a lobbying force
in favor of development assistance allocation to their home countries.
Stylized facts are consistent with this view. In most cases, those countries that receive
the most aid from a donor country (specifically those that are in the first quintile of aid
recipients) are by far the main sources of immigration to that donor country. On average,
immigrants coming from countries that are among the main beneficiaries of donor aid
allocation policies account for 44 % of total immigrants to donor countries, and this ratio
is well above 50 % in all donor countries except for the United States and Nordic European
countries.
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However, this observation requires further scrutiny, for two reasons. First, both vari-
ables may be correlated simply because they are correlated with a third variable, e.g.
geographical proximity or historical and cultural ties. Second, the proportion of migrants
originating in countries which are main aid recipients is probably too high to result only
from lobbying activities of previous immigrants. For example, this concentration is ob-
served even in donor countries which are not among the major destinations of immigrants,
such as Italy, Japan or Spain.
Actually, this correlation might be due to a reverse link, namely from aid to migration.
Aid concentration in a given recipient country may stimulate migration into the donor
country, because it facilitates contacts and population movements with this donor country,
through various channels, such as technical assistance. Specifically, at least in some donor
countries, a significant part of official development assistance is related to financing of
scholarships for foreign students and support granted to refugees in donor countries. For
example, in France, these two components account for about 25 % of total ODA in recent
years. Such assistance may have a major impact on migration, insofar as it facilitates the
mobility of foreigners to donor countries.
The issue of complementarity/substituability between aid and migration is another
issue that has received attention in the literature. This is, as previously mentioned, an
important question in the context of the policy coherence for development, which con-
cerns not only aid and migration, but also other development policies. In a study on the
interaction between aid flows and three other North-South flows, namely trade, FDI and
migration, Cogneau and Lambert (2006) find evidence of complementarity with respect
to development assistance-migration relationship. Griswold (2003) identifies complemen-
tarity development and migration. He illustrates that the propensity to migrate is likely
to rise when the economic context improves in the sending countries Remittances become
more profitable under sound economic conditions; this increases the incentive to migrate.
Complementarity between aid and migration might appear counterintuitive, since it is
widely believed that an effective way to dissuade migration is to improve welfare in origin
countries, by fighting the causes of migration, such as unemployment, poverty reduction
and inequalities. Nevertheless, the substitutability between aid and migration has not yet
been proven empirically. Therefore, one objective of this analysis is to shed light on the
debate concerning the complementarity/substitutability between aid and migration. Our
results, in Section 6, will reveal that there is a threshold above which migration and aid
are substitutes.
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4.3 Model
This section presents the model which consists of two equations estimated simultane-
ously: (1) a migration gravity equation, and (2) an aid allocation equation. It discusses the
variables (the determinants of both migration and aid allocation) as well as the appropriate
estimation method.
4.3.1 Migration Gravity Equation
According to Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989, 1994), migration can be viewed as
an investment in human capital. Migrants choose the destination where their expected
payoff is higher than that of any other alternative, including domestic wage. Several
predictions can be made based on the human capital investment approach: emigration
is higher from source countries with a lower mean income (considered as a proxy for
domestic wage), and immigration to host countries with a higher mean income; such
movements are lower when migration costs are high; they are higher the greater the payoff
to the observed income-generating variables (in our paper: education, benefits that can be
drawn from redistribution policies) in the host country relative to the payoff in the source
country. Section 6 will revisit the self-selection issue (Borjas, 1989), i.e., the impact that
the different returns to education have on migration flows.
These predictions are derived from three equations, namely, two wage equations regard-
ing the home and destination countries and one equation describing the cost of migrating.
We rely on a “gravity model” of international migration commonly used for quantifying
the potential for migration (e.g., Karemera et al., 2000; Rotte and Vogler, 2000). Mi-
gration depends upon supply or push factors, which are the income per capita and the
population in the origin country, and it also depends on demand or pull factors in the host
country, which are likewise a function of income and population. Income per capita here
is a proxy for wages in the origin and destination countries. The larger income per capita
is in the recipient country, the higher the probability of moving; conversely, the lower it
is in the sending country, the higher the probability of migrating. A higher population in
the receiving (sending) country reflects better opportunities for work (higher supply size).
In principle, both populations have positive parameters, but a sending country of small
size may result in higher migration. This is because in a small country the only migration
possibility is international migration, while in a large country, in some instances there can
be inter-regional migration.
To this basic gravity equation we add total aid received by country i (ai). The under-
lying assumption is that domestic wages are influenced not only by GDP per capita but
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also by total aid received, which finances gross national expenditure. As such it can be
accounted for in the push factors. Instead of adding aid per capita to GDP per capita
(GDPpci), we enter it as a separate variable, because the elasticities of wages to GDP per
capita and to total aid may differ5.
We add also a trade intensity variable, measured by the bilateral export from the
country of emigration to the country of immigration as a ratio of GDP of the country
of emigration. A positive parameter would imply that labor flows and external trade
are complements (pull factor), while a negative parameter would imply that they are
substitutes (push factor).
As a result, we get the following system of supply and demand equations:{
Si = s0 ∗GDPpcb1i ∗ popb2i ∗ aidb3i ∗Xb4ij
Dj = d0 ∗GDPpcc1j ∗ popc2j ∗ aidc3j ∗Xc4ij
Combining supply and demand yields a migration equation, to which we add Rij,
which accounts for transaction costs restraining migrant flows, such as transport costs the
linguistic cost of moving, and historical ties, such as residing in a former colony. We add
to those transaction costs the attraction effect induced by bilateral aij. This effect tells
that migration cost is lower when the representative agent has contacts with agents in the
destination country, while the probability of being in contact with such an agent is related
to the bilateral aid received by the origin country:
Migrationij = a0S
a1
i D
a2
j /(R
a3
ij a
−a4
ij ) (4.1)
Taking the log of both sides yields the following equation:
mij = α0 + α1GDPpci + α2GDPpcj + α3popi + α4popj + α5aij + α6ai +
+α7Xij + A8Ri,j + uij (4.2)
where:
• mij stands for the log of bilateral migrations stocks;
• GDPpci and GDPpcj stand for the log of GDP per capita of country i and j;
5Only part of gross national expenditure financed by aid can end up in wage increases because aid also
finances expenditure components such as technical assistance, import costs associated to aid tying, etc.
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• popi and popj stand for the log of the population of country i and j;
• aidij stands for the log of bilateral aid given by donor j to recipient i. In order to
smooth out fluctuations in aid flows, we take averages over the years 1996 to 2000
and over the years 1991 to 2000 for the sensitivity analysis;
• aidi stands for the log of total aid, including multilateral aid, received by country i.
The smoothing procedure is applied here as well;
• Xij stands for the logarithm of bilateral export from the origin country i to the
destination country j as a ratio of GDP of the origin country i;
• Rij, is proxied by a set of control variables: the bilateral distance between the send-
ing and the receiving countries, a “former colony” dummy equal to 1 when countries
i and j have had in the past a colonial relation and equal to zero otherwise; a dummy
for common language; we also further test whether some post-colonial ties are more
influential than others (e.g., within the Commonwealth, labor mobility is greater
than between France and former French colonies); dummy variables that account
for some stylized facts: the fact that “western offshoots” namely Canada, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand, have more immigrants than the “old” Europe;
the strong link between the United States and Latin America; the cultural speci-
ficity of Japan, which has very restrictive attitudes vis-a`-vis immigration; and the
migration policy variable, a component of the “Commitment to Development Index”
(Center for Global Development) that reflects the extent to which rich countries
aid poor countries by opening their frontiers to the migrants. The index is ranked
between 1 and 10, with a higher score meaning that it is easier for individuals to
immigrate, find a job, and send remittances abroad (this index is for 2003, but it is
stable over time);
• uij stands for the error term.
4.3.2 Aid Equation
We employ the aid equation proposed by Berthe´lemy (2006), who emphasizes a differ-
ent set of explanatory variables: geopolitical motives by which aid is provided preferably to
countries that are like-minded, to reinforce attitudes in favor of the donor. Those motives
are captured by dummy variables; merits and needs, which include the extent of poverty
as measured by the GDP per capita of the recipient country, the size of the recipient
country as measured by its population, and the quality of institutions; trade interests:
donors giving more assistance to recipients that are major trade partners; and internal
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politics, as in Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000), where the lobbying activities of the
migrants influence the geographical aid pattern. This networking effect is captured by
mij, defined above. It is symmetrical to the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral migration
through the attraction effect. Finally, bilateral aid is explained by the total aid provided
by country j, and the parameter for this variable is expected to be reasonably close to 1,
under the neutral assumption that the total size of aid budget does not affect significantly
its structure.
The model is written as follows:
Aidi,j = β0 +
∑
k
β1kcolijk + β2GDPpci + β3popi + β4Insti + β5Xji + β6mij +
+α7aidj + vij (4.3)
where:
• colijk is the same colonial dummy variable as described above, to which we add an
additional dummy variable equal to 1 when recipient i is an Asian country and donor
j is Japan. The latter dummy variable takes into account the geopolitical specificity
of the Japanese foreign policy in favor of Asia;
• GDPpci is the log of GDP per capita of the recipient i;
• popi is the log of its population of the recipient i;
• Insti describes the quality of institutions in the recipient country i. Here, we depart
from Berthe´lemy (2006) by using the World Bank’s governance indicators developed
by Kaufmann et al. (2005), namely: voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption;
• Xji refers to trade intensity, measured by bilateral exports from the donor j to the
recipient i as a ratio of GDP of the donor j. In order to avoid simultaneity biases,
this variable is lagged by five years;
• aidj is the log of the total aid budget of donor j;
• vij stands for the error term.
We also introduce the possibility that unobserved variables co-determine aid and mi-
gration; in econometric terms, this implies a correlation between the error terms uij and
vij of the two equations. Hence the parameters are estimated using the three-stage least
squares method (3SLS), which allows for the correction of possible simultaneity biases and
also takes into account the correlation between residuals of the two equations.
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For both the migration and aid allocation equation, there is a standard technical prob-
lem, related to the censored nature of the dependent variable, which cannot be negative.
Estimating such equations with all observations could potentially result in large biases. In
the aid allocation literature, this problem is frequently overcome by estimating equations
on samples restricted to strictly positive variables. This also permits the equations to be
specified in logarithmic form, facilitating the interpretation of parameters as elasticities.
We adopt this logarithmic specification form here. This method may result, however, in
a second bias (known as the selection bias) that comes from the fact that the selection
of a country as a recipient of assistance (or as a destination of migration) may depend
on variables that also influence the amount of assistance (or the number of migrants).
There is no perfect solution to this problem in the absence of variables that would explain
the selection of a country but not the amount of aid (or the number of migrants) that
it receives. The most frequent approach is to assume that the selection bias is of second
order, and we adopt this approach here. In his paper on aid allocation, Berthe´lemy (2006),
who used a large dataset that included a time-series dimension, found that there was no
significant correlation between the selection of aid recipients and aid allocation, suggesting
that there is no significant selection bias.
4.4 Data and stylized facts
In this analysis we take advantage of the World Bank’s recent release of an update
to the global database of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization
and Poverty. This database consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin-destination stocks by
country6 and by level of education for the year 2000. We restrict this dataset to the stocks
of migrants from 187 sending countries, which are developing, emerging, and transition
economies, to 22 OECD member countries (the members of the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD).
Since we are interested in the impact of aid flows on migration, ideally we would
rely upon migration flow data. While the United Nations provides total migrant stocks
for each country, the OECD is the only source to provide both stocks and flow data on
immigrants in OECD countries. However, as emphasized by Lucas (2005), the latter are
not collected in a systematic and comparable way. By contrast, the data set that has
been made available recently by the World Bank is the first to offer comprehensive and
reliable information on the pattern of international migration between countries. More
importantly, our assumption of two channels for the impact of aid on migration is tested
6See Parsons et al. (2007) for a complete description of the database
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by using the education level embodied in the immigrant stocks. This information is made
available only by the World Bank dataset, on which we therefore rely. In order to correct
a possible mismatch, we use aid flows aggregated over time. For this aggregation we have
used two alternative time spans, five and ten years, with very similar results. Aid data
are Official Development Assistance disbursements available in the OECD/DAC database.
Sources for other explanatory variables are described in Table 4.7 in the Appendix of the
chapter.
Table 4.2 shows the overall geographical structure of international “South-North” mi-
grants. The largest destination of migrants appears to be North America, which is not
surprising since the United States and Canada are by nature immigration countries, sim-
ilar to both Australia and New Zealand in this respect. These four “western offshoots”
have historically been major destination for migrants, given the small size of their native
population. The Western Europe is the second largest destination, surpassing developed
Asia and Oceania, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The latter two attract
many migrants, but are demographically small countries compared to Japan.
The vast majority of immigrants to North America come from the neighboring Latin
America countries (most notably from Mexico), while immigrants to Western Europe are
more diversified, coming from the neighboring Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, and
the Middle East, and also from Asia (principally from former colonies in South Asia and
Indochina, and to some extent from China).
Table 4.2: Migrants in proportion of total “South-North” migration (2000).
North Developed Asia Western Total
America & Oceania Europe
Africa & Middle East 4.4% 0.8% 18.4% 23.9%
Latin America 31.2% 0.9% 4.3% 36.4%
Developed Asia & Oceania 14.2% 3.6% 6.6% 24.2%
Central & Eastern Europe 4.7% 0.7% 10.0% 15.5%
Total 54.6% 6.0% 39.4% 100.0%
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank data.
The relative weights of the regions of origin are however very different, as Asia is much
more populated than either Africa or Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, it is also
useful to consider the shares of migrants over the population of origin. Table 4.3 provides
this information. It indicates that the greatest source of per capita migration comes from
citizens of Latin American countries (in particular, Mexican immigrants to the United
States), followed by citizens from Central and Eastern European countries. Africans tend
to migrate even less, although they do migrate to Western Europe, and Asians migrate
much less than any other group.
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Table 4.3: Migrants in proportion of population of country of origin (2000).
North Developed Asia Western Total
America & Oceania Europe
Africa & Middle East 0.3% 0.0% 1.1% 1.4%
Latin America 3.0% 0.1% 0.4% 3.4%
Developed Asia & Oceania 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Central & Eastern Europe 0.8% 0.1% 1.6% 2.5%
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank data.
Hence, it seems that distance plays a major role in migration behaviors - people tend
to migrate to neighboring countries or regions. Historical ties and cultural factors, such
as common languages, likely play a significant role also, as suggested by the large number
of immigrants coming from former colonies. For example, in Europe, 35% of immigrants
come from former colonies.
Considering the purely economic determinants of migration, a standard intuition, con-
sistent with the seminal Harris and Todaro (1970) model, is that migration is positively
influenced by the per capita income of the country of destination, relative to the per capita
income of the country of origin. However, stylized facts do not confirm this intuition. The
correlation between per capita GDP and the percentage of per capita immigrants (in the
total population) in developed countries is insignificant (Figure 4.1). There is, however, a
significant positive correlation between per capita GDP and the percentage of per capita
emigrants (in the total population) in developing, emerging and transition economies at
the 2% significance level.
Figure 4.1: Immigration and per capita GDP in destination countries (2000).
Importantly, this positive correlation masks a more complex pattern, namely that
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there is a positive correlation for relatively low levels of GDP per capita and a negative
correlation for relatively higher levels of GDP per capita (Figure 4.2). This hump-shaped
pattern, also observed in our dataset, can be related to the existence of migration costs,
which reduce the possibility of emigration from poorer countries.
Figure 4.2: Emigration and GDP per capita in origin countries (2000).
4.5 Estimation Results
Table 4.4 reports the main findings of our model of joint determination of migration
equation and aid allocation. Each estimate is composed of two columns: in the first column
aid is averaged over five years, in the second it is averaged over ten years.
Since we are principally interested in migration behavior, the aid equation is reported
at the bottom of the table here only for reference. Its properties are very similar to those
of equations estimated by Berthe´lemy (2006), with the expected negative sign for the GDP
per capita variable and positive signs for the trade intensity variable, the former colony
dummy variable (with a significantly higher parameter for former Spanish colonies), and
the Japan-Asia dummy variable. The sign of the population parameter is also positive
but lower than 1, results that correspond to the standard ones in the literature: that is,
smaller countries receive more aid than larger countries per capita7.
With respect to the governance variables, we find that two of them are significant and
lead to very similar results - voice and accountability and regulatory quality. We show
7To interpret this parameter correctly, we also have to take into account the parameter associated
with trade intensity, given that the latter variable is also presumably positively correlated to population.
However, even if we add up the two parameters, the final result is still below one, meaning that smaller
countries receive more aid per capita than larger countries.
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results for both variables in 4.4 (respectively, columns 1-2 and columns 3-4). Finally,
we find that migrant stocks influence aid allocation. Hence our data are consistent with
the existence of lobbying activities by immigrants to donor countries in favor of their
countries of origin. Introducing this variable does not alter the significance of other cultural
proximity variables, such as the post-colonial dummy variable.
We now turn to the migration equation estimations. Most variables, except for the
GDP per capita of countries of destination, have significant parameters with the expected
signs8. One possible explanation of the negative result obtained for the GDP per capita
of the country of destination variable is that all of our 22 destination countries are rich,
with relatively small differences among them. In addition, many factors beyond GDP
per capita may affect disparities of purchasing power actually obtained by migrants in the
different immigration countries, and most of these factors are not observable. For instance,
depending on the functioning of the labor markets, immigrants, who are outsiders in the
market, may face different obstacles in their search for a job. Such unobservable disparities,
notable in terms of the unemployment rates of immigrants, are potentially of much greater
magnitude than GDP per capita variations. Therefore, we decided to drop the GDP per
capita of destination countries from our list of explanatory variables. This does not affect
the rest of our results.
Foreign aid exerts a significant and relatively large positive influence on migration.
As previously explained, we distinguish between two possible channels. The first one
(associated with bilateral aid) is bilateral by nature. It corresponds to what we called the
“attraction effect”. More aid to a country intensifies the attractiveness of the donor country
for citizens of the recipient country. Part of this effect comes from aid given in the higher
education sector: when a donor country provides scholarships for students originating from
a developing country, this increases the flow of migrants9. More generally, the presence of
a donor in a recipient country, or of projects funded by this donor, creates opportunities
for contacts between the local population and the donor country. If this conjecture is
relevant, we can expect that the increase in migration due to bilateral aid will consist
mainly of skilled people. This consistency check will be provided in the next section.
The second channel (associated with total aid) is related to the budgetary constraints
which can prevent people from migrating. The first (bilateral aid) effect dominates the
second effect. The coefficient of bilateral aid varies from 0.273 to 0.316, implying that an
increase in bilateral aid of ten percent will increase bilateral migration stocks by about
8It is not significant either in Faini and Venturini (1993, Table 4, p. 441), where country equations are
estimated and the wage differential is included in the specification; it is not always significant in Karemera
et al. (2000, p. 1751), who estimate a gravity migration equation very similar to our equation.
9Similarly, subsidies given to refugees are accounted for in bilateral aid, in which case aid also creates
an attraction effect.
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Table 4.4: Gravity estimation of Migration and Aid (three-stage least-squares).
Migration 1 : Aid averaged 2 : Aid averaged 3 : Aid averaged 4 : Aid averaged
over 5 years over 10 years over 5 years over 10 years
Bilateral Aid 0.316*** 0.276*** 0.312*** 0.273***
(8.95) (8.62) (8.86) (8.49)
Total aid of recipient 0.145*** 0.161*** 0.156*** 0.169***
(3.38) (3.54) (3.65) (3.71)
GDP per capita i 0.806*** 0.770*** 0.808*** 0.771***
(19.39) (19.06) (19.45) (19.10)
Population j 0.639*** 0.634*** 0.642*** 0.636***
(12.81) (12.70) (12.88) (12.74)
Population i 0.557*** 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.553***
(19.44) (19.40) (19.38) (19.35)
Distance -0.676*** -0.721*** -0.682*** -0.728***
(14.13) (15.57) (14.25) (15.70)
Common language 0.895*** 0.911*** 0.896*** 0.912***
(7.81) (8.14) (7.83) (8.15)
Former colony 1.365*** 1.335*** 1.376*** 1.340***
(6.67) (6.66) (6.73) (6.68)
Former colony of Portugal 2.669*** 2.588*** 2.695*** 2.618***
(3.97) (3.77) (4.01) (3.82)
Former colony of the UK 0. 409 0.397 0.406 0.409
(1.41) (1.37) (1.40) (1.41)
USA-Latin America 0.695** 0.775** 0.704** 0.789**
(2.14) (2.46) (2.17) (2.50)
Western offshoots 1.426*** 1.506*** 1.423*** 1.501***
(12.94) (13.91) (12.93) (13.86)
Japan -3.234*** -2.983*** -3.209*** -2.961***
(19.48) (18.69) (19.35) (18.55)
Trade intensity 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.087***
(4.00) (4.08) (3.97) (4.04)
Migration policy 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.110*** 0.119***
(7.38) (8.00) (7.44) (8.05)
Intercept -14.405*** -13.767*** -14.423*** -13.781***
(12.06) (11.47) (12.09) (11.48)
Aid
GDP per capita i -1.424*** -1.488*** -1.365*** -1.411***
(22.19) (23.75) (21.83) (23.10)
Population i 0.103** 0.118*** 0.072** 0.082**
(2.80) (3.29) (1.99) (2.31)
Former colony 0.340 0.672*** 0.295*** 0.664***
(1.57) (3.16) (1.36) (3.10)
Former colony of Spain 1.990*** 1.608*** 1.975*** 1.566***
(4.26) (3.69) (4.21) (3.57)
Japan-Asia 1.269*** 1.212*** 1.295*** 1.253***
(4.15) (4.07) (4.22) (4.19)
Migrations 0.226*** 0.236*** 0.243*** 0.253***
(8.00) (8.55) (8.57) (9.15)
Total aid of donor 1.064*** 1.069*** 1.049*** 1.053***
(28.26) (31.56) (27.89) (31.03)
Trade intensity 0.414*** 0.445*** 0.397*** 0.422***
(14.16) (15.93) (13.47) (14.88)
Voice and accountability 0.357*** 0.418***
(6.01) (7.27)
Regulatory quality 0.271*** 0.308***
(4.68) (5.41)
Intercept 5.345*** 5.768*** 5.154*** 5.428***
(4.68) (5.17) (4.51) (4.85)
Number of observations 1766 1877 1766 1877
R-squared
Migration 0.7053 0.7033 0.7053 0.7032
Aid 0.5838 0.6305 0.5819 0.6272
Note: *** (resp. **, *) significant at the 1% level (resp. 5%, 10%). Student-t between brackets. i
stands for the country of origin of migrants and j for their country of destination.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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three percent. An increase in total aid of ten percent augments migration by a mere 1.5
percent on average.
The coefficient of the migration policy component of the“Commitment to Development
Index” is positively signed, meaning that a stricter immigration policy translates into less
migration. We know that aid and migration policies are not always coherent. For instance,
Spain is very open to immigration; in 2005 it received a flow of immigrants from developing
countries equivalent to 1.45% of its population, while in the same year it gave a net flow of
aid of only 0.23% of its GDP. By contrast, Denmark and the Netherlands gave more than
three times as much aid, while they received only 0.30% of immigrants. Our estimates
contribute to this debate by allowing us to determine the amount of bilateral aid that would
have the same effect on migrations as a deterioration of the migration policy component.
An average deterioration of the latter by one point would be equivalent to an average
reduction of the level of aid by about 23.6%10.
Population and distance variables have the correct signs, positive and negative, re-
spectively. Our dummy variables also have the expected signs. Countries of origin of
migrants who share a common language or a common colonial history with a developed
country tend to send more migrants to this country. In a similar way, the United States
attracts more people from Latin America. We find also that Portugal (and to a smaller
extent the United Kingdom) attracts more migrants from its former colonies than do the
other former colonial powers. Finally, we find that the “western offshoots” attract more
migrants than the “old” European countries and that Japan attracts less, a stylized fact
that is mentioned in Lucas (2005, p. 127).
The GDP per capita of the migrant’s country of origin has a positive parameter,
suggesting that the effect of total fixed costs of migration prevails over the effect of relative
income comparison. However, consistent with the stylized facts described in the previous
section, it is likely that this effect of GDP per capita of the country of origin could be
negative after some threshold is reached. This is tested in Table 4.5 by introducing a
quadratic term in the migration equation11.
After taking into account the indirect effect of GDP per capita through aid allocation,
we may conclude that the total income effect is positive below a threshold of US$7348, in
10A one-point change in the migration component leads to a reduction of migration by about 11% for
each donor-recipient dyad, according to estimates in the first column of Table 1. In order to compensate
for this, an increase of aid by 23.6% would be necessary (0.109/(0.316+0.145).
11In principle we should not include the square of logarithms of GDP per capita but the square of
logarithms of domestic wages, which is in our framework supposed to be a linear combination of logarithms
of GDP per capita and logarithms of aid. However this would introduce a non-linearity in estimation.
Given that the contribution of aid to domestic wages is small compared to the contribution of GDP per
capita (on average about 13%, using the parameters estimated in Table 4.4), this approximation does not
change qualitatively our results.
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Table 4.5: Gravity estimates of Migration and Aid with quadratic per capita GDP of
country of origin (three-stage least-squares).
Migration 1 : Aid averaged 2 : Aid averaged 3 : Aid averaged 4 : Aid averaged
over 5 years over 10 years over 5 years over 10 years
Bilateral Aid 0.338*** 0.301*** 0.334*** 0.297***
(9.86) (9.65) (9.83) (9.53)
Total aid of recipient 0.111*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.135***
(2.65) (2.86) (2.91) (3.03)
GDP per capita i 4.050*** 4.148*** 4.081*** 4.206***
(7.79) (8.20) (7.84) (8.29)
GDP per capita i sq -0.200*** -0.208 -0.202 -0.212
(6.20) (6.65) (6.25) (6.74)
Population j 0.608*** 0.596*** 0.611*** 0.599***
(12.47) (12.22) (12.57) (12.30)
Population i 0.538*** 0.534*** 0.535*** 0.532***
(18.96) (18.87) (18.93) (18.85)
Distance -0.684*** -0.726*** -0.693*** -0.736***
(14.49) (15.91) (14.65) (16.10)
Common language 0.939*** 0.960*** 0.940*** 0.962***
(8.30) (8.70) (8.31) (8.72)
Former colony 1.257*** 1.212*** 1.269*** 1.217***
(6.21) (6.11) (6.28) (6.14)
Former colony of Portugal 2.708*** 2.642*** 2.746*** 2.684***
(4.10) (3.92) (4.16) (3.99)
Former colony of the UK 0.556* 0.488* 0.556* 0.505*
(1.95) (1.71) (1.95) (1.78)
USA-Latin America 0.511 0.578** 0.519 0.591*
(1.60) (1.87) (1.63) (1.91)
Western offshoots 1.427*** 1.510*** 1.425*** 1.505***
(13.18) (14.20) (13.18) (14.17)
Japan -3.205*** -2.959*** -3.177*** -2.933***
(19.60) (18.84) (19.47) (18.68)
Trade intensity 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(4.35) (4.41) (4.30) (4.38)
Migration policy 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.107*** 0.115***
(7.31) (7.90) (7.38) (7.98)
Intercept -26.164*** -25.984*** -26.277*** -26.214***
(10.98) (11.24) (11.03) (11.33)
Aid
GDP per capita i -1.447*** -1.508*** -1.392*** -1.436***
(22.64) (24.18) (22.32) (23.60)
Population ih 0.088** 0.102*** 0.056 0.066*
(2.40) (2.87) (1.57) (1.89)
Former colony 0.287 0.621*** 0.241 0.617***
(1.33) (2.93) (1.11) (2.90)
Former colony of Spain 1.902*** 1.543*** 1.885*** 1.494***
(4.14) (3.59) (4.09) (3.46)
Japan-Asia 1.309*** 1.260*** 1.331*** 1.293***
(4.36) (4.30) (4.42) (4.39)
Migrations 0.204*** 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.233***
(7.10) (7.68) (7.67) (8.30)
Total aid of donor 1.081*** 1.085*** 1.066*** 1.068***
(28.51) (31.81) (28.14) (31.27)
Trade intensity 0.413*** 0.443*** 0.398*** 0.421***
(14.03) (15.75) (13.39) (14.75)
Voice and accountability 0.341*** 0.409***
(5.66) (7.01)
Regulatory quality 0.238*** 0.279***
(4.06) (4.85)
Intercept 5.744*** 6.174*** 5.570*** 5.856***
(5.07) (5.57) (4.90) (5.27)
Number of observations 1766 1877 1766 1877
R-squared
Migration 0.7032 0.7033 0.7033 0.7034
Aid 0.5841 0.6306 0.5822 0.6273
Note: *** (resp. **, *) significant at the 1% level (resp. 5%, 10%). Student-t between brackets. i
stands for the country of origin of migrants and j for their country of destination.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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PPP 2000 prices12. These figures are similar to the US$8000 in PPP 2000 prices reported
in Lucas (2005, p. 133). In the same vein, Adams and Page (2003, p. 18) argue that “the
share of international migrants increases until a country has a per capita GDP income (in
1995 prices) of $1630, and falls thereafter”. By converting US$7348 in PPP 2000 prices
into US$ in 1995 prices, we find a figure that is not far from $1630. For instance, for lower
middle-income countries, the ratio of PPP to current prices is equal to 2.8 in 2000. In
1995 prices, it is about 3.1.
This result confirms the view13 that migrants must be able to afford the costs associated
with international migration and that migration does not happen for the lowest-income
countries. On this point, Hatton and Williamson (2002) observe that Sub-Saharan mi-
grants are remarkably few because the bulk of their migration is within Africa and not
abroad.
4.6 Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants
We turn now to a disaggregation of our results by education level of migrants. The
decision to migrate depends upon observable and unobservable characteristics, including
education and dispersion of earnings in both the source and destination countries. As a
result, (1) educated persons migrate to the countries that value educated labor the most,
and (2) host countries that tax high income workers relatively more than source countries
attract more unskilled migrants. The migration of skilled labor can generate a policy issue
in itself: some donors attract skilled migrants from developing countries, hence destroying
capacities that they have contributed to building through their financial support. This
creates an additional policy coherence dilemma, which is documented for instance by the
OECD (2006), notably regarding the emigration of skilled personnel in the health sector.
In addition, this disaggregation is useful to further validating our interpretation of the
previously reported effect of bilateral aid on bilateral migration. Our conclusion, based on
the assumption from previous sections, is that aid affects migration through two channels:
by facilitating contacts and population movements of skilled foreigners (e.g., students) into
the donor country and by allowing migrants to afford migration costs. While the former
channel is of a bilateral nature, the latter is about the total amount of aid provided by
all donors, including multilateral agencies. Our dataset allows us to test whether skilled
migration is more reactive to bilateral aid and whether unskilled migration is more affected
by total aid.
12Estimate obtained from column 1. Estimates obtained from other columns lead to very similar results.
13Shared with many others: see Rotte and Vogler (2000, p. 495) or Hatton and Williamson (1998,
chapter 3).
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Finally, we can test whether trade and migration are substitutes or complements for
unskilled migrants versus skilled migrants. In Markusen (1983), one main reason for
complementarity appears when both trade and migration are based upon technological
superiority in the exporting sector. Countries achieving technological progress export
more, have higher wages, and attract more skilled migrants.
Our estimates are obtained in a gravity framework similar to the previous one. We
add to this model variables that contribute to test selection hypotheses: the replacement
rates (over 60 months of unemployment, with or without social aid), taken here as a proxy
for redistribution policies, and the Gini index in the destination countries14. Introducing
the same variables in origin countries, while desirable, was impossible due to data con-
straints. We expect that a rather equal or redistributive society will attract relatively
more migrants with below average skills; conversely, positively selected individuals with
above average skills will prefer destinations with higher earning and unequal distribution
of incomes. Table 4.6 reports the result for the test of whether unskilled (primary) and
skilled (secondary plus tertiary) estimated parameters are equal or not.
In all specifications, the coefficient of total aid is significantly lower for skilled migrants,
as reflected by the difference in the coefficients for skilled and unskilled workers set equal
to -0.189 (column 1) and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of bilateral aid is
significantly higher for skilled workers. This result corroborates the prediction from our
model, namely that bilateral aid promotes skilled migration, while total aid enhances
unskilled migration by relaxing budgetary constraints.
Distance and language have the same impact on the migration of both types of work-
ers. Interestingly, coming from a former colony is more significant for unskilled migrants,
but coming from a former British colony is more significant for skilled workers. Moreover,
skilled migrants seem to be particularly attracted to the western offshoots. The coefficient
estimated for the replacement rate (with or without social aid) is lower for skilled migrants
than for unskilled migrants, as expected: skilled individuals are not attracted to countries
offering higher replacement rates. The coefficient estimated for the Gini variable is sig-
nificantly higher for skilled migrants than for unskilled migrants: skilled migrants select
destinations where their expected wage varies over a wider range. Finally, the comple-
mentarity between trade and migration is higher for skilled than for unskilled migrants, a
finding which corresponds to Markusen’s model, and the influence of migration policy is
significant only for skilled migrants.
14Hatton and Williamson (2002) also use the Gini coefficient as a proxy for the return to skills.
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Table 4.6: Tests of differences in parameters in equations for skilled (with tertiary and
secondary education) and unskilled migrantsa.
Migration 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years 5 years 10 years
Bilateral Aid 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.310*** 0.280*** 0.334*** 0.370***
(4.62) (5.20) (4.49) (5.12) (3.76) (4.22) (3.15) (3.56)
Total aid of recipient -0.189*** -0.247*** -0.192*** -0.245*** -0.211** -0.245*** -0.216** -0.307***
(2.61) (3.28) (2.64) (3.26) (2.57) (3.04) (2.25) (2.93)
GDP per capita i -1.180 -1.045 -1.219 -1.105 -1.366 -1.096 -1.395 -1.204
(1.28) (1.19) (7.06) (1.26) (1.42) (1.24) (1.30) (21.93)
GDP per capita i sq 0.085 0.076 0.087 0.079 0.097 0.079 0.100 0.088
(1.49) (1.40) (1.53) (1.46) (1.62) (1.44) (1.48) (1.43)
Population j -0.333*** -0.351*** -0.426*** -0.446*** -0.414*** -0.398*** -0.531*** -0.570***
(4.08) (4.41) (5.01) (5.40) (3.87) (4.08) (4.08) (4.32)
Population i -0.028 -0.012 -0.030 -0.020 -0.040 -0.018 -0.040 -0.031
(0.61) (0.27) (0.67) (0.43) (0.84) (0.39) (0.74) (0.57)
Distance 0.062 0.073 0.133* 0.137* 0.108 0.102 0.041 0.064
(14.94) (0.98) (1.67) (1.80) (1.28) (1.29) (0.42) (0.68)
Common language 0.285 0.307 0.243 0.245 0.257 0.300 0.251 0.250
(1.46) (1.64) (1.25) (1.31) (1.29) (1.59) (1.16) (1.21)
Former colony -1.068*** -1.006*** -0.918*** -0.853*** -1.059*** -0.952*** -1.308*** -1.346***
(3.28) (3.19) (2.85) (2.73) (3.13) (2.98) (3.10) (3.23)
Former colony of Portugal -0.355 -0.858 0.672 -1.141 -0.323 -0.863 -0.376 -0.816
(0.34) (0.81) (0.64) (1.09) (0.30) (0.82) (0.34) (0.74)
Former colony of the UK 0.897** 0.962** 1.065** 1.139** 0.974** 0.994** 0.959* 1.178**
(1.96) (2.15) (2.34) (2.55) (2.07) (2.20) (1.84) (2.28)
USA-Latin America 0.557 0.613 0.218 0.299 0.520 0.602 0.756 0.767
(1.09) (1.25) (0.43) (0.61) (1.01) (1.23) (1.44) (1.53)
Western offshoots 0.808*** 0.840*** 0.361* 0.455** 0.583*** 0.652*** 0.607 0.713***
(3.65) (4.82) (1.93) (2.54) (3.05) (3.61) (2.97) (3.56)
Japan -0.200 -0.134 -0.989*** -0.855*** -0.143 -0.029 0.623** 0.673**
(0.74) (0.53) (3.21) (2.99) (0.52) (0.12) (2.06) (2.31)
Trade intensity -0.138*** -0.151*** 0.114*** -0.129*** -0.141*** -0.147*** -0.119*** -0.138***
(3.65) (4.05) (3.03) (3.51) (3.53) (3.83) (2.80) (3.18)
Migration policy 0.034 0.038 0.043* 0.045** 0.062** 0.065*** 0.142*** 0.142***
(1.42) (1.60) (1.80) (1.93) (2.51) (2.68) (4.72) (4.89)
Replacement rate -0.022*** -0.021***
Without social aid (6.63) (6.58)
Re placement rate -0.013** -0.010**
With social aid (2.37) (2 .15)
Gini index 0.105*** 0.099***
(3.23) (3.17)
Intercept 10.019** 9.698** -12.461*** 12.281*** 12.669*** 11.088** 10.164** 10.284**
(2.39) (2.47) (2.94) (3.10) (2.60) (2.59) (2.02) (2.93)
Number of observations 3035 3218 3035 3218 3035 3218 2468 2637
R-squared 0.6468 0.6526 0.6484 0.6549 0.6285 0.6414 0.6626 0.6602
Note: *** (resp. **, *) significant at the 1% level (resp. 5%, 10%). Student-t between brackets. i stands for the country of origin
of migrants and j for their country of destination.
aH0: test whether the coefficients for skilled (secondary + tertiary) and unskilled (primary) migrants are or are not significantly
different. The figures correspond to the difference between skilled and unskilled migrants’ coefficients. Basic regressions for skilled
and unskilled migrants are available upon request.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of a recent database of the World Bank on disaggregated
migration flows by level of education. Starting from the seminal work of Faini and Ven-
turini (1993), which introduced the link between total aid and migration (push effect), we
propose a model of joint determination of aid and migration. This model is rooted in the
traditional Borjas approach, to which non-linearity of the effect of income per capita is
added. This pattern has been explained in the previous literature (e.g., Faini and Ven-
turini, 1993) by a budgetary constraint hypothesis, arguing that at very low levels of
income, any income increase will be accompanied by more migration instead of less migra-
tion. In addition, the model highlights a new channel for the impact of aid on migration.
This channel is related to a reduction of transaction costs of migration, and we call it
the attraction effect (the other way around is the networking effect, e.g., the impact of
presence of aid workers on bilateral aid).
In this framework, we have shown that foreign assistance and migration are substitutes
above a threshold of US$7348 in PPP 2000 prices. For a majority of sending countries there
is, therefore, on average, a combination of generous aid policies and restrictive immigration
policies that are not necessarily at odds with one another: increasing aid will help reduce
migration pressure from all sending countries above the threshold. This policy combination
is, however, inconsistent when implemented vis-a`-vis poor countries. For those countries,
there is a trade-off between the aid that they receive and migration policies that are
imposed on them: a deterioration of the migration policy by one point in the Center for
Global Development indicator is equivalent to an average reduction of the level of aid by
about 23.6%.
Second, we analyze the dual causality between aid and migration. We have found a
significant influence of migrants on aid allocation, as suggested by the model of Lahiri
and Raimondos Møller (2000). We go further by emphasizing the other way around, in
other words the causality running from aid to migration. According to our model, this
causality has two components. The first is the causality running from bilateral aid to
bilateral migration, and this reflects the attraction effect. We have established that this
attraction effect is all the more significant for skilled migrants. The second one stands for
the causality from total aid to migration. Any poverty reduction that would be induced
by aid may help alleviate the budgetary constraint faced by the poor and then translate
into more migration.
Regarding the differences between skilled and unskilled migration behavior, we report
several interesting findings. First, the higher significance of the migration component of
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the CGD’s Commitment to Development Index is strongly associated with skilled migra-
tion but not unskilled migration. This echoes the fact that recent migration policies favor
skilled migrants over the unskilled. Second, our results confirm that unskilled migrants
are attracted to more redistributive welfare states, while skilled migrants gravitate to-
wards countries that offer better opportunities and greater expected earnings. Third, we
show that the complementarity between trade and migration is higher for skilled than for
unskilled migrants, a fact which is consistent with Markusen’s model of a technological
superiority in rich countries. This complementarity explains the fact that rich countries
export skilled labor-intensive goods and host relatively more skilled individuals.
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Appendix of Chapter 4
Table 4.7: Data Sources and Definitions.
Variable name Source Definition
Migration Development Research Stock of migrants.
Centre on Migration,
World Bank
Bilateral Aid DAC database, Aid flows commitments averaged over a five-year period
OECD (1996-2000) and ten-year period (1991-2000),
constant prices 2000 $US (million).
Total Aid DAC database, Sum of bilateral and multilateral aid flows committed by a donor,
OECD constant prices 2000 $US (million).
GDP per capita j World Development GDP per capita of home country of migrants,
Indicators, World Bank constant prices PPP 2000 $US (million).
GDP per capita i World Development GDP per capita of host country of migrants,
Indicators, World Bank constant prices PPP 2000 $US (million).
Population j World Development Population of migrants’ home country,
Indicators, World Bank (million inhabitants).
Population i World Development Population of migrants’ host country,
Indicators, World Bank (million inhabitants).
Distance CEPII database Bilateral distance between home and host
country (kilometers).
Common language CEPII database Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home and the host
country share a common language.
Former colony CEPII database Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home and the host
country have a colonial link.
Former colony of Portugal Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home country
is a former colony of Portugal.
Former colony of Spain Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home country is a
former colony of Spain.
Former colony of UK Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home country is a
former colony of United Kingdom.
USA-Latin America Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home country is a
Latin American country and the host country
is United States of America.
Japan-Asia Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the recipient is an Asian
country and the donor is Japan.
Western offshoots Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the host country is
Australia, New Zealand, Canada or United
States of America.
Japan Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the host country is Japan.
Europe Own calculations Dummy variable equal to 1 if the home country is a
Central and Eastern European country and the
host country is a Western European country.
Trade intensity Feenstra et al. database In the migration equation: Exports from recipient to donor country,
(2005), NBER % as a ratio of the GDP of the recipient, lagged by 5 years.
In the aid equation: Exports from donor to recipient country,
as a ratio of the GDP of the donor, lagged by 5 years.
Voice and Accountability Kaufmann et al. (2005) Measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5,
Regulatory quality database, World Bank with higher values corresponding to better
governance outcomes.
Migration policy Center for Global Migration component of Commitment to Development Index,
Development 2003 data. Ranks between 1 and 10, with higher scores
corresponding to more openness vis-a`-vis immigration.
Replacement rate OECD Social Indicators Average net replacement rates over 60 months
of unemployment, 2001 data.
Gini index OECD Calculations from OECD questionnaire on
distribution of household incomes.
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Figure 4.3: Policy Coherence: Basic Framework.
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General Conclusion
I
n this dissertation we have presented a discussion on foreign aid effectiveness and aid
allocation criteria in transition economies. We have also explored aid’s relation to
migration in the context of policy coherence for development.
The questions relating to aid and its effectiveness in promoting growth have gained
increasing attention over the last few decades, both in academic and policy circles. Foreign
aid’s contribution to growth has been extensively analyzed and it has been argued that its
impact depends on how macroeconomic policies are implemented in recipient countries.
The belief that aid benefits to growth more when sound economic policies are set up
(following Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) findings), has long dominated the debate about
the effectiveness of aid and has produced a broad and inconclusive literature. The role of
aid as a development policy instrument, and its capacity to achieve its objectives, as well
as the real motivations of donors to provide aid have often been questioned. Aid literature
has also broadly explored the determinants of aid allocation, in an attempt to identify the
role of donors’ aid allocation policies in achieving an efficient allocation among recipients
and consequently ensuring development effectiveness, as well as finding the causes of aid
failure.
Relating aid effectiveness and allocation to transition economies is one objective of this
dissertation. We consider that the experience of transition economies as aid recipients,
even though not very long, is an opportunity to shed light on several issues related to
development policy and growth. Ever since the early years of transition, packages of
structural and institutional reforms were implemented in order to deal with the changes
required by the transformation from centrally planned to market economy. Supported
mainly by multilateral organizations (the European Commission, the EBRD, the World
Bank, the IMF) and to a lesser extent by bilateral donors, these reforms have not always
had the expected outcomes, at least in some of these countries.
A question that comes natural is whether the foreign financial and technical assistance
worked in these countries? The answer is simply common sense: sometimes it did work,
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but sometimes it did not. When it did, the financial assistance helped countries to adopt
market institutions that placed them on a development path. Among those who succeed
in reforming their economies we can count most of CEECs countries. For them, the
integration perspective played an important role in the institutional transformation. The
necessity to satisfy the requirements for the integration within the EU supported the
new orientation of economic policy towards the institutional dimension. Actually, the
adoption of acquis communautaire consisted basically in the harmonization of institutions
with those of the countries already members of the EU. This preparation has been a
determinant factor in the institutional transformation of CEECs, while it was the missing
ingredient in the transformation process of the CIS; this explains to a certain extent their
delayed transformation.
Another objective of this thesis is to place aid in its relation to other development
policies, in particular migration policy, and therefore contribute to the debate about pol-
icy development coherence. This is supported by the belief that together with foreign
aid, other policies with regard to trade, investment and migration might contribute to
growth. Moreover, a joint analysis of the objectives of these policies likely improves the
understanding about their potential shortcomings and provides means on how each policy
should enhance the objectives of the others.
This dissertation contributes to the policy debate and aid literature in several ways.
With regard to aid effectiveness, it adds to the debate on aid conditionality by exploring
how aid influenced growth (Chapter 2 ). It analyzes the interaction of aid with different
factors and tests their significance in enhancing growth. The factors considered are (i)
macroeconomic policy, (ii) structural and institutional reforms, and (iii) initial conditions.
Our findings reject Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) belief that aid works better in a sound
policy environment. Aid appears to have contributed to growth, but not necessarily where
sound macroeconomic policies were set up. The same goes for structural policy reforms and
institutions. They positively impact on growth but they do not necessarily enhance the
effectiveness of aid in terms of growth. Our results also indicate that the initial situation
of a recipient (at the beginning of the transition period) plays an important role in the
process of macroeconomic adjustment and restructuring; furthermore it comes out that in
countries with bad initial conditions aid it is more effective in enhancing growth. However,
it seems that the effect of initial conditions changes over time; their role is decreasing as
the transition proceeds.
Concerning the determinants of aid allocation in transition economies, this disserta-
tion adds to the literature dwelling on the criteria of aid allocation. It explores donors’
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motivations for providing aid, and stresses the role of governance among the of aid allo-
cation criteria (Chapter 3 ). We have identified the motives that underlie the aid to these
economies; more precisely, we have investigated whether donors attempt to make aid ef-
fective in promoting reforms and enhancing growth by taking into account the recipients’
needs, in their aid allocation strategies. Additionally we have examined whether the qual-
ity of governance matters for donors’ aid allocation decisions. Our findings point out that,
on average, bilateral donors do take into account the recipients’ needs. Moreover, good
quality of governance seems to be rewarded by donors, since they consider it as a sign of
aid being put to good use. Overall, bilateral aid allocation patterns are not different from
multilateral ones, which, as expected, take into consideration recipient needs, and merits
(to a lesser extent). However, some donors, e.g. the United Stats, France, Japan, give
weight to their self-interests when making allocation decisions.
Finally, this dissertation takes part in the debate on policy coherence for development,
by studying the complementarities that might exist between migration and foreign aid
(Chapter 4 ). With regard to the impact of total aid on migration, our findings reveal
the existence of a so-called “push” effect; this effect indicates that total aid increases
migration by financing expenditures and by that, it increases the wages in the origin
country of migrants (aid recipient country). Moreover, we have identified an “attraction”
effect, which indicates that bilateral aid influences migration by enhancing information
about labor market conditions in the migrants destination country (i.e. the aid donor
country). We have shown that aid and migration are substitutes above a threshold of about
$7300 US per capita (PPP 2000 prices). For countries below this threshold, increases in
income per capita (as a consequence of efficient aid policy) initially stimulate rather than
dampen emigration; for these countries there is a trade-off between aid and migration
policies. With respect to the degree of migrants’ qualification, it appears that skilled
migrants are more sensitive to the “attraction” effect than unskilled migrants.
***
Having looked back at the main findings of our empirical studies, in this concluding
section we wish to focus on some more fundamental questions, regarding the challenges
which are still relevant with regard to aid.
Despite all the controversies surrounding aid and its effectiveness in enhancing growth,
from our point of view, there is no reason to consider foreign aid as an useless instrument
for development. The experience of successful transition economies has shown that aid
can be considered as a prerequisite of successful development. The financial support and
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technical assistance that the international organizations (the EU, the EBRD, the WB,
the IMF) and some bilateral donors, provided for the implementation of structural and
institutional reform programs have played an important role in the restructuring and
subsequent development of transition economies.
In our opinion, aid failures should not necessarily be considered in terms of a donor’s
allocation behavior, nor in terms of aid volume, but rather in terms of a recipient country
structural characteristics and/or its capacity to manage the funds. Knowledge of how to
spend money in the most effective way, and, maybe most importantly, willingness to do
so, are key issues for aid’s success. Corruption, commonly considered as an outcome of
transition (for example, countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan,
Taijikistan are found by Transparency International15 to be among the most corrupt coun-
tries in the World) might disturb this managerial capacity. Low quality of the governance
is a key element which adversely affects aid achieving its objectives. Concerned with the
way aid is effectively used by the governments of recipient countries, donors are lead to
apply conditionality. A solution to cope with this lack of confidence might be to provide
more aid through NGOs (where there is the conviction that they are active and pro-poor
supportive), and thus bypassing the governments.
Reforming these economies and achieving fast and self-sustained growth have not been
easy tasks of transition and results have varied across economies. They were often ac-
companied by macroeconomic imbalances which made the reforms more difficult to im-
plement and the subsequent outcomes less impressive. Moreover, they generated social
costs and did not automatically solve acute social problems, even where economic wel-
fare was achieved quickly, in countries like Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic. Problems
of excessive income disparities, regional differences, poverty and social exclusion had to
be tackled, and indeed still have to be, in particular in some CIS countries, where the
situation is sometimes critical.
In our opinion, more should be done in order to properly address these social issues,
such as directing more aid towards sectors like health and education (in particular in rural
areas). We consider that making more resources available for public spending (where
donors are confident in the quality of governance) or as previously mentioned, through
NGOs, for these sectors, is crucial.
Furthermore, more support should be provided to investment, particularly for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME). For example, through reduced taxation for investment
activity, investments become attractive. In this respect, the role of aid would be to support
152008 Corruption Perceptions Index.
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government’s revenues. Productive investment is a way to underpin economic growth and
development. This is particularly important in the context of the current crisis that
has affected these economies. High levels of unemployment is one the problems that
should be presently payed attention. Increasing investment might, to a certain extent,
overcome this issue. Furthermore, improving the institutional environment and promoting
an entrepreneurial environment without excessive regulation and continual change should
also allow these economies achieving more growth, by attracting more FDI.
Finally, we would like to stress the idea that aid is not the one and only instrument
to achieve development objectives in terms of growth and poverty reduction. Other in-
struments, based on migration or trade policies are also as effective as aid, or maybe even
more. We join in the debate regarding the necessity of articulating the implementation of
development policies, by pointing out the importance of coordination between the objec-
tives of development policies. By identifying the threshold above which aid and migration
are substitutes ($7300 US per capita, in PPP 2000 prices), we have shown that gener-
ous aid policy, by increasing the income per capita in migrants’ sending countries (i.e.
aid recipients) is likely to drive rather than reduce migration for the countries below this
threshold; for these countries, migration policy designed to reduce migration pressure is
not likely to be effective. This underlines the importance of thinking about the potential
shortcomings of these policies.
157
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References
Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J. (2004), “Institutions As the Funda-
mental Cause of Long-Run Economic Growth,”, NBER Working Paper, 10481.
Adams R. and Page J.Jr. (2003, “International Migration, Remittances and Poverty
in Developing Countries”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3179, Wash-
ington DC.
Adler J.H. (1965), “Absorptive Capacity, the Concepts and its Determinants”, Brook-
ings Institution, Washington DC.
Alesina A. and Dollar D. (2000), “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”,
Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1): 36-63.
Alesina A. and Weder D. (2002), “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign
Aid?”, American Economic Review, 94(4), 1126-1137.
Amprou J. and Chauvet L. (2004), “Efficacite´ et allocation de l’aide, revue des
de´bats”, Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement, Notes et Documents, 6.
Anderson T.W. and Hsiao C. (1982)“Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Mod-
els using Panel Data”, Journal of Econometrics, 18: 47-82.
Andreff W. (2007), Economie de la Transition, Editions Bre´al, Paris.
Apodaca C. and Stohl M. (1999), “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign
Assistance,”, International Studies Quarterly, 43(1): 185-198.
Arellano M. and Bond S. (1991),“Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic
Studies, 58: 227-297.
Arellano M. and Bover O. (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental-variable
Estimation of Error-Components Model”, Journal of Econometrics, 82(4): 901-921.
158
Barro R.J. (1996), “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical
Study”, NBER Working Paper, 5698, Cambridge, MA.
Barro R.J. and Lee J.W (2000), “International Data on Educational Attainment:
Updates and Implications”, Center for International Development Working Paper,
42, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University.
Bauer P.T. (1972), “Dissent on Development”, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press.
Bauer T.K and Kunze A. (2004), “The Demand for High-Skilled Workers And Im-
migration Policy,” Brussels Economic Review/Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles,
Editions du DULBEA, Universite´ libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Eco-
nomics (DULBEA), 47(1): 57-75.
Berg, A., Borensztein E., Sahay R. and Zettelmeyer J. (1999), “The Evolution
of Output in Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences”, IMF Working Paper
WP/99/73, Washington DC.
Berthe´lemy J.C. and Varoudakis A. (1996), “Economic growth, convergence clubs
and the role of financial development”, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 48(2):
300-328.
Berthe´lemy J.C. (2006), “Bilateral Donor’s Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Mo-
tives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?, Review of Development
Economics , 10(2): 179-194.
Berthe´lemy J.C. and Tichit A. (2004), “Bilateral Donors Aid Allocation Decisions:
A Three-Dimensional Panel Analysis”, International Review of Economics and Fi-
nance, 13, 253-274.
Blundell R. and Bond S. (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in
Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87: 115-143.
Boone P. (1995), “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth”, London School
of Economics Working Paper, .
Boone P. (1995), “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, European Economic
Review 40(2): 289-329.
Borjas G.J. (1989), “Economic Theory and International Migration”, International
Migration Review, 23(3): 457-485.
159
Borjas G.J. (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, Journal of Economic Literature,
32: 1667-1717.
Burnside C. and Dollar D. (2000), “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Economic
Reiew, 90(4): 847-868.
Carrington W.J and Detragiache E. (1998), “How Big Is the Brain Drain?”, IMF
Working Paper, 98/102, Washington DC.
Casella A. and Eichengreen B. (1996),“Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?”,
The Economic Journal, 106: 605-609.
Chauvet L. and Guillaumont P. (2004), “Aid and Growth Revisited : Policy, Eco-
nomic Vulnerability and Political Instability”, in B. Tungodden, N. Stern, I. Kol-
stad (eds), Toward Pro-Poor Policies - Aid, Institutions and Globalization, World
Bank/Oxford University Press, New York, 111-131.
Chenery H.B. and Strout A.M. (1966), “Foreign Assistance and Economic Devel-
opment”, American Economic Review 56(4): 679-733.
Chenery H.B. and Eckstein P. (1970), “Development Alternatives for Latin Amer-
ica”, Journal of Political Economy, 78(4): 966-1006.
Claessens S., Cassimon D. and Van Campenhout B. (2007), “Empirical Evidence
on the New International Aid Architecture,” IMF Working Paper, WP/07/277.
Clague C., Keefer P., Knack S. and Olson M. (1997a), “Institutions and Eco-
nomic Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement,” In Clague C. (ed.),
Institutions and Economic Development, Johns Hopkins Press, 67-90.
Clague C., Keefer P., Knack S. and Olson M. (1997b), “Democracy, Autocracy,
and Institutions Supportive of Economic Growth,” In Clague C. (ed.), Institutions
and Economic Development, Johns Hopkins Press, 91-120.
Clark, X., Hatton, T. and Williamson J. (2002), “Explaining US immigration
1971-1998”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2): 335-342.
Cogneau, D. and Gubert F. (2005), “Migrations du Sud, Pauvrete´ et De´veloppe-
ment”, In E.M. Mouhoud (Ed.), Les nouvelles migrations, Paris: Editions Univer-
salis.
Collier P. and Dehn J. (2001), “Aid, Shocks and Growth”, World Bank Working
Paper, 2628, Washington DC.
160
Collier P. and Dollar D. (1999a), “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2041, Washington DC.
Collier P. and Dollar D. (1999b), “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, World
Bank Development Research Group, Washington DC.
Collier P. and Dollar D. (2001), “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How
Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Met International Development Goals”, World
Development, 29(11): 1787-1802.
Collier P. and Dollar D. (2002), “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, European
Economic Review, 46(8): 1475-1500.
Combes J.L., Guillaumont P., Guillaumont S., Guillaumont J. and Combes
Motel P. (2000), “Ouverture sur l’exte´rieur et instabilite´ des taux de croissance,”
Revue Franc¸aise d’Economie, 15: 3-33.
Dalgaard C. and Hansen H. (2001), “On Aid, Growth and Good Policies”, Journal
of Development Studies, 37(6): 17-41.
Dalgaard C., Hansen H. and Tarp F. (2004), “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and
Growth”, The Economic Journal, 114(496): 119-216.
Dayton-Johnson J. and Xenogiani T. (2007), “Inmmigration, de´veloppement et
arbitrages entres politiques”, Reveue d’Economie du De´veloppement, 2, 97.
De Melo, M., Denizer C., Gelb A. and Tenev S. (1997b), “Circumstance and
Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition Economies”, WWorld
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1866, Washington DC.
Devarajan S., Dollar D. and Holmgren T. (2001), “Aid and Reform in Africa.
Lessons from Ten Case Studies”, World Bank, Washington DC.
Dollar D. and Easterly W. (1999), “The Search for the Key: Aid, Investment and
Policies in Africa”, Journal of African Economies 8(4): 546-577.
Dollar D. and Svensson J. (2000), “What Explains the Success or Failure of Struc-
tural Adjustment Programs?,”The Economic Journal, 110: 894-917.
Dollar D. and Levin V. (2004), “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-
2003,”World Development, 34(12): 2034-2046.
Doucouliagos H. and Paldam M. (2008), “Aid Effectiveness on Growth: A meta
study”, European Journal of Political Economy, 24(1): 1-24.
161
Dudley L. and Montmarquette C. (1976), “A Model of the Supply of Bilateral
Foreign Aid”, American Economic Review, 66(1): 132-142.
Durbarry R., Gemmell N. and Greenway D. (1998), “New Evidence o the Impact
of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth”, CREDIT Research Paper, 98(8), University
of Nottingham.
Easterly W. (2007), “Are Aid Agencies Improving?,”, Economic Policy, 633-678.
Easterly W. (2006), “The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the
Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”, Penguin Press.
Easterly W. (2003), “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth”, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 13(3): 23-48.
Easterly W. (1999), “The Ghost of Financing Gap: Testing the Growth Model of
the International Financial Institutions”, Journal of Development Economics, (60)2:
423-438.
EBRD (1998a, 1999a, 2000a, 2001a, 2002a, 2003a, 2004), Transition Report, London.
Falcetti E., Raiser M., Stanfey P. (2002), “Defying the Odds: Initial Conditions,
Reforms and Growth in the First Decade of Transition”, Journal of Comparative
Economics, 30(2): 229-250.
Easterly W. and Levine R., (1997), “Africa’s growth tragedy: Politics and ethnic
divisions,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1203-1250.
Easterly W., Levine R. and Roodman D. (2003), “New Data, New Doubts: A
Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s “Aid, Policies, and Growth” (2000), American
Economic Review, 94(3), 774-780.
Easterly W. and Robelo S. (1993), “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Em-
pirical Investigation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3): 417-458.
Faini R. (2006), “Remittances and the Brain Drain,” IZA Discussion Papers, 2155,
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Faini, R. and Venturini A. (1993), “Trade, Aid and Migrations: Some Basic Policy
Issues”, European Economic Review, 37(2-3): 435-442.
Feyzioglu T., Swaroop V. and Zhu M. (1998), “A Panel Data Analysis of the
Fungibility of Foreign Aid”,World Bank Economic Review, 12(1), 29-58.
162
Fidrmuc J. and Tichit A. (2004), “Mind the Break! Accounting for Changing Pat-
terns of Growth during Transition”, William Davidson Institute Working Papers
Series 2004-643, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen
M. Ross Business School, revised.
Fischer S., Sahay R. and Vegh C.A. (1996),“Stabilisation and Growth in Transition
Economies: The Early Experience”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2): 45-66.
Fischer S. and Sahay R. (2000), “The Transition Economies After Ten Years”, NBER
Working Paper, 7664.
Fischer S. (1993), “The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth”, Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 32(3): 485-512.
Friedman M. (1958), “Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives”, In Bhagwati,
Jagdish and Richard Eckhaus (ed.), 1970, Foreign Aid, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Ghosh A.R. (1997), “Inflation in Transition Economies: How much? and Why?”, IMF
Working Paper, WP/97/80.
Gounder R. (1994), “Empirical Results of Aid Motivations: Australia’s Bilateral Aid
Program”, World Development, 22: 99-113.
Greene W.H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, 4e edition, Prentice Hall Ed., New York.
Greene W.H. (2004), “The Behaviour of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of Limited
Dependent Variables Models in the Presence of Fixed Effects”, Econometrics Journal,
7, 98-119.
Griffin K. and Enos J. (1970), “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences”
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18(3): 313-327.
Griffin K. (1970), “Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development”,
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 32.
Griswold D.T, “Migration, Globalization and the Spirit of Peter Bauer,”, Economic
Affairs 23: 20-26.
Guillaumont P. (1971), “L’absorption du capital”, Cujas, Paris.
Guillaumont P. (1994), “Politique d’ouverture et croissance e´conomique : les effets de
la croissance et de l’instabilite´ des exportations,” Revue d’Economie du De´veloppe-
ment, 1: 91-114.
163
Guillaumont P. (2001), “Ouverture, vulne´rabilite´ et de´veloppement”, Document de
Travail, E2001.03 de la se´rie Etudes et Documents.
Guillaumont P. (2001b), “Ouverture, vulne´rabilite´ et de´veloppement,” In Boudhiaf M.
et J.M. Siroen (eds.), Ouverture et de´veloppement e´conomique, Economica, Paris,
149-172.
Guillaumont P. and Chauvet L. (2004), “Aid effectiveness in an Unstable Environ-
ment”, mimeo, CERDI.
Guillaumont P. and Chauvet L. (2001), “Aid and Performance: A Reassessment”,
Journal of Development Studies, 37(6): 66-92.
Gunning J.W. (2001), “Rethinking Aid”, in B. Pleskovic and N. Stern (eds), Annual
World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2000, 125-144, World Bank,
Washington DC.
Hadjimichael M.T, Ghiura D., Mu¨hleisen M., Nord R., Uc¸er E.M. (1995),
“Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth, Savings, and Investment, 1986-1993”, IMF Occasional
Paper, 118, Washington DC.
Hansen H. and Tarp F. (1999), “The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”, mimeo, Develop-
ment Economics Research Group, University of Copenhagen.
Hansen H. and Tarp F. (2000), “Aid Effectiveness Disputed”, Journal of International
Development, 12(3): 375-398.
Hansen H. and Tarp F. (2001), “Aid and Growth Regressions”, Journal of Develop-
ment Economics, 64(2): 544-570.
Hatton T. and Williamson J.G. (1998), “The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and
Impact”, Oxford University Press, New York.
Hatton, T. and Williamson J.G. (2002), “What Fundamentals Drive World Mi-
gration?”, In G. Borjas and J. Crips (Eds.), Poverty, International Migration and
Asylum (15-38), Hampshire, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan for WIDER.
Havrylyshyn O., Izvorski I. and Van Rooden R. (1998), “Recovery and Growth in
Transition Economies 1990-1997 Stylized Regression Analysis”, IMF Working Paper,
98/141.
Havrylyshyn O. and Van Rooden R. (2003), “Institutions Matter in Transition
Economies, but so Do Policies”, Comparative Economic Studies, 45(1): 2-24.
164
Heybey B. and Murrell P. (1999), “The Relationship Between Economic Growth
and the Speed of Liberalization during Transition”, Journal of Policy Reform, 3(2):
121-137.
Hjertholm P. and White H. (2000), “Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective: Back-
ground and Trend”, In F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and Development, London and
New York, Routledge, 80-102.
Jaros J. (2001), “Decade in Transition Economies: Comparative Analysis of Economic
Growth,” Prague Economic Papers, 10(3): 253-77.
Jensen P.S. and Paldam M. (2006),“Can the New Aid-growth Models be replicated?”,
Working Paper, 17, Institute for Economics, University of Aarhus.
Karemera D., Iwuagwu Ogueldo V. and Davis B. (2000), “A Gravity Model
Analysis of International Migration to North America”, Applied Economics, 32:
1745-1755.
Katada S.N. (1997), “Two Aid Hegemons: Japanese-U.S. Interaction and Aid Alloca-
tion to Latin America and the Caribbean,”World Development 25: 931-45.
Kaufmann D., Kraay A. and Mastruzzi M. (2005), Governance Matters IV: Gov-
ernance Indicators for 1996-2004, World Bank Working Papers, 3630, Washington
DC.
Knack S. (2000), “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”, World Bank, Washington
DC.
Knack S. and Keefer P. (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests using Alternative Institutional Measures,”Economics and Politics, 7:
207-227
Kormendi R. and Meguire P.G. (1985), “Macroeconomic Determinants of Economic
Growth: Cross-Country Evidence”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 16: 141-163.
Kornai J., (2000), “What the Change of System from Socialism to Capitalism Does and
Does Not Mean,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1): 27-42.
Lahiri S. and Raimondos-Møller P. (2000), “Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid
Allocation”, Economic Journal, 110(2000): C62-79.
Lensink R. and Morrissey O. (1999), “Uncertainty of Aid Inflows and the Aid-
Growth Relationship”, CREDIT Research Paper, 99/3, University of Nottingham.
165
Lensink R. and White H. (2001), “Assessing Aid : A Manifesto for Aid in the 21st
Century?”, Oxford Development Studies, 28(1): 5-17.
Lensink R. and White H. (2001), “Are There Negative Returns to Aid”, The Journal
of Development Studies, 37(6): 42-65.
Levy V. (1987), “Does Concessionary Aid Lead to Higher Investment Rates in Low-
Income Countries?”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 69: 152-156.
Levy V. (1988),“Aid and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Recent Experience”, Eu-
ropean Economic Review, 32: 1777-1795.
Little I. M. D. and Clifford J. M. (1965), “International Aid”, George Allen and
Unwin Ltd, London.
Lougani P. and Sheets N. (1997), “Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Growth
in Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29: 381-99.
Lu S. and Ram R. (2001), “Foreign Aid, Government Policies and Economic Growth:
Further Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data for 1970-1993”, International Eco-
nomics, 54(1): 14-29.
Lucas R. E. B. (2005) “International Migration to the High Income Countries: Some
Consequences for Economic Development in the Sending Countries”, Revue d’Economie
du De´veloppement, 4: 123-171.
Maizels A. and Nissanke M.K. (1984), “Motivations for Aid to Developing Coun-
tries”, World Development 12(9): 879-900.
Mankiw G.N., Romer D. and Weil D.N. (1992), “A Contribution to the Empirics
of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107: 407-437.
Markusen J. R. (1983), “Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements,
Journal of International Economics, 14(3-4): 341-356.
Massey D. S., Arango J., Hugo G., Kouaouci A., Pelligrino A. and Taylor
J. E. (1998), Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End
of Millennium, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mavrotas G. (2003), “Assessing Aid Effectiveness in Uganda: An Aid-Disaggregation
Approach”, Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, U.K.
McGillivray M. (2003), “Modelling Aid Allocation: Issues, Approaches and Results”,
UNU-WIDER Discussion Paper, 2003/49.
166
McGillivray M. et Morrissey O. (2000), “Aid Fungibility in Assessing Aid: Red
Herring or True Concern?”, Journal of International Development, 12: 413-428.
McGillivray M. et Oczkowsky E. (1992), “A Two-Part Sample Selection Model of
British Bilateral Foreign Aid Allocation”, Applied Economics, 24: 1311-1319.
McGillivray M. and White H. (1993), “Explanatory Studies of Aid Allocation
among Developing Countries: A Critical Survey”, Institute of Social Studies Working
Paper, 148, The Hague.
McKinley R.D and Little R. (1979) “The US Aid Relationship: A Test of the
Recipient Need and Donor Interest Model”, Political Studies, 27(2): 236-50.
McKinley R.D and Little R. (1978a), “The French Aid Relationship: A Foreign
Policy Model of the Distribution of French Bilateral Aid, 1964-1970”, Development
and Change, 9: 459-478.
McKinley R.D and Little R. (1978b),“A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of
British Bilateral Aid, 1960-1970”, British Journal of Political Science, 8(3): 313-331.
Merlevede B. (2003),“Reform Reversals and Output Growth in Transition Economies”,
Economics of Transition, 11(4): 649-669.
Mosley P., Harrigan J. and Toye J. (1995), “Aid and Power”, 2e edition, 1, Rout-
ledge, London.
Mosley P., Hudson J. and Horrell S. (1987), “Aid, the Public Sector and the
Market in Less Developed Countries”, The Economic Journal, 97(387): 616-641.
Mosley P., Hudson J. and Horrell S., (1992), “Aid, the Public Sector and the
Market in Less Developed Countries: A Return to the Scene of the Crime”, Journal
of International Development, 4(2): 139-150.
Mundell R. A. (1957), “International Trade and Factor Mobility”, American Economic
Review, 47(3): 321-335.
Naude´ W. (2009), “The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Deveoping Countries”, UNU-
WIDER Discussion Paper, 2009/01.
Neumayer E., “The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on De-
velopment Assistance”, Routledge Studies in Development Economics, London.
Nunnenkamp P and Thiele R. (2006), “ Targeting Aid to the Neddy and Deserving:
Nothing but Promises?”, The World Economy, 1177-1201.
167
OECD, Development Assistance Committee, http://www.oecd.org/dac.
OECD (2006), “Migration, Aid and Trade: Policy Coherence for Development”, Policy
Brief, 28, Paris: OECD, Development Centre Studies .
Olson M. (1996), “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and
Others Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2): 3-24.
Olson M., Sarna N. and Swamy A. (2000), “Governance and Growth: A Simple
Hypothesis Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Productivity Growth,” Public
Choice, 102: 341-363.
Raiser M., Di Tommaso M. and Weeks M. (2001), “A Structural Model of Insti-
tutional Change: Evidence from the Transition Economies,”, EBRD Working Paper
, 60, London: EBRD.
O’Rourke K. H. and Williamson J. G. (1999), “Globalization and History”, Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
O’Rourke K. H. and Sinnott R. (2007), “Migration Flows: Political Economy of
Migration and the Empirical Challenges”, In Annual World Bank Conference on
Development Economics - Europe 2004: Economic Integration and Social Responsi-
bility, 91-114.
Ouellet E. (2005), “Guide d’e´conome´trie applique´e pour Stata,”, University of Mon-
treal.
Papanek G.F., (1972), “The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings
and Growth in Less Developed Countries”, The Economic Journal, 82: 934-950.
Parente S. and Prescott E. (2002), “Barriers to Riches,”Walras-Pareto Lectures,
MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Parsons C. R., Skeldon R., Walmsley T. L. and Winters L. A. (2007), “Quan-
tifying International Migration: A Database of Bilateral Migrant Stocks”, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4165, Washington DC.
Radelet S., (2004), “Aid Effectiveness and the Millennium Development Goals”, Center
for Global Development Working Paper, 39, Washington DC.
Radelet S., (2006), “Aid Primer on Foreign Aid”, Center for Global Development Work-
ing Paper, 92, Washington DC.
168
Radelet S., Clemens M. and Bhavnani R., (2006), “Aid and Growth: The Current
Debate and Some New Evidence”, in P. Isard, L. Lipschitz, A Mourmouras and B.
Yontcheva, eds., The Macroeconomic Management of Foreign Aid: Opportunities
and Pitfalls, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Radulescu R. and Barlow D., (2002) “The Relationship Between Policies and
Growth in Transition Countries,”, Economics of Transition, 10(3): 719-745.
Rahman M.A., (1968), “Foreign Capital and Domestic Savings: A Test of Haavelmo’s
Hypothesis with Cross-Country Data”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 50(1),
pp. 137-138.
Rajan R.G. and Subramanian A., (2005a), “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show?”, IMF Working Paper, 05/127, Washington DC.
Rajan R.G. and Subramanian A., (2005a), “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on
Growth?”, IMF Working Paper, 05/126, Washington DC.
Rajan R.G. and Subramanian A., (2008), “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-
Country Evidence Really Show?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics”, 90(4):
643-665.
Razin A. and Sadka E. (1995), “Welfare Migration: Is the Net Fiscal Burden a Good
Measure of Its Economic Impact on the Welfare of the Native Born Population?,”
NBER Working Papers, 10682.
Razin A., Sadka E. and Swagel P. (2002), “Tax burden and migration: a political
economy theory and evidence,” Journal of Public Economics, 85(2): 167-190.
Reichel R. (1995),“Development Aid, Savings and Growth in the 1980s: a Cross-section
Analysis”, Savings and Development, 19(3): 279-296.
Rodriguez F. and Rodrik D. (2001), “Trade Policy and Economic Growth : A
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” In Bernanke B. and K.S. Rogoff
(eds.), Macroeconomics Annual 2000, MIT Press for NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Rodrik D., (1996), “Understanding Economic Policy Reform”, Journal of Economic
Literature, 34(1): 9-41.
Roodman D. (2007), “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country
Empirics”, World Bank Economic Review, 21(2): 255-277.
Roodman D. (2009), “How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system
GMM in Stata”, Stata Journal 9(1): 86-136.
169
Roodman D. (2008), “A Note of Too Many Instruments”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics, 71(1): 135-158.
Rosenstein-Rodan P.N., (1961), “International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries”,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 43(2): 107-138.
Rotte R. and Volger M. (2000), “The Effects of Development on Migration: Theo-
retical Issues and New Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Population Economics, 13(3):
485-508.
Sachs J. (1994), “Life in Economic Emergency Room” In Williamson J. (ed), The Polit-
ical Economy of Policy Reform, Institute for International Economics, Washington
DC.
Sachs J. (2005), “The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time”, Har-
mondsworth, The Penguin Press, New York.
Sachs J. and Warner A. (1995), “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Inte-
gration”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1-118.
Schiff M. (2006), “Migration, Investment and Trade: Substitute or Complements?”
Paper presented at the AfD/EUDN Conference on “Migration and Development:
Mutual Benefits?”, Paris, http://www.eudnet.net/download/Schiff.pdf.
Siroe¨n J.M. (2000), “L’ouverture commerciale est-elle mesurable?”, mimeo.
Sjaastad L. A. (1962), “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration”, Journal of
Political Economy, 70(5): 80-93.
Snyder D. (1990), “Foreign Aid and Domestic Savings: A Spurious Correlation”, Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 39(1): 175-181.
Stark O., Helmenstein C. and Prskawetz A. (1997), “A brain gain with a brain
drain,” Economics Letters, 55: 227-34.
Stark O., Helmenstein C. and Prskawetz A. (1998), “Human capital depletion,
human capital formation, and migration: a blessing or a“curse”?” Economics Letters,
60(3): 363-367.
Stern N. (2002), “Making a Case for Aid”, In Wolfensohn J.D, Stern D., Goldin I.,
Rogers H. and Karlsson M., A Case for Aid. Building a Consensus for Development
Assistance, World Bank, Washington DC.
170
Stiglitz J. (2002), “Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehen-
sive Development Paradigm”Review of Development Economics, 6(2): 163-182.
Svensson J. (1998), “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking”, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper, 1880, 27.
Svensson J. (1999), “Aid, Growth and Democracy”, Economics and Politics, 11: 275-
297.
Tarp F. (2006) “Aid and Development”, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 13: 9-61.
Tarp F., Bach C.F., Hansen H. and Baunsgaard S. (1998), “Danish Aid Policy:
Theory and Empirical Evidence,” Discussion Paper 98/06, University of Copen-
hagen, Institute of Economics, Copenhagen.
Temple J., (1998), “Initial conditions, social capital and growth in Africa,” Journal of
African Economies, 7: 309-347.
Thorbecke E. (2000), “The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of
Foreign Aid, 1950-2000”, In Tarp F. (ed), Foreign Aid and Development, London
and New York, Routeledge, 17-47.
Trumball W.N. and Wall H.J. (1994), “Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with
Panel Data”, The Economic Journal, 104(425): 876-882.
Weisskopf T.E. (1972), “The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings
in Underdeveloped Countries”, Journal of International Economics, 2: 25-38.
Wildasin D.E. (1994), “Income Redistribution and Migration,”, Canadian Journal of
Economics, 27: 637-656.
White H. (1992a), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid : A Critical Sur-
vey”, Journal of Development Studies, 28(2): 163-240.
White H. (1992b), “What Do We Know about Aid’s Macroeconomic Impact? An
Overview of the Aid Effectiveness Debate”, Journal of International Development,
4(2): 121-137.
Windmeijer F. (2005), “A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient
tow-step GMM Estimators”, Journal of Econometrics, 26(1): 25-51.
Wolf H.C. (1999), “Transition Strategies: Choices and Outcomes”, Princeton Studies in
International Economics, 85, International Economics Section, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ.
171
Wooldridge J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT
Press.
World Bank (1998), “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why”, World
Bank Policy Research Report, 148, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.
World Bank (2002), “A Case for Aid: Building a Consensus for Development Assis-
tance”, Washington DC.
WTO (2004), “Coherence”, World Trade Report 2004, WTO, Geneva.
172
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Politiques d’aide dans les pays en transition: l’impact sur la croissance et la migration
Re´sume´
Cette the`se e´tudie la proble´matique de l’aide sous trois angles comple´mentaires: l’impact de l’aide sur la
croissance (chapitre 1 ) , les crite`res de leur allocation, (chapitre 2 ) ainsi que la relation entre l’aide et la
migration dans le cadre du de´bat sur la cohe´rence des politiques au services de de´veloppement. (chapitre
3 ). Cette the`se contribue e´galement au de´bat sur la conditionnalite´ de l’aide en ce qui concerne la qualite´
des politiques macroe´conomiques, et des reformes structurelles et institutionnelles. Ainsi, nos re´sultats
montrent un impact positif de l’aide en termes de croissance, mais ils rejettent l’hypothe`se de condition-
nalite´. La qualite´ de politiques e´conomiques, et l’avancement des reformes n’est pas ne´cessairement un
facteur d’efficacite´ de l’aide. Nos re´sultats montrent e´galement que les conditions initiales joue un roˆle
important dans le processus d’ajustement macroe´conomique, et affecte la croissance. De plus, il ressort
que dans les pays avec des conditions initiales mauvaises, l’aide est plus efficace. Ne´anmoins, l’effet des
conditions initiales diminuent avec le temps, lorsque la transition avance. Cette the`se contribue aussi
au de´bat sur les de´terminants de l’allocation de l’aide, en mettant en avant le roˆle de la bonne gouver-
nance, conside´re´e comme un signal de la manie`re efficace dont l’aide est utilise´e et de l’ame´lioration des
strate´gies d’allocation d’aide de bailleurs de fonds. Cette the`se enfin, participe au de´bat sur la ne´ces-
site´ d’imple´menter de fac¸on cohe´rente des politiques au service du de´veloppement vis-a`-vis des pays en
de´veloppement, en e´tudiant la relation entre l’aide et la migration. Nous montrons dans ce contexte que
l’aide et la migration sont des substitutes uniquement pour les pays receveurs dont le revenu par habitant
de´passe un certain seuil ($7300 US PPP prix constant 2000). Pour les pays en dessous de ce seuil, une
augmentation du revenu suite a` un politique ge´ne´reuse d’aide stimulerait plutoˆt la migration au lieu de la
re´duire. Nous soulignons ainsi l’importance d’imple´menter de manie`re cohe´rente les politiques au service
du de´veloppement et la ne´cessite´ de s’interroger sur les effets potentiellement contradictoires.
Mots-cle´s : Aide publique au de´veloppement, croissance e´conomique, gouvernance, migration, e´conomie
de la transition, e´conome´trie des donne´es de panel, e´conomies d’Europe Centrale et Orientale.
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This thesis addresses aid in transition economies with regard to its effectiveness in enhancing growth
(chapter 1 ), the allocation criteria (chapter 2 ), as well as its relationship with migration in the context
of the policy coherence for development (chapter 3 ). This thesis contributes to the debate on aid condi-
tionality with respect to the quality of macroeconomic policies, and of structural policy and institutional
reforms. We identify a positive impact of aid on growth, but reject the conditionality issue. Aid does not
necessarily perform better in a sound policy environment. The same goes for structural policy reforms
and institutions. Our results indicate that a recipient’s initial conditions play an important role in the
process of macroeconomic adjustment and restructuring; furthermore, it appears that in countries with
bad initial conditions aid is more effective in enhancing growth. However, the effect of initial conditions
seems to decrease over time. This thesis adds to the literature on the criteria of aid allocation and the
issue of donors’ motivations for providing aid, while stressing, amongst the aid allocation criteria, the
role of governance, considered as a signal of aid being put to good use, and, consequently, of improving
aid allocation patterns. Finally, this thesis takes part to the debate about the necessity of a joint imple-
mentation of development policies vis-a`-vis developing countries, by studying aid in relation to migration.
We show that aid and migration are substitutes above a threshold of about $7300 US per capita (PPP
2000 prices). For countries below this threshold, increases in income per capita, as a consequence of
efficient aid policy, initially stimulate rather than dampen emigration; thus, for these countries, there is a
trade-off between aid and migration policies. By identifying this threshold, we underline the importance
of a coherent implementation of these policies, while considering their potential shortcomings.
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